1. HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT
1.1 General Characteristics
1.1.1 Ontological Differentiation
1.1.2 Unity in Diversity
1.2 Sein und Zeit
1.2.1 From the Dasein to Being
1.2.2 Unauthenticity and Authenticity
1.3 Later Works
1.3.1 From Being to the Dasein
1.3.2 Alètheia, Pseudos and Lèthè
2.1 Mysticism as Such
2.1.1 In Search for a Definition
2.1.2 Etymological Analysis
2.2 The three Basic Elements of Mysticism
2.2.1 The Transcendent
2.2.2 The Mystic
2.2.3 The Teaching
2.3 The two Moments in Mysticism
2.3.1 The Mystical Basic Attitude
2.3.2 The Mystical Experience
3. A HEIDEGGERIAN MYSTICISM
3.1 Phenomenology of the Essence of Mysticism
3.2 Phenomenology of the Mystical Basic Attitude
3.3 Phenomenology of the Mystical Experience
Titles of works, for instance of movies, books or – as in this case – master thesis’s, are both attuned and attuning. Attuned is a title to the content of the regarded work. A title mentions the work, and in that mentioning a trace of the essence of the content is to be found. It is this mentioning with the in it contained trace of the essence of the content, the title, which is at the same time also attuning; namely with regards to the possible viewer or reader. For this one is by the title attuned to the essence of the content of the work. It is then consequently against the background of this attuning that notion is taken of the concrete content of the work. The attuning of the title is hereby an attuning to a questioning and an open attitude. It attunes to a questioning for the essence which the title mentioning presents, and it attunes at the same time to an openness for the taking notion of this through the concrete content. When the title attunes to a being closed with regards to the content – for this is also possible – then can instead of an attuning be spoken of a distuning. In that case shall the work usually not be taken at hand. Because the reader of these words however arrived already beyond the taking notice of the title and started with the exploration of the content of this thesis it is likely that in this case the title has attuned and not distuned.
Now the title of this consideration reads: ‘A Heideggerian Mysticism’. This title mentions and carries within itself the essence of this consideration, and the special question to which this title attunes is the question for the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism. Here we see: it doesn’t regard the question for a comparison between Heidegger’s thought and mysticism, not the question for which mystical elements can be found in Heidegger’s thought and not the question whether Heidegger can be seen as a mystic (although hints as answers to these questions may implicitly be present in this consideration). It is the question for a Heideggerian mysticism. A Heideggerian mysticism; so also not the question for the Heideggerian mysticism. This consideration is thus not completely normative in the sense that here a sketch shall be given of how Heideggerian mysticism should look like in any case. Rather it regards the question for how mysticism can be designed and understood from or through Heidegger’s thought, and how a thus designed and understood mysticism then can look like. It is this question to which the title attunes and it is this question which will resound in the background in the further elaboration. Also is that for which this question questions the essence which will be present in the further thematising and concrete elaboration.
The above regards the main question and research question in this consideration. ‘How can mysticism be designed and understood from or by Heidegger’s thought?’ This main question however also carries within itself sub-questions, and the putting of the main question by itself calls forth these sub-questions. Thus the question for a Heideggerian mysticism calls forth for instance the question for the Heideggerian. We may have heard of Eastern mysticism, Western mysticism, Hinduistic mysticism, Islamic mysticism, Christian mysticism, Rhineland mysticism and possibly also about many other kinds of mysticism, but ‘Heideggerian mysticism’ shall not occur in a general accepted summarization or division of mysticisms. This shall thus call forth the sub-question for the Heideggerian. What makes something, for instance mysticism, Heideggerian? The Heideggerian shall without doubt have to do with the philosopher Martin Heidegger and with his thought. With this perhaps already much has been said, but at the same time little or nothing contentual elaborated. And the question for the Heideggerian exactly does ask for a further and a more elaborate thematising of it. Thus shall Heidegger’s thought be put central in the first chapter of this consideration to give in this way an idea of the Heideggerian in a Heideggerian mysticism. Together with the question for the Heideggerian comes to the fore the question for mysticism as such. Of what must we think or in which direction must we let our thoughts go when something is mentioned as ‘mystic’? This also asks further than a simply mentioning for a more elaborate thematising. This then shall be done in the second chapter, where we shall provide ourselves a view on mysticism as such and on several aspects which we can recognize in it. In the third chapter conclusively we take the above sub-questions back into their whole to against the background of the main question design and make understandable mysticism from the Heideggerian, to further thematise a Heideggerian mysticism and to elaborate the essence of it in its whole. The elaborating of the essence of this consideration in its whole does not mean that everything shall be explicated what can be objectively seen and explicated about the subject. Rather it is so that especially in the third chapter the essence of this whole consideration can be presented in its wholeness. This means: especially in the third chapter shall be anticipated to the wholeness of this consideration, on its essence. Because it is however not meant here to Heideggerian mystify a Heideggerian mysticism we shall after these to questioning attuning words in a pragmatic way make a true start with the concrete elaboration.
In the introduction we saw that the question for a Heideggerian mysticism brings with it the sub-question for the Heideggerian. To deepen out and thematise that question shall in this chapter Heidegger and his thought be thematised. Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century and may without doubt be included in the list with names of great philosophers from the history of Western philosophy.1 A history in which he did not really include himself; he didn’t considered his oeuvre to belong to philosophy but to what he named distinguishingly ‘thought’.2 This makes the need to bring to the forth the characteristics of Heidegger’s thought only greater. To do this shall in the first paragraph of this chapter some of the most important characteristics be mentioned and still rather generally be treated. In the two following paragraphs shall these characteristics however be anchored in more concrete descriptions of Heidegger’s thought. The space to do this very elaborate lacks here, for enough space must be saved for the thematising of the main question in chapter 3. It is there that mysticism eventually shall be made understandable from Heidegger’s thought, and there also can the specific of Heidegger’s thought be further and more elaborately be brought to the fore in a thematically way (namely with as leading theme ‘mysticism’). The goal of this chapter then is also especially to sketch a general image of Heidegger’s thought and to give an idea of it. This to sketch the context from where, or by which, in chapter 3 mysticism can be Heideggerian designed and made understandable.
1.1.1 Ontological Differentiation3
Heidegger’s thought may very concisely be summarized in the words which he wrote in Sein und Zeit: “The Being of the beings ‘is’ itself no being.”4 Metaphysics has forgotten the question for Being as such according to Heidegger and thematises Being as if it were itself a being, and then the highest being.5 Examples of such a metaphysical consideration of Being as highest being regard: the idea of the good with Plato, the unmoved mover with Aristotle, God with the middle agers and the human subjects since Descartes. The whole history of Western philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche has been governed by this metaphysical thought.6 Now Heidegger wants to go beyond those metaphysics and philosophy (metaphysics and philosophy are for Heidegger exchangeable terms)7 and leave these eventually to themselves by taking up in his thought again the question for Being.8 Thus Heidegger aims in his thought to leave metaphysical philosophy and ask the question for the sense of Being.9 What Heidegger hereby in fact aims at is an ontological differentiation. Being is ontologically different from the beings. To bring that ontological differentiation to the fore, to ask the question for Being and to thematise Being Heidegger makes use of both form and content. His works are both in form and content characteristic. In a certain sense can form and content in Heidegger’s thought not really be separated. For Heidegger writes contentual about the thought that conquers metaphysics, and he does this in a form which exactly constitutes that metaphysics conquering thought. Although thus form and content in Heidegger’s thought can be difficultly separated may with a separate bringing to the fore of the characteristics of those two the specific of that thought be depicted more clearly.
Then what typifies the form of Heidegger’s thought? Approximately it can be stated that Heidegger thematises the ontological differentiation in a form which borders on poetry10 and mysticism11 (for according to Heidegger it is in disciplines like mysticism and especially poetry that an experience of Being is the case).12 This thematising in that specific form he does among other ways through the use of countless neologisms.13 These neologisms may be already existing words which by Heidegger however get assigned an unusual and often an ambiguous meaning (for instance ‘Dasein’ and ‘Sage’), or by Heidegger new created words on base of already existing words (for instance ‘Geworfenheit’ and ‘Eigentlichkeit’). He also makes use in his later works (such as for instance in ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie’)14 of in meanings difficult to phantom and recover terms that often sound very mystical or poetic (for instance ‘der letzte Gott’ and ‘die Zukünftigen’). Hereby Heidegger lets himself be inspired by poets, and then especially by Hölderlin,15 and by the pre-Socratic Greeks.16 He then usually works out his thought through on the one hand interpretations of poems of Hölderlin (which are considered to present a certain originality), and on the other hand own etymological analyses which carry him back to according to him original meanings of pre-Socratic Greek use of language. These analyses are thereby considered to bare an originality in the metaphysical use of language. Further in this consideration we shall encounter lots of examples concerning this.
Contentual it is so that Heidegger thematises and comes to an ontological differentiation by considering Being as the origin of the beings which is always present in them and usually, but not always, is covered itself by those beings. So: Being is the origin and ground of every being,17 Being is as that ground always present in the beings, Being is usually covered by the beings,18 but Being is not necessarily and always covered by the beings. It is this think figure of originality and covering which every time returns in Heidegger’s thought about metaphysics. For the thought by traditional metaphysics of Being as being a being is by Heidegger considered as a thought which finds its ground in Being itself, but as derivation of it at the same time covers that Being and the question for it.19 Being is the ground for metaphysical thought, for after all it is Being from which the beings derive their being. No being is without Being. Even a highest being, the central subject of metaphysics, must when it ‘is’ derive its being from Being. With that finds as said thus the metaphysical thematising of Being as highest being its origin and ground in Being itself. An origin and ground which is by metaphysics at the same time covered by not thematising Being as Being itself but as highest being. Heidegger then considers metaphysics as first philosophy also as the root of the tree of philosophy which itself however is rooted in the ground of Being.20 That the original thought of Being does not necessarily need to be covered by metaphysics also clearly comes to the fore in Heidegger’s thought. For Heidegger stays especially in his later philosophy concerned with the thematising of a new beginning where the leap to such a thought of Being can be made.21
Equal original with the above sketched characteristic of originality and covering is in Heidegger’s thought also always a certain wholeness in play which stands in close relation with the originality of Being. Heidegger uses for the indicating of this wholeness terms like ‘world as such’ [Welt als solche] and ‘beings as a whole’ [Seinde im Ganzen]. This wholeness then must explicitly not be thought as a sum of parts, which is the way in which metaphysics thematises the whole. For the wholeness which Heidegger aims at is never concrete, graspable and at hand given, but is as background always present as ground of the concrete, separate and meaningful beings. This wholeness can be considered as the horizon against which background separate beings can appear meaningful, whereby the horizon itself however is never concrete and meaningful at hand.22 So the parts are thereby understood against the background and in the context of the whole in which they stand. It is thus by grace of that wholeness, which is ungraspable in the background, that the separate beings can be disclosed and understood.23 A sentence in a linguistic work (to elucidate the think figure with a concrete example) derives its specific meaning from the whole of that work, in which context that sentence is contained. However for the reader who reads the regarded sentence is that work only given at the background and not as at hand and rounded off whole. If the reader wants to relate to the work in its whole then he must so to speak let his relation to the concrete particular sentences go and transfer his concrete attention or focus to a considering of the whole.
In this then the close relationship is shown between Being and the world-as-such, between origin and whole. For Being and world-as-such are both (though not necessary) covered when the meaningful beings step up to the foreground. This close relationship shall later in this chapter and after that in chapter 3 increasingly clearer and more concrete be brought to the fore. For now it is of importance to note that originality and wholeness in relation to the content of Heidegger’s thought are two important characteristics with which Heidegger wants to come to the ontological difference between beings and Being.
When we concisely summarize the above words it turns out that the main characteristic of Heidegger’s thought is that of ontological difference. This Heidegger wanted to achieve in relation to the form of his thought through neologisms and mystical terms that bring his thought at the border with poetry and mysticism. Contentually he thematised the ontological difference through a basic structure of originality and covering. In that structure does the originality not necessarily need to be covered, although this usually is the case. In this covering this originality however still stays present as ground for that covering. In close relation with this originality as ground Heidegger then also thinks a wholeness which as horizon makes the unclosing and the understanding of the separate (and covering) beings possible. In short; in Heidegger’s thought we find the main characteristic of ontological difference, which regarding form is worked out through neologisms and poetic / mystic / mystical use of language, and which regarding content is worked out in the structure of originality and covering in which a notion of an original wholeness is included. It are these characteristics which will be further elucidated and concretised in the following two paragraphs (1.2 and 1.3) where successively Heidegger’s early thought at the time of Sein und Zeit and his later thought of after Sein und Zeit shall be subject of consideration.
1.1.2 Unity in Diversity
Before turning to a concretisation of the general and abstract thematised characteristics should here first be gone deeper into the above mentioned earlier and later thought of Heidegger. For when is spoken of Heidegger’s thought a discernment is made between his earlier thought at the time of his best known work ‘Sein und Zeit’ and his later works of after that, in which period a numerous amount of other works were written. For after Sein und Zeit a turnaround takes place in Heidegger’s thought. That such a turnaround has taken place is not a subject of discussion among academics. Also Heidegger himself mentions this turnaround, namely as ‘die Kehre’,24 a term which by academics is still often used to refer to this turnaround. Still a subject of discussion is the question whether this Kehre is a turnaround of or a turnaround within Heidegger’s thought; whether die Kehre regards a radical turnaround of Heidegger’s thought itself or a turnaround within a unity of his thought. There are important signs which decide this discussion in the advantage of the last assumption; the assumption that die Kehre takes place within a unity of Heidegger’s thought way. In the first place did Heidegger himself explicitly state that after die Kehre his point of view of Sein und Zeit is not deserted.25 It is an utterance which we see acknowledged in his works which tirelessly keep handling the same theme: “Being is never a being.”26 And also the mentioned characteristics stay present both in Sein und Zeit and in his later works.
Within this given unity of Heidegger’s thought we do however find a clear difference in his concrete elaboration of the mentioned characteristics. Where in Sein und Zeit the being-human (by Heidegger indicated with ‘Dasein’)27 is the point of departure to ask the question of Being, there this becomes in Heidegger’s later works Being itself.28 These two points of departure and the elaborations thereof however can be considered as being complementary to each other, thus claims not in the last place Heidegger himself.29 It then is also on basis of the mentioned directions that here shall be departed from the unity of Heidegger’s thought. This unity shall further become clear when connections can be laid between the point of departure in Heidegger’s earlier thought (Dasein) and his later thought (Being). This shall happen in the coming two paragraphs, near the concretization of the earlier mentioned characteristics. With the thematising of Sein und Zeit shall the road be gone from the Dasein to Being, and with the thematising of the later works shall the road be gone from Being to the Dasein. Although in this sub-paragraph already enough arguments have been given to come to a decision, shall in the thematising of the two mentioned roads the unity in diversity in Heidegger’s thought as plausible point of departure be able to show itself clearer and more concrete.
1.2.1 From the Dasein to Being
Two tasks were set out for this paragraph. On the one side it must be shown how Heidegger in Sein und Zeit walks the road from the Dasein to Being. This on behalf of the thinking of a unity in Heidegger’s earlier and later thought. On the other side it must be made concrete how the in sub-paragraph 1.1.1 mentioned characteristics in Sein und Zeit are to be recognized. This to not let these characteristics float in abstract propositions but to anchor them concretely in Heidegger’s thought, or to point them out. The first task shall be executed in this sub-paragraph and the second in the next. That we have to be concise was already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. How does Heidegger, so we ask thus the question here, in Sein und Zeit find his way from the Dasein to Being?
As mentioned in the previous paragraph Heidegger aims in Sein und Zeit to ask the question of Being from the point of departure from the being-human. It is then also there that Heidegger introduces his specific term ‘Dasein’ for that being human. A term which is preserved also in the entirety of his later works. This term, which can also be read as ‘Da-sein’, expresses for Heidegger perfectly the way of being of the being-human. The Dasein (by Mark Wildschut in Dutch translated as ‘erzijn’,30 and in English translatable as ‘being-there’) is namely always there. The Dasein is always already in the world; with the things and with the others.31 ‘Dasein’ is ‘being-in-the-world’ [In-der-Welt-sein].From this Da-sein also speaks Heidegger’s phenomenological method. Heidegger does not think in metaphysical subject-object relations but takes subject and object as contained in the occurrence of phenomena. Phenomenology he then understands as that which shows itself from itself and as the revealed.32 The revelation of the things and the being-in-the-world are equal-original with the Dasein. For this being-in-the-world of the Dasein is grounded in the given that the Dasein encountering beings in the world are always unclosed to him. ‘Unclosedness’ [Erschlossenheit] means that the Dasein always understands [versteht] the encountering beings and the world in a specific way.33 But the beings derive that unclosedness only from Being itself (without Being the beings are not), and thus belongs more original than the understanding of beings to the Dasein also an understanding of Being.34 This is not an understanding of one or the other transcendent given but exactly an intimate understanding of the own being.35 This understanding of the own being is however also again not a deep introspection in which the world is left behind. Being-in-the-world and understanding of Being fall together as the original basic aspects of the way of being of the Dasein. The being which matters for this being in its being is being its ‘there’.36 When for instance the Dasein is with a scissor and with another whose hair he cuts with that scissor against a pay, then he shall equal-originally with this way of being-in-the-world understand himself as being a haircutter.
The unclosing of the beings and of Being thus carries within itself the being-in-the-world and the understanding of Being, and this as one way of being of the Dasein. Now this unclosing is however, as the example of the haircutter already indicates, never an indifferent happening. For it always takes place through a certain attuning [Stimmung] and enfindingness [Befindlichkeit].37 This enfindingness can be understood as a specific, attuned and unclosing attitude or way of being. In German ‘Befindlichkeit’ simply means ‘mood’, however Heidegger recognizes in his conception of enfindingness also the finding oneself and the finding. For in the enfindingness the Dasein finds himself attuned in-the-world and has in a specific attuned way unclosed and found himself.38 Enfindingness is an important core concept in Sein und Zeit but also keeps playing an important role in the later works (be it perhaps more implicitly than in Sein und Zeit).
The nature of this specific enfindingness from which the world and the Dasein thus are unclosed in a specific way is itself however grounded in again another given, namely in ‘thrownness’ [Geworfenheit].39 ‘Thrownness’ here basically indicates the tradition and the personal history from which the world and the Dasein are unclosed. The Dasein is always already very specifically thrown in the world from the cultural setting and the personal context in which he was raised. He understands the world and himself from his cultural roots. However besides thrown in the world the Dasein is also thrown in a designing [Entwerfen].40 This designing relates to the Dasein’s understanding of himself and the possibilities on which he from this understanding designs himself.41 This notion of possibility is crucial in Heidegger’s thought because therein possibility is seen as higher than reality.42 For being is by Heidegger not thought as actuality but from the Dasein’s thrown designing understood possibility.43 Something ‘is’ from its design. One and the same being or object can be designed on different possibilities. A nail file shall by a pedicure be designed in the meaning coherence of the caretaking of nails, however can by a prisoner be designed as an instrument for escape from his prison. Dependent upon the tradition, the environment and the attuning can objects in different ways be understood in their being. The things which make out the world and equal-original the in the world being being (the Dasein) are from the cultural roots and the context specifically designed on their being from possibilities. In this way is in Sein und Zeit then from the point of departure of the Dasein eventually arrived at Being (as possibility), and this through the Dasein’s way of being of the thrown designing on the possibility according to which he understands and uncloses himself and the world.
1.2.2 Unauthenticity and Authenticity
With the previous sub-paragraph are the ontological difference of Being and the contentual characteristics of the asking of the question of Being in Heidegger’s early thought of Sein und Zeit already somewhat concretized and has also the characteristic of the form which Heidegger handles already come to the fore in diverse neologisms. What until now however has not become recognizable regards the structure of originality and covering, and this shall be put central here. This then asks for a thematising of unauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit] and authenticity [Eigentlichkeit], for it is therein that in Sein und Zeit this structure can be recognized. We trace the structure from the above analysis of the Dasein. The world is, as we saw, for the Dasein, by the Dasein and as the Dasein44 unclosed from a thrown designing on the understood possibility. This thrown designing is itself in its specification however rooted in again another specific given. In his everydayness [Alltäglichkeit], as the Dasein usually is, regards this given ‘the they’ [das Man].45 The they can be understood as the others in their generality with which the Dasein is in-the-world. It regards so to speak the general ruling public opinion. Here everyone is the other and nobody is himself.46 It is here that the Dasein is set in the mode of being of unauthenticity.47 This unauthentic way of being in which the Dasein is lost in the they is in a certain sense a way of being which covers. For in this way of being it is that Being is covered by a preoccupation with beings. It regards a way of being in which a consideration of ontological difference is not the case because the question of Being here is not asked. Heidegger then speaks in this context also of unburdening of being.48 The they unburdens the Dasein so to speak from asking for the being of his own being. For in the ground of his being the Dasein is designing on possibilities, and it is exactly the designing which the they takes over from the Dasein and of which it unburdens him. For the they designs in the unauthenticity for the Dasein his possibilities. This unburdening is thereby also a covering, for the by the they handed over possibility covers the original possibility on which the Dasein can design himself in his ground.49
Now in the above mentioned ground is the Dasein set when he is in an authentic way. ‘Ground’ here is a suitable term, for as Being lies at the ground of the beings, so lies authenticity at the ground of unauthenticity. The understanding of authenticity as ground however becomes only accessible from the analysis so far. Therein the Dasein was sketched primarily as an on possibilities designing and Being understanding being, which usually is designing from the they. To the possibilities of the Dasein on which he designs himself belongs however also the outmost possibility of his can-be [Sein-können]. And that outmost possibility regards the own death. For further than death do the possibilities of the Dasein not reach. With this reaching out to the outmost can-be and the own death the Dasein touches equal-original his own wholeness (for the wholeness of his life stretches from his birth to his death).50 Now in this anticipating of the wholeness of his can-be it is that the Dasein is set in his original, authentic way of being.51 The designing himself on the own possibilities does now not take place anymore from the they, but the Dasein is by the anticipation of his outmost can-be taken back from that they and thrown in a designing himself on his most-own [eigenste] possibility.52 Here the Dasein has taken on himself his own being (which always regards the being from a possibility, for Being must be understood as possibility). This most-own possibility can thereby also be understood as possibility as such.53 This means that the Dasein in the authenticity acknowledges his most-own possibility also as possibility. And because Being must be understood from possibility it also becomes understandable in this way how for the Dasein in authenticity Being is unclosed as Being (namely acknowledged as possibility). This makes the earlier mentioned characteristics clear. Being is the original ground of the beings. But Being is possibility. When set in his most-own possibility the Dasein is set for possibility as possibility (so for Being as Being), and is the Dasein set in an authentic way. A way of being which is covered when he lets himself being unburdened by a designing from the they. Then Being as possibility is covered and is a preoccupation with beings the case. The Dasein here doesn´t concern himself with his possibility as possibility but lets himself being carried away by the they from where the inner-worldly beings receive their general and obvious meanings. The wholeness which in Sein und Zeit is therewith equal-originally thought is the wholeness of the Dasein; the wholeness of his own life. But because the Dasein is equal-originally with the world, the wholeness of the Dasein is equal-original with the wholeness of world-as-such [Welt-als-solche]. Here the meanings of the inner-worldly beings which the they delivered to the Dasein have sunk away because equal-originally the Dasein is taken back from the they.
Now this original way of being Heidegger understands also as a specific enfindingness which he calls ‘Angst’ [anxiety].54 This anxiety must be distinguished from fear [Furcht]. Fear is always fear of a specific being while anxiety regards an undetermined anxiety for world-as-such.55 In chapter 3 this original way of being shall be addressed elaborately and worked out further. For the forming of a general impression of Heidegger’s thought here with regards to Sein und Zeit has been written enough. And in that writing then are also the contentual characteristics of originality and covering and of wholeness, as also the formal characteristic through the used neologisms, brought to the fore.
1.3.1 From Being to the Dasein
Just like for the previous paragraph are for this paragraph two tasks set out. In this paragraph must for the sake of the thought of a unity in Heidegger’s earlier and later thought be made clear how Heidegger in his works of after Sein und Zeit goes the way from Being to the Dasein. Also it must be made concrete how the in sub-paragraph 1.1.1 mentioned characteristics are recognizable in Heidegger’s later work. Thus to take the characteristics out of the abstract and show them concretely in Heidegger’s thought. This latter shall be done in the next paragraph, and here it shall be brought to the fore how Heidegger in his later thought goes the way from Being to the Dasein.
We earlier already saw that in Sein und Zeit the point of departure is at the Dasein to come from there to the asking of the question of Being. Although the concept ‘Dasein’ in Heidegger’s later thought certainly not disappears is there as point of departure for the asking of the question of Being thus Being itself taken. As in Sein und Zeit Being came in sight from the Dasein there comes in Heidegger’s later works the Dasein in sight from Being. Exemplary this given shows itself in Heidegger’s concept of ‘Ereignis’. For in the Ereignis it is that Being gives itself to the Dasein and that Being is unclosed for the Dasein. In itself ‘Ereignis’ is a German word which has the meaning of ‘happening’, and indeed does Heidegger think in the Ereignis the unclosing of Being as something which happens. Heidegger’s conception of ‘Ereignis’ however goes further than that. For in ‘Ereignis’ the word ‘Eignen’ reverberates, and this has the meaning of ‘making one’s own’. This refers recognizably to the Dasein for who in the Ereignis Being becomes his.56 However with this ereignen also an Enteignis [expropriation] takes place.57 Namely the Ereignis hides as Ereignis the given that it ereignet, hides the given that Being is being brought out of the hidden into the unhidden.58 In the next sub-paragraph shall this hiddenness with regards to Being be further elucidated. Further then in ‘Ereignis’ also the word ‘Eigen’ reverberates, and in this clearly the kinship can be recognized of the Eigentlichkeit from Sein und Zeit with the Ereignis from the later work. Eigentlichkeit and Ereignis regard both the same moment, be it that the first is thought from the Dasein and the second from Being.
That Ereigenis thus must be thought as original and authentic seems, given what was discussed in relation to the structure of originality and covering, to imply that Being gives itself not necessarily as Being but shall do this in the everydayness in a covering way. Heidegger acknowledges this in his later thought. Also thought from Being is in the everydayness a being lost in the surrounding beings the case.59 There, just as in the unauthentic moment in Sein und Zeit, the question of Being is not asked.60
Important in the bringing to the fore of Being as point of departure in Heidegger’s later thought is also the concept ‘Geschick’. In Sein und Zeit, after a deepening analysis of the Dasein, the choice as resolve [Entschlossenheit] is still put very central as answer to the question what may be the reason for the being of the Dasein in an authentic way.61 However because this resolve in the moment of authenticity regards a (on the own death) anticipating resolve is here the timeliness brought into play. And it is this timeliness exactly which Heidegger relates to the fate [Schicksal] of the Dasein.62 The Dasein’s anticipating and timely running ahead of the own death and the own wholeness makes the resolved chosen most-own possibility understandable as the Dasein’s fate.63 For someone’s most-own possibility which can be his only true possibility is someone’s fate. But this fate of the Dasein is closely related to what Heidegger calls ‘historicality’ [Geschichtlichkeit].64 For the Dasein’s fate is contained in the collective destined fate of the people to which he belongs. This collective destined fate regards the whole of the individual destined fates, and Heidegger indicates this with the term ‘order of fate’ [Geschick].65 The order of fate of a people is thus closely related to the individual fate of the Dasein who belongs thereto, and the taking on himself of this fate by the Dasein (when he anticipates to the own death) is for the people then also of historical meaning.
Where in Sein und Zeit the fate, the order of fate and the historicality is thought from the analysis of the Dasein, there are these in the later work thought from Being itself. ‘Geschick’ Heidegger now reads as ‘Ge-schick’ whereby ‘schick’ (‘schicken’ means ‘sending’) indicates that in the order of fate there is something which is being sent by Being.66 Heidegger speaks in this context of a roaming [wesen] of Being.67 In the sending itself, Being roams. Whether subsequently Being sends itself as Being itself or covered depends in Heidegger’s later thought thus primarily on Being itself. The Dasein cannot bring about the Ereignis himself and can at the most keep an open place therefor.68 The term which Heidegger uses for that open place is ‘Lichtung’. For ‘Lichtung’ indicates in German an open place in the woods where the light can fall in, and this image of the (possible) falling in of light in the open place in the woods Heidegger adopts in his thought about the lighting of Being in the by the Dasein open held place.69 That Being not necessarily Ereignet itself, that Being not necessarily is lighted as Being but also can give itself covered as being and therewith also can withhold itself as Being is something which Heidegger indicates with ‘secret’ [Geheimnis].70 Nevertheless the Dasein can keep himself open for Being as Being, independent whether Being sends itself in an original way or covered as being. This keeping open of the Dasein for the secret that Being can send itself in an original way or covered is by Heidegger indicated with ‘resignation’ [Gelassenheit].71 This resignation can be understood as a form of enfindingness. As there is an openness in the anxiety for Being whereby Being uncloses itself, there is in the resignation also an openness for Being. This however without Being giving and unclosing itself necessarily as Being.72
In chapter 3 concepts like ‘Ereignis’, ‘Geschick’ and ‘Gelassenheit’ shall be elucidated still further. Here their mentioning had the mark of the sketching of the road from Being to the Dasein in Heidegger’s later thought. Being sends itself covered or not in the Geschick or order of fate in the openness which the Dasein in his ground has for Being as Lichting. That Being gives itself covered as being or not and therewith withholds itself as Being is the secret for which the Dasein however always can hold himself open in resignation. The ontological difference of the asking of the question of Being as also the characteristic form have therewith come clearly to the fore. Also the structure of originality and covering is already recognizable. This latter can however in the next sub-paragraph be set sharper with the handling of Heidegger’s conception of truth.
1.3.2 Alètheia, Pseudos and Lèthè
In the previous paragraph where the road was gone from Being to the Dasein the ontological difference and the asking of the question of Being, as also the characteristic form of Heidegger’s thought already came recognizable to the fore. Under this paragraph the structure of originality and covering shall be anchored and indicated in the later thought of Heidegger. Because Heidegger’s later thought is much more encompassing than Sein und Zeit and knows in itself also a diversity different perspectives are possible. The clearest this structure however comes to the fore in the thematising of the concepts ‘alètheia’, ‘pseudos’ and ‘lèthè’. ‘Alètheia’, ‘pseudos’ and ‘lèthè’ are three of the from Greek derived concepts which are inseparable connected to each other in Heidegger’s conception of truth.73 Already in Sein und Zeit,74 but especially in his later work, Heidegger thinks truth as unconcealment [Unverborgenheit] from the Greek ‘alètheia’.75 This unconcealment may regard both an unconcealment of beings and of Being itself.76 Being and truth then are also equal-original.77 This is a thought which is already found with Aristotle, be it there still in (according to Heidegger) a less original way.78 In the not original conception of truth is truth understood as correspondence of an utterance with a being and not as unconcealment. Heidegger thinks this truth as correspondence as being derived from the more original and pre-given truth as unconcealment. For the correspondence of an utterance with a being only becomes possible when this being is unconclealed.79
Truth according to Heidegger is thus unconcealment of Being, however in the everydayness Being gives itself in the beings in a way of covering [Verdeckung] and displacement [Verstellung].80 For this giving itself of Being in a covering and displacing way Heidegger gives the Greek name of ‘pseudos’.81 In these two concepts of alètheia and pseudos clearly the structure of originality and covering can be recognized. In the covering and derived pseudos the original revealing alètheia is present. Herewith do alètheia and pseudos thus in structure correspond with Being and the beings, and with authenticity and unauthenticity.
In his later work Heidegger however goes further in his analysis of originality than in Sein und Zeit. For it shows that unconcealment itself is also grounded in another given, namely in concealment. Heidegger came to his notion of truth as unconcealment through the Greek word ‘alètheia’. This word itself however simply means ‘truth’ and seems as such not to carry a meaning within itself such as ‘unconcealment’.82 Heidegger however reads ‘alètheia’ also as ‘a-lètheia’. Now ‘lètheia’ being reduced to ‘lèthè’ means in Greek ‘concealment. When the ‘a-‘ thus expresses the opposite of ‘lèthè’ may ‘alètheia’ as ‘truth’ also be interpreted as ‘un-concealment’. It is in this way that Heidegger comes to his notion of truth as unconcealment. The ‘a-‘ however not only indicates a negation of the thereafter placed word.83 It also indicates a dependency thereof.84 Unconcealment is dependent upon the more original concealment and is therein grounded.85 Concealment turns out to be more original than unconcealment. Thus we recognize in alètheia and pseudos very clearly the structure of originality and covering, whereby Heidegger gives this structure with lèthè a further depth.
Herewith then enough words have been given to the sketching and bringing to the fore of the characteristic of Heidegger’s thought and are thus enough words given to the sketching and bringing to the fore of the characteristic of the Heideggerian in a Heideggerian mysticism. The findings in this chapter can be brought along to chapter 3, where mysticism shall be designed and made understandable from Heidegger’s thought. First however an impression must be gained of mysticism. This task shall be undertaken in the next chapter, where the other sub-question in the question for a Heideggerian mysticism shall be asked; the question for mysticism.
In the introduction it was already asserted that in the question for a Heideggerian mysticism together with the question for the Heideggerian also the question for mysticism as such comes to the fore. In the previous chapter the Heideggerian was thematised, and in this chapter then shall mysticism be the explicit subject of consideration. Mysticism shall in this chapter be thematised in three steps and sub-themes. Some coherency of these sub-themes shall already be found, however especially in chapter 3 shall this coherency come to the fore. This is however not yet the case in this chapter where mysticism shall be the subject of consideration in a more usual way. The three sub-themes of this chapter regard: ‘mysticism as such’, ‘the three basic elements of mysticism’ and ‘the two moments in mysticism’. Hereby shall ‘mysticism as such’ thematise mysticism in its whole, and shall in the two other sub-themes aspects be brought to the fore which are contained in mysticism as such.
2.1.1 In Search for a Definition
What is that: ‘mysticism’? Of what must we think with mysticism? In which direction must we let our thoughts go? When we are going to search for the specifics of mysticism in books and texts that have mysticism as subject we may encounter plentiful definitions and descriptions. Mysticism then may relate to not understandable utterances of an illogical speaker, the twisted visions of someone with schizophrenia, hallucinations or by drugs caused visions, spiritual visions or to the quiet experience of a holy darkness or void.86 Other examples of definitions regard: “immediate, inner experience of the divine or transcendental reality”,87 “supernatural actions and situations, which human meddling and powers never can accomplish”,88 “a special, religious experience of unity-communion-presence wherefrom flow out undeterminability and inexpressibility”89 and “knowledge from experience about god”.90 More often however do authors choose to refrain from giving a definite definition, and those who do hurry themselves usually to nuance the definiteness and to bring to the fore the difficulty of a definite all saying definition. Almost always the author is thus explicitly nuanced with regards to a given definition. Apparently mysticism is a phenomenon that lets itself not being caught easily in concrete, not even wide concrete, definitions.91
This difficulty can be met by giving descriptions of mysticism and thematising aspects within mysticism further. Also in this consideration shall in the next two paragraphs aspects within mysticism be thematised, but for this is no place in a paragraph which has as subject ‘mysticism as such’. What seems to remain then is the giving of a general description. However a general description could offer too less grip and could as basis for a further thematising turn out to be not solid enough. For this reason we choose here for the option which countless other authors also chose, namely tracing and mentioning that where all descriptions of mysticism pivot around. What is this central given, thus we ask the question. What is mysticism all about? Following many other authors may that around which mysticism pivots be brought to the fore through an etymological analysis. This is the standard instrument with which we can gain an opening to and a sight on the essence of mysticism where definitions and descriptions lack.
2.1.2 Etymological Analysis
Three kinds of sources are at our disposal with the execution of an etymological analysis of the word ‘mysticism’, namely: dictionaries, etymological dictionaries and earlier executed etymological analyses of other authors. Let us start with a collected inventory of what the dictionaries have to tell us, starting with the dictionary of the Dutch language. As noun two definitions are given, namely: “passionate strife for the special, personal union of God with the human soul” and “the teaching of this strife”.92 Because definite definitions however already were found to be insufficient we may take notice of these definitions (which we surely must do), but leave them for the moment for what they are. To ‘mystiek’ [‘mystic’] as adjective this same dictionary gives the meanings of “secretive” and “puzzling”.93 So something which is mystic is considered to be secretive and puzzling. When we add translating dictionaries of to Dutch akin languages, such as German and English, we see that the German dictionary translates ‘Mystik’ besides as ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] also figuratively as ‘speculation’.94 The English dictionary translates the English ‘mysticism’ besides as ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] also as ‘mysticisme’ [‘mysticness’], which then is given the meaning of ‘faith in miracles’.95 ‘Mysticisme’ [‘mysticness’] knows in Dutch however itself the meaning of ‘tendency to mysticism’. Here we must pause with our collected inventory to explicate a difference between two ways in which mysticism in contemporary Dutch language is used. Both the German and the English dictionary give two Dutch translations for their own linguistic use of the word ‘mysticism’. The German dictionary gives the two meanings of ‘mysticism’ and ‘speculation’ (figurative) and the English dictionary gives the two meanings of ‘mysticism’ and ‘faith in miracles’. Apparently is in this case the Dutch language better able to explicate a difference between a figurative and a literary, or perhaps better; original notion of mysticism. When we relate the meaning of ‘faith in miracles’ to the meaning of ‘speculation’ (and this is plausible) then we can keep the Dutch ‘mysticisme’ [‘mysticness’] to such a figurative use of language. The Dutch ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] then can be kept free in this way for its original meaning without the need to think of speculation or faith in miracles. Attribution of meanings to ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] we thus reserve for terms such as ‘secretive’ and ‘puzzling’.
Above we already took notion of a more original meaning of mysticism, and therewith we actually already went on the road of etymology. Let us proceed on this road by consulting the etymological dictionary of J. de Vries. This dictionary follows a line from the Dutch ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] through the French ‘mystique’ and the Latin ‘mysticus’ back to the Greek ‘mysticos’. The meaning of this original word ‘mysticos’ turns out to be ‘secret’.96 A meaning which, given the above conclusion, evidently is kept in the use of ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] in contemporary Dutch. Other authors turn out however to carry through their etymological analysis still further. For usually they trace the Greek ‘mysticos’ back to the Greek root words ‘mýein’ (‘muo’) and ‘myeín’ (‘mueo’). The meaning of the first root word is ‘closing’ (and then especially of the mouth and the eyes), the meaning of the second root word has reference to the being initiated into the mysteries.97 Eventually the diverse authors come usually to the original meanings of which ‘secret’ and ‘concealment’ are part.98 Meanings to which we also came in our analysis, and which we may thus consider as generally accepted.
In this way we have the central given around which mysticism pivots, and therewith its essence, brought to the fore. ‘Mysticism’ showed to be a concept being too ungraspable to fit in a tight definition, and descriptions could stay too general and therewith offer no solid basis. We therefore chose to bring to the fore the central given around which mysticism pivots. This we did through an etymological analysis. Core concepts which we found here were ‘secret’ and ‘concealment’. This is what mysticism is about.99 This is what can be considered as the essence of mysticism. With this bringing to the fore of the core points and the essence of mysticism we however still stay rather abstract. Mysticism in its whole, mysticism as such, is herewith elucidated, though a clear understanding of mysticism as such needs a certain explication of more concrete sub-aspects. Like sub-aspects are understandable against the background of the whole (which we thus brought to the fore here) must the whole be elucidated through the sub-aspects which constitute that whole.100 Not for nothing we indicated in the previous sub-paragraph that a further thematising of aspects within mysticism can give a clearer view on mysticism. For this was no place within paragraph 2.1 with as subject ‘mysticism as such’. Now that place is however present in the following two paragraphs. There shall from our gained view on the whole several sub-aspects in their coherency with the whole be elucidated.
In sub-paragraph 2.1.2 we found at the start of the etymological analysis in the dictionary of the Dutch language two definitions. These definitions we left at that moment aside as they were and took notice of them. Without invalidating earlier statements about the insufficiency of definitions of mysticism we here bring the found and as notice taken definitions again to the fore. Not to still define mysticism, from this we refrained and shall keep refraining, but for the purpose of the given that these definitions can put us on track towards that which under this paragraphs shall be thematised. As definitions for ‘mysticism’ as noun the dictionary gave: “passionate strife for the special, personal union of God with the human soul” and “the teaching of this strife”. In these definitions, in which ‘strife’ plays a central role to define ‘mysticism’, can three basic elements be descried. The first definition brings the first two basic elements to the fore and the second definition brings up the third. The three basic elements regard here: ‘the transcendental’ (God), ‘the mystic’ (the human soul) and ‘the teaching’. In the recognition of these three basic elements we are not alone. We find them implicit or explicit also in other works (such as fir instance that of Kees Waaijman).101 In the three sub-paragraphs that follow shall these three basic elements be shortly elucidated.
2.2.1 The Transcendent
Mentioning must be set apart from the indicating use of terms. For terms can be used to indicate something without having the intention to also directly mention.102 It is in this way here that for the first basic element of mysticism we use the term ‘the transcendent’. There are two reasons why we here indicate instead of mention with the term ‘the transcendent’. The first reason has to do with the multitude of terms which in the different mysticisms are used for the central given of the intention in the mystical longing and the mystical strife. Among the better known terms are found: ‘the absolute’, ‘ultimate reality’, ‘the unending spirit’, ‘God’ and ‘the holy’.103 This we could perhaps, given our etymological analysis, complement with ‘the concealed’ and ‘the secret’. Dependent upon the religious setting in which the mysticism occurs and dependent upon the mystic himself can however also names be found of a more personal nature. In this we may think of for instance Krishna and other Hindu figures in the East and of Christ in the West. Such a mysticism is known as ‘bridal mysticism’, which is differentiated from the earlier brought to the fore ‘essential mysticism’.104 All in all however may ‘the transcendent’ here count as a generic term for the great diversity of terms and names which in the different mysticisms are used to indicate the central given of intention in the mystical longing and strife. Hereby we do not decide upon the question whether in the different mysticisms we have to do with mystical experiences of different natures (empiricism) or of the same nature (essentialism).105 Thus using ‘the transcendent’ as a generic term a wide but specific collection of positive terms and names is indicated.
However like among many also Richard of St. Victor brought to the fore is a usage of positive terms as sketched above not the only way of considering the central given of intention in mysticism.106 And here we then touch upon the second reason why we indicate and not mention. For this reason has to do with the nature (for as far as can be spoken here of ‘nature) of what here eventually is indicated. For the transcendent is both in theology and philosophy, as also in mysticism, often described as indescribable. It is indicated as inexpressible. Exemplary here are the negative theology of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,107 the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein108 and the mysticism of Meister Eckhart.109 Thus is here the term and expression ‘the transcendent’ used to indicate what cannot be expressed. Taken together we thus indicate what cannot be expressed and perhaps therefore is subject to an enormous diversity of expressions. To keep the indication neutral (as far as possible) is here the common term ‘the transcendent’ used.
Now what mysticism typifies is the explicit thematising of this transcendent as the at the same time immanent.110 This may perhaps also take place in theology and certainly also in philosophy, however in mysticism the transcendent shall as the immanent never stay only a theoretical consideration of it, but this shall always be accompanied with an intrinsic longing and strife for it.111 And this then brings us to the second basic element of mysticism: the longing and striving mystic.
2.2.2 The Mystic
What we in the previous sub-paragraph indicated with ‘the transcendent’ is in mysticism the central given of intention in the mystical longing and the mystical strife. With this the second basic element is brought in view, namely the one who longs and strives: the mystic. This longing and strife for union with the transcendent is that which the mystic thus characterises and with that also what distinguishes him. For with this he distinguishes himself from both the everyday man and the enlightened master or the saint. For the everyday man does not relate consciously to the transcendent. Nor a longing nor a strife for it are in the life of the everyday person present. And where an everyday practitioner of religion is the case attention is according to external guidelines especially directed at the transcendent as transcendent and not so much experienced by oneself as immanent.112 An anticipation to a possible union is here not the case. The enlightened master (in a more Eastern orientation) or the saint (in a more Western orientation) distinguishes himself equally so from the mystic. For the enlightened master or saint lives in a continuous unity with the transcendent and knows as such also no longing and strive for it.113 The mystic in contrary lives neither in an everydayness where no conscious relation to the transcendent occurs, nor in an enlightened state of consciousness in which he lives continuous in unity with the transcendent. The mystic relates consciously to the transcendent in a longing and a strife for that continuous unity which has not yet come to him.
With the above then an important general characteristic of the mystic is indicated, however with this it is not said that there are no differences to be discerned; for this is certainly the case. Of course this is the case because different mystics are different persons who lead different personal lives. An Eckhart isn’t Maimonides, isn’t Rumi, no Mira Bai and no Krishnamurti, to bring to the fore a few individuals from the long list of known mystics. They differ from each other in their personal individuality, in place, time and cultural setting. Also they differ from each other in their teachings. For the mystics that have become known to us have become so through their mystical teachings which they have left us.114 In these we recognize them as mystics because of the longing and the strife for the transcendent that speaks therefrom, but also we recognize in this their difference. This brings us to the third basic element of mysticism: the teaching.
2.2.3 The Teaching
Mystics differ from each other and this difference is recognizable in the teaching which they left us. Also recognizable in that teaching is the cultural setting in which the regarded mystic was placed.115 More specific recognizable in the teaching of the mystic is the religious tradition in which he stood, and this also means: the religious teaching which the mystic imbibed. For just like non-mystics did also the mystic grow up in a specific culture with its specific religious (or perhaps agnostic) doctrines.116 Usually then the mystic is connected to one or other specific religion or conception of truth. It is this given of the cultural and religious rootedness of the mystic which forms the ground for the discussion between empiricists and essentialists. For in that discussion the empiricists take the stand that mystical experiences are different on base of the cultural and religious particularities from which these experiences are considered to sprout, and do the essentialists take the stand that mystical experiences transcend cultural and religious particularity and that they are in essence of the same nature.117 As mentioned earlier in this consideration is with regards to these stands no position taken, and this mainly because this would need an elaborate discourse on itself.
Now the religious teaching in which the mystic is rooted is not the only teaching with which we have to do in mysticism. For as second teaching there are also the own deliverances of the mystic as they have been established on base of his mystical experience(s). This own teaching contains, as we saw, usually still the traces of the religious teaching in which the mystic is grounded.118 For the traditional teaching provides to the mystic as basis the possibility to express himself and to bring his mystical experience(s) to words. Nevertheless do the deliverances of the mystic usually differ from the conventional doctrines in which he is grounded, for the latter always lack.119 Characteristic for the mystical deliverances is that these are considered by the mystic in any case to fall short in expression because the mystical experience is simply not expressible in words.120 Because the mystic however feels that he nevertheless must express himself does he do this in a way that deviates from the conventional teaching.121 This deviation may relate to both content and form, for except contentual diverse are mystical deliverances also diverse in form (think for instance of different forms like poetry, autobiography, philosophy, theology, prayer, etc.).122 These mystical deliverances are with regards to form and content thus almost always renewing for the conventions of the time and place in which they are delivered in first instance. With this we may thus recognize in the deliverances of the mystic both a conservativeness and innovation.123 A conservativeness because in the mystical deliverance usually a trace of the conservative religion of the regarded time and place is found, and an innovation because the mystical deliverance with regards to the conventional religion of the regarded time and place is usually renewing in form and / or content.124 It are these two elements which also bring us on the track of what shall be elucidated in the next paragraph: the two moments in mysticism.
In the deliverances of the mystic we recognized in the previous paragraph two elements: conservativeness and innovation. It are two elements which usually are very concretely recognizable in the mystical deliverances. There is however still a third element which can be recognized and which also is the most essential of the three, namely the mystical experience. It is this experience which is the incentive for the mystic to innovate the conventional teaching. This cycle of conservativeness, mystical experience and innovation needs however not to be kept limited to only the teaching but can be brought in relation to the whole life of the mystic. In this case this cycle of conservativeness, mystical experience and innovation regards the mystical road which the mystic goes in his life.125 This is not a straight road but is gone through as a spiral which every time visits the three moments of conservativeness, mystical experience and innovation.126 In the first moment of this cycle, the conservative moment, is everything in life in order. Everything which occurs in that life has its obvious meaning and with that its given place.127 In the second moment, that of the mystical experience, a disruption of that order takes place. The obviousnesses that guaranteed the order are blown away and the mystic sees himself from out of the risen chaos placed in a mystical night128 in which, exactly through the space which with the falling away of the obviousnesses comes to being, the transcendent can tread in in an indescribable intensity.129 Conclusively in the third moment from that mystical experience a reordering of the world takes place in which everything receives a renewed meaning. A reordering where however the mystical experience in reverberates and thus shall never lead to the same order as that of before the mystical experience.130 Nevertheless the third moment is again a moment of order. This cycle of three moments can thus actually also be reduced to two essential moments: a moment of order and a moment of chaos. Both moments in the life of the mystic shall under this paragraph be give a further elucidation under the names of ‘the mystical basic attitude’ and ‘the mystical experience’.
2.3.1 The Mystical Basic Attitude
In the introduction of this paragraph the mystical road was concisely elucidated and sketched as a spiralling road of life which every time visits three moments which eventually can be reduced to two essential moments: a moment of order and a moment of chaos. The moment of order is what here shall be elucidated further as ‘the mystical basic attitude’. In this naming of ‘mystical basic attitude’ are three aspects to be recognized which characterize this mystical basic attitude. In the first place the mystical basic attitude is an attitude. With ‘attitude’ here is meant a certain way in which a human relates to the world and how he behaves within it.131 And that attitude then is a basis for something, therefor: ‘basic attitude’. For a basis this attitude is for all other attitudes and behaviours which are less general and basic and more incidental and based.132 That by which this basic attitude, which is the basis for more incidental attitudes and behaviours, then consequently is characterized is that is regards a mystical basic attitude. The basic attitude of the mystic distinguishes itself obviously from the basic attitude of everyday man as also from the basic attitude of the enlightened master or saint, exactly as the mystic distinguishes himself from everyday man and the enlightened master or saint.133 What the mystic distinguishes from the latter two was his longing and strife for union with the transcendent, and equally so shall the mystical basic attitude then be characterised by this. Thus as first characteristic of the mystical basic attitude can be explicated here the longing and strife for union with the transcendent.
Now in the introduction of this paragraph we however already found a characteristic, namely the order. In the mystical basic attitude an order holds sway; all things in the world have there their own place and their obvious meaning. When these two characteristics are taken together the mystical basic attitude can be characterized as an orderly and ordered longing and strife for union with the transcendent. Behaviours and actions of the mystic in the world, when he is set in that mystical basic attitude, shall thus be based upon this mystical basic attitude, shall be grounded in an orderly and ordered longing and strife for union with the transcendent. Now such actions are recognizable as spiritual exercises. For in his prayers, his practises of virtue, in his contemplations and in his meditations it is that the mystic orderly and ordered strives for that union.134 That the mystic in the mystical basic attitude longs and strives and exercises himself spiritually indicates the given that in the mystical basic attitude the transcendent has not given itself in its wholeness to the mystic. Said differently; the transcendent keeps itself for the mystic concealed and secret. Thus we recognize in the mystical basic attitude in this way the central given around which mysticism pivots, we recognize in the mystic basic attitude pre-eminently the essence of mysticism.
2.3.2 The Mystical Experience
The mystical experience distinguishes itself from the mystical basic attitude. Where the mystic in the mystical road usually finds himself in the mystical basic attitude, there forms the mystical experience a (short though intense)135 break of this which among other things is characterized by chaos, thus we saw in the introduction of this paragraph. When it is stated that the mystical experiences is characterized by a chaos then the meaning of the use of ‘chaos’ must be understood here in the right way, and this means in this case: ambiguous. The best known meaning which in the everydayness is ascribed to ‘chaos’ regards the meaning of ‘disorder or confusion’.136 To the more original meanings of ‘chaos’ belong however ‘void’ and ‘abyss’. Such attributions of meaning we find in Greek,137 with the people in the near East,138 as also in Latin.139 When we then in the context of a consideration of mysticism profess a term like ‘chaos’ we must not take it only in the everyday meaning which makes us think of a scattering of things. The moment of the mystical experience may indeed be characterized by a disorder of the living world of the mystic, but this is coupled also with the setting in of a void. With the falling away of the ordered world a void sets in. And it is then from this chaos as void that the in the introduction of this paragraph mentioned mystical night is born, analogue to the myth in Hesiods ‘Theogonia’ where Chaos (void) makes his offspring Erebus (darkness) and Nyx (night) being born.140 Aspects like chaos, void and night are thus all included in the moment of the mystical experience.
Nevertheless this night in which the order is blown away is not only a gaping void. For paradoxically the mystic sees himself in the mystical experience placed in the full presence of the transcendental given.141 The chaos and emptiness of the world have created the space for the fullness of the transcendent to make its entrance. This is not a given which the mystic fully creates himself, as for instance with this spiritual exercises.142 The mystical experience is exactly characterized by a radical passivity on the side of the mystic.143 How could it be otherwise? For the living world and the personal identity which are derived therefrom are in the moment of the mystical experience blown away. With this blowing away of the personal acting identity it is however also that the deepest self breaks through.144 For the most transcendent is for the mystic at the same time the most immanent.145 With this are already two (of the undoubtable countless) paradoxes in the mystical experience mentioned. Namely the seeing oneself at the same time set in a void and a fullness and the breaking through of the transcendent as at the same time the immanent. Apparently the mystical experience is of such an inexpressible nature that an attempt to linguistic explication of it ends in paradoxical descriptions.146 The mystic then after this experience does not find the words to express himself adequately and shall, as mentioned in sub-paragraph 2.2.3, try to express his experience in an innovative way. This expressing however is not part anymore of the mystical experience itself, which after all was characterized by a radical passivity.
Meanwhile are the two sub-questions which the main question for a Heideggerian mysticism calls forth treated in the previous chapters. In chapter 1 the sub-question for the Heideggerian was thematised. The Heideggerian had to do with the philosopher Martin Heidegger and his thought, and several characteristics of that thought were brought to the fore. Primarily Heidegger’s thought, which was taken as one road of thought despite differences of emphasis between his earlier and later thought, was characterised by a thematising of ontological difference. This took place with regards to form through the use of neologisms and poetic / mystic / mystical use of language. Contentual the ontological difference was thematised through the characteristic of originality and covering, in which an original wholeness was also thought. In chapter 2 subsequently the sub-question for mysticism was thematised. Through an etymological analysis the central point around which mysticism pivots was brought to the fore in two core concepts, knowing: secret and concealment. Subsequently this still abstract characterization was concretized through sub-aspects which are found in mysticism. We found three basic elements of mysticism; the transcendent, the mystic and the teaching, and we found also two essential moments: the mystical basic attitude and the mystical experience. Now in this chapter shall be anticipated to the whole of this consideration. Here the main question of this investigation, the question for a Heideggerian mysticism, shall be asked. In this thematising of the main question then shall the findings of the previous chapters be taken in consideration. In other words it shall be here that mysticism shall be designed and made understandable from, or through, Heidegger’s thought.
An accountability for the to be handled method for this understandable making asks for a short elucidation. As in chapter 1 already brought to the fore is in Heidegger’s thought the reaching of an ontological difference through a structure of originality and covering characteristic. Now this same structure we find again in the way in which things according to Heidegger can be understood. Things can be understood in an original way or in a covering way. Characteristic for the metaphysical thought is that it understands things in a way which covers that original thought. For metaphysics understands phenomena in a thingmatic way as subject-object relations.147 Subject and object are for metaphysics primary givens. This covering thought Heidegger calls ‘ontic’ thought, and he places it against an original existential-ontological [existenzial-ontologisch] thought which thinks from the phenomenon in which subject and object are already contained.148 The term ‘Dasein’ expresses for instance clearly this phenomenality because it expresses that being-human is always being-there [Da-sein].149 This original thought is thus obvious the thought which constitutes Heidegger’s thought. When we then want to understand mysticism from Heidegger’s thought this means that we want to understand it through the original and phenomenological thought, where principally is no place for ontic and thingmatic conceptions.
The above mentioned thought of Heidegger is also a thought from wholeness.150 When thus the diverse aspects of mysticism such as found in the previous chapter would be made understandable separately from each other through Heidegger’s thought, then would that wholeness be deprived and would the phenomenological method fall short. Thus it is important to thematise the different phenomenological aspects and structures which are all present in mysticism in their mutual coherence, and not only separately and isolated from each other. Thinking from the wholeness it must however at the same time not be neglected that that wholeness must be elucidated though the parts.151 Thus it is also important to lay the emphasis in different paragraphs on different parts of the wholeness, and this then without losing sight of their mutual coherence.
From these considerations we may eventually come to a following design. In the first paragraph shall the central given around which mysticism pivots phenomenologically be analysed and made understandable. This central given regards, as came to the fore in sub-paragraph 2.1.2, concealment and secret. This concealment and secret can therewith also be understood as the horizon against which background further sections only become visible. The central given is at the same time the horizon, the essence and the wholeness. The two moments in mysticism, the mystical basic attitude and the mystical experience, then shall be included in- and can only become understandable against the background of that wholeness. Thus in this chapter shall in the first paragraph mysticism be sketched in its wholeness. Against the background thereof then may in the subsequent paragraphs the two moments in mysticism be thematised. Hereby shall then also both times the three basic elements of mysticism be included and worked out phenomenological in their mutual coherence (so not as from each other to be isolated elements). It may be expected that in this way a mysticism shall be designed which shall carry within itself the Heideggerian characteristics of ontological difference, originality and covering, wholeness and neologisms.
In sub-paragraph 2.1.2 was through an etymological analysis the central given bought to the fore around which mysticism pivots. The two concepts which constituted that central point regarded ‘concealment’ and ‘secret’. The question which we question here is how concealment and secret according to Heidegger can be understood phenomenological. In sub-paragraph 1.3.2 the concept ‘concealment was already touched upon. ‘Concealment’ is made understandable by Heidegger through its coherence with the concepts ‘unconcealment’ and ‘covering’. These concepts all have a place in Heidegger’s analysis of truth. Truth as un-concealment is grounded in concealment. The question is how that concealment must be thought phenomenological. On itself the concept ‘concealment’ seems to pre-eminently lend itself for a phenomenological explanation. For it cannot be thought as an on itself standing being, and evenly so it is not obvious to think concealment predicative as a quality of the one or other being. Rather the concept ‘concealment’ calls forth the phenomenological association with a Being understanding being which the Being of the beings doesn’t understand. In that Being understanding being we may of course recognize the Dasein. But a being which in its ground always has an understanding of Being, but which at a certain moment nevertheless doesn’t understand Being, thereof it can be said that it in those moments has forgotten Being. This is apparently also Heidegger’s thought when he understands concealment as aa forgetting [Vergessung].152 So the forgetting can be understood as phenomenological concealment, and what is forgotten in that moment regards Being. So forgetting has here in relation to concealment not in first instance reference to the forgetting of the one or the other particular being. The concealment regards the forgetting of Being itself, and that means equal-originally also: The Dasein’s own being.153
Hesiod’s Theogonia taken in consideration Heidegger sees lèthè thereby equal-originally with limos. Limos is usually translated as ‘hunger’, however according to Heidegger this must be correctly understood as the failure of occurrence of gift and appointment.154 This failure of occurrence of gift and appointment of course has reference to Being, which holds itself back and doesn’t give itself. For the unconcealment of Being Heidegger sees as a gift of Being.155 Thus Heidegger sees lèthè and limos, oblivion in which truth is grounded and the failure of occurrence of the gift of Being, as equal-original. In the forgetting (of Being) Being has not given itself to the Dasein.
The above mentioned equal-originality of concealment as forgetting and the failure of occurrence of the gift of Being Heidegger thinks through lèthè and limos as they occur in Hesiod’s Theogonia. For therein they are two of a considerable number of children of the goddess Eris.156 Now Eris is the goddess of battle.157 Battling, according to Heidegger, is however the essence of truth.158 For it is in battle with concealment that unconcealment is wrested from.159 This doesn’t mean that it is so to speak ‘man’ who wrests from concealment unconcealment. For then Being could not be thought as gift. Who delivers this battle and how this battle is delivered however stays in the dark.160 This staying in the dark of the one who battles and how is battled Heidegger indicates with the term ‘secret’ [Geheimnis].161 This secret, the battle of unconcealment with concealment, carries within itself the nature of concealment.162 Now ‘Geheimnis’ does not stand on itself but carries within itself the word ‘Heim’, which has a kinship in meaning with the Dutch word ‘thuis’ (and the English word ‘home’).163 ‘Home’ the Dasein is in his unauthentic modus, when he is in the everyday world with its meanings. When the him known meanings however fall away, as in anxiety, then the Dasein feels ‘Unheimlich’,164 or translated to Dutch terms; ‘akelig’, ‘eng’ of ‘onheilspellend’ (in English ‘ghastly’, ‘scared’ or ‘sinister’),165 but according to Heidegger thus also ‘not-home’. It is such an anticipation to a not-being-home and to a scary, sinister attuning which also reverberates in ‘Geheimnis’, where the battle with concealment and forgetting is waged.166
Secret thus regards the battle of unconcealment with concealment, a battle which in Hesiod’s Theogonia is represented by the goddess Eris. Eris however was born from Nyx, the goddess of the night,167 and also Heidegger brings concealment in relation to nightliness. For the night keeps Being back in concealment. It is for this reason that according to Heidegger the night got the nickname of noxiousness. The night is noxious because it destroys (or en-not-s). ‘To destroy’ (or ‘to en-not’) here means that the night hides Being.168 Here we have traced a remarkable aspect of a possible way of being of the Dasein. For it is nightly that Being is kept back in concealment. The night lets everything disappear. In the everydayness (everydayness), when the Dasein is in an unauthentic mode, Being sends itself in a covering way and is the Dasein lost in the him surrounding beings. Set in the moment of authentnicity Being is for the Dasein unclosed and gives Being itself thus not in a covering way. In the night as mode of being of the Dasein however none of those two moments are the case. Being has not given itself covered and the Dasein is not unauthentic, but Being also has not given itself originally and the Dasein also isn’t authentic. In the night are both covering of Being and uncovering of Being held back in concealment. At the same time the night is however also the origin and condition of possibility for the giving itself of Being in an original way. For when the covering so to speak is destroyed (or en-not-ed), then the space is created for Being to give itself in an original way.169 Here clearly can be recognized the mystical night as it was thematised in the introduction of paragraph 2.3. For in the mystical night the order of the things in the word fell away, because of which an entrance in the transcendent became possible.170 Thus there too the mystical night was not equalled to the mystical union, although they both were contained in the mystical experience.171
We saw that the night got the nickname of ‘noxiousness’ because it destroys (en-not-s). This ‘destroying’ (en-not-ing) we must, when we want to understand mysticism from Heidegger’s thought, however not understand in an everyday way as if in the night so to speak a destruction of beings would take place. For the destructing (en-not-ing) by the night Heidegger rather understands as a ‘nullifying’ (‘not-ing’) of the nothing.172 The notion of a nothing which in the night would be nullifying (not-ing) however means that this nothing must be seen as more original than a simple negation of the whole of beings.173 For Heidegger wants to understand the nothing phenomenologically and not metaphysically. It is not so that in the night the whole of beings is nullified (not-ing-ed) to make the nothing possible. Rather the contrary is the case. In the night the nothing is nullifying (not-ing) by keeping the meanings of the beings back in itself, to be thus the ground and the condition of possibility for the whole of beings; namely that the being is, and not nothing.174 Something is, so to speak, on ground of the given that it isn’t nothing. With that the nullifying (not-ing) of the nothing is always as original given contained in the being of the beings.175 As the un-concealment grounds in the concealment,176 so the not-nothing grounds in the nothing. And this nothing can also be understood as the void, for as far as this is understood in a phenomenological and non-metaphysical way.177 That this void or this nothing nullifies (not-s) by keeping the meanings of the beings back may already calls forth a recognition of earlier executed analyses, but one and the other shall in paragraph 3.3 further be elucidated. Here it is of import to follow the trace of the nothing and the void without being distracted. For in subparagraph 2.3.2 it was explained that ‘(gaping) void’ can be ascribed as original meaning to ‘chaos’, a meaning which Heidegger also acknowledges.178 The nothing is the gaping void, is the chaos. Here the pieces of the puzzle seem to fall together. For in Hesiod’s Theogonia it is the chaos which makes the night be born.179 Thus we find here as that around which mysticism pivots a whole genealogy from Chaos to the offspring of Eris (among which Lèthè and Limos). Chaos gives birth to Nyx, who subsequently lets Eris be born, who conclusively among others bears Lèthè and Limos. Understood from Heidegger’s thought this means that concealment (Lèthè) and the staying away of the gift of Being (Limos) are grounded in the battle which is waged in secret between concealment and unconcealment (Eris), which itself is grounded in the nullifying (not-ing) in the night (Nyx), which in its turn can eventually be traced back to the gaping void of the nothing (Chaos). When we thus dare to make such a sketch we must beware that we don’t understand that sketch in a metaphysical way; the mentioned concepts are aspects of the Dasein’s mode of being. The nullifying (not-ing) of the nothing in the night as origin of the in secret waged battle between concealment and unconcealment is around which a Heideggerian mysticism pivots, is the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism.
The previous paragraph was concluded with a typifying of the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism, namely ‘the nullifying (not-ing) of the nothing in the night as origin of the in secret waged battle between concealment and unconcealment’. This is around which a Heideggerian mysticism pivots. The question now rises how this central given is present in the mystical basic attitude and how in the mystical experience. This paragraph must make that question in relation to the mystical basic attitude clear.
In paragraph 2.3 we saw how the mystical road is usually characterized by the moment of the mystical basic attitude. In mysticism usually the mystical basic attitude is the case. For the mystical experience may be an intense, however even so a short break of it. This means that the mystic in the life of ever day sees himself set in this mystical basic attitude. And in that everydayness order holds sway. All things in the world have there their owned place. The mystic is home there.180 This characteristic of order connects to Heidegger’s findings when he thematises the mode of being of the Dasein in his everydayness. In that everydayness the Dasein is lost in the they.181 From the they, which thus regards the others in their generality with whom the Dasein is in-the-world, are the him surrounding beings unclosed and understood. The world with the beings which therein encounter the Dasein have for the Dasein all a familiar meaning, and it is also through that familiar world that the Dasein also understands himself and is familiar with himself.182 In this way lost in the they the Dasein fled into the him surrounding beings which are so familiar to him.183 It is here where the Dasein feels at home [Heim, Zuhause].184 And also the Dasein is set here in an unauthentic mode of being.185 A mode of being in which a lostness in the beings is the case and in which Being as such is not unclosed for the Dasein.
Now it is certainly not so that, despite a seemingly striking similarity of the unauthentic mode of being with the mystical basic attitude, the phenomenological analysis of the mystical basic attitude is therewith executed. For the mystic was distinguished from everyday man and is in his everydayness still also not ordinarily ordinary (everyday-ish everyday-ish). Thereby it is so that one on one translations of by metaphysical thought characterized concepts to Heidgger’s phenomenological concepts are not possible. In chapter 2 a normally ontic use of language was busied wherein beings, despite a perhaps thematised coherence nevertheless can be understood isolated from each other. This is in contrast with the use of langue of Heidegger which exactly primarily aims at expressing the wholeness in which separate beings are contained and wherein they are grounded.186 The Dasein as the Da-sein of the being-human is what only makes a thought in terms of subject-object relations possible. The mystic as relating himself to the transcendent is not phenomenologically understood by translating these two concepts (to for instance Dasein and Being). One must seek for a more original use of language which the understanding of the mystic as relating to the transcendent only makes possible. What in this paragraph up till now has been analysed phenomenologically regards the orderliness which is characteristic for the mystical basic attitude. The everydayness with its mentioned aspects may therein be considered as phenomenological orderliness in its generality. However like the Dasein as point of departure in Sein und Zeit is thereafter further analysed in his structures of being, so must here the phenomenological understood orderliness as characteristic of the mystical basic attitude also be elucidated in its divers phenomenological structures. This is then which will make up the continuation of this paragraph.
We saw that the mystic in his everydayness at the same time is not ordinary (everyday-ish). Now what is it which the mystical Dasein in his everydayness has especially in common with the Dasein as such in his everyday mode of being? In the first place this is the order, as already was made clear. The world with the beings which encounter the Dasein therein have for him all a familiar meaning. The Dasein is at home in the world. This world (and equal-originally the Dasein, but that doesn’t have to be repeated every time) is towards its possibilities designed from a thrownness. Thrown designing the Dasein, also the mystical Dasein, is in-the-world.
As brought to the fore in sub-paragraph 1.1.2 the point of departure is here that Heidegger’s thought in Sein und Zeit and that in his later works are complimentary to each other. The eventual incentive for the being-in-the-world can from this point of departure then also be found in Heidegger’s later thought. There in relation to the being-in-the-world language plays an important role. In sub-paragraph 1.3.2 already through alètheia, pseudos and lèthè the structure was sketched of Heidegger’s thought about truth. For truth (and the equal-original Being) Heidegger thinks as unconcealment. Now this happening of truth, of un-storing, takes place in language.187 It is language which uncloses the inner-worldly [innerweltliche] beings and makes them appear.188 For at the moment of birth the Dasein is already immediately initiated in the coherence of meaning and the essence of the language which hold sway at that time and place. The Dasein then is never located outside language, but also within it.190 Now language may, equal-originally with truth, un-store and unclose Being covered or in an original way.191 Thus for instance Being has given itself from Plato to Nietzsche through metaphysical use of language in a non-authentic way.192 Heidegger speaks in this context of ‘Seinsgeschick’. Now ‘Geschick’ means ‘fate’, and the incentive for Being to give itself in a covering or original way Heidegger characterizes then as a groundless play of Being itself.193 ‘Geschick’ carries within itself also the notion of ‘schicken’ or ‘sending’, and ‘Seinsgeschick’ then also indicates that something is being sent by Being.194 Now this schicken of Being, in which Being sends itself either or not in an original way, is what composes according to Heidegger the essence of all history.195 This thus means that the Dasein already from birth is contained in the regarded Seinsgeschick, in the essence of the history, which together with the others of that time and place is the fate of his people or culture.196 This means that the fate of the Dasein [Schicksal] hangs together with the fate of the culture [Geschick] in which he is born and grows up. This most-own fate the Dasein can take on himself when he running-ahead of the own death is set in an authentic mode of being, but the Dasein may also unburden himself of his fate when he is set lost in the they in an unauthentic way of being.197 Whatever the case, authentic or unauthentic, in his ground the Dasein is always temporal and historicitic.198 There is history because the Dasein is historicitic, but the Dasein is historicitic from the original or covering history of Being through language.199 It is this historicity which lies at the base of the Dasein’s thrownness, as already was brought to the fore in sub-paragraph 1.2.1. The thrown Dasein is always located in a by Being sent culture and tradition. This shall not be different for the mystical Dasein. The mystical Dasein shall thrown see himself in any case always set in a through language opened orderly world in which he is home. This may be a Christian world, an Islamic world, a Hinduist world, a Humanistic world, or any other (religious-) cultural world. The mystical Dasein simply cannot escape his cultural, delivered thrownness.200 When the mystical basic attitude thus is understood phenomenological this character of the historicity of the mystical Dasein must be considered also. Thereby is that historicity the original condition of possibility for the thingmatic thought of the teaching and the mystic who subsequently related to each other.
In its generality the mystical Dasein sees himself from his historicity set in an orderly being-in-the-world at home. This also goes for the Dasein as such. The Dasein’s historicity is the original ground from where the beings in the world in their meanings are unclosed. The world is in order and the Dasein feels himself at home there. Herewith the commonality is brought to the fore of the Dasein as such and of the mystical Dasein. However herewith it has not become clear in which way the mystical Dasein in his everydayness differs from the Dasein as such; so in which way the mystical Dasein in his everydayness is not ordinary (everyday-ish). The Dasein as such is everyday-ish when he is lost in the they, so when he is set in an unauthentic mode of being. Non-ordinary (non-everyday-ish) he is when he is set in an authentic mode of being; the mode of being in which the Dasein is taken back from the they and in which Being is unclosed for him. That seems to imply that a non-ordinary (non-everyday-ish) everydayness must regard a mode of being which somewhere holds the middle between those two extremes. Is there from Heidegger’s thought a mode of being thinkable whereby the Dasein is taken back from the they, but wherein Being has not necessarily given itself originally to the Dasein? According to Heidegger’s later thought this is possible, namely when the Dasein is set in the attitude of resignation (or letting-ness) [Gelassenheit]. This term was already mentioned in sub-paragraph 1.3.1, and Heidegger derives that term from Meister Eckhart’s mysticism. Eckhart indicates there a detachment with regards to the things which the birth of Christ in the soul hinder and an open and receptive attitude with regards to that birth.201 Although Heidegger’s use of this term may differ from that of Eckhart,202 is at the same time that use by Heidegger to be mentioned as exemplary for the sketching of the in paragraph 1.1 mentioned proximity of Heidegger’s thought to mysticism.203 What does Heidegger aim at with the use of this term? Just like with Eckhart is with Heidegger in the ‘letting’ in ‘letting-ness’ (resignation) too an ambiguity indicated of on the one side a detachment and on the other side an open anticipation. The detachment here has relation with the beings and the open anticipation here has relation with the ereignen of Being. Ereignis is however not produced by the openness of the Dasein.204 Resignation (letting-ness) does not necessarily bring about Ereignis. For Being can in the resignation also hold itself back. Rather the resignation is thus an openness for the battle between concealment and unconcleament and therewith an openness for secret.205 This resignation can be clearly distinguished from the unauthentic mode of being in which the Dasein is lost in the they. In the lostness in the they an anticipation to a possible Ereignis is not at all the case. The Dasein is lost there in the beings and the question of Being is there not asked. At the same time must the attitude of resignation be distinguished from the anxiety, in which Being is unclosed for the Dasein every time. The resignation must therewith be contained in the phenomenological analysis of the mystical basic attitude. For the mystical Dasein in the attitude of resignation distinguishes himself from the Dasein in his everydayness and from the Dasein in Ereignis in analogy with the manner in which the mystic distinguishes himself from the everyday man and from the enlightened master or saint.206 For the mystical Dasein in the attitude of resignation is non-ordinarily ordinary (non-everyday-ish everyday-ish). Ordinary he is for so far as Being has not given itself in an original way to him, non-ordinary he is for so far as he isn’t lost in the him surrounding beings.207 In first instance this resignation seems therewith perhaps a little like the in sub-paragraph 3.1.3 thematized experience of the night. For also there neither authenticity nor unauthenticity were the case. Resignation however does distinguish itself from the experience of the night. For in resignation are the meanings of the world not so much held back, but the Dasein is with regards thereto only attuned resigned. The experience of the night destroys meanings which make out the world, resignation lets them be for what they are without keeping them back in concealment.
With this then the second characteristic of this phenomenology of the mystical basic attitude has been brought to the fore. These characteristics must, although thematised in different sub-paragraphs, not be considered as separate from each other. In the end they regard one mode of being of the mystical Dasein in his mystical basic attitude. Resignment then is also no indifferent openness for secret, but must be thought in relation with the earlier thematised historicity. Further must here too resignation be thought in an original way, which subsequently an ontic thought of the transcendent, the mystic and their resigned relation only makes possible.
Towards the end of the previous sub-paragraph already mention was made that the characteristics of historicity and resignation in relation to the mystical basic attitude must be thought together in one mode of being. The thematising of this third characteristic, that of preservation [Bewahrung],208 will make this assignment perhaps somewhat easier. Through language and art we may get a trace of this third characteristic.
In sub-paragraph 3.1.2 already Heidegger’s thought about language was discussed. Language uncloses and uncovers Being, and does this either or not in an original way. Since Plato this has happened in the history of the Western culture mainly in a covering way. However that this uncovering of Being also may happen in an original way is clear; in his question for the sense of Being the whole of Heidegger’s thought is directed towards unclosing Being in an original way. Then Heidegger in his thought distincts between ‘speaking’ [Sprechen] as covering use of language and ‘saying’ [Sagen] as original use of language.209 Sage is for Heidegger therewith also the essence of language as Being is the essence of the beings.210 Sage then must not be understood as a concrete sequence of words, like Being must not be understood as a being or a sequence of beings. Sage shows itself in the words, usually covering, but not necessarily covering. If man wants to find the words which don’t cover but which bring Being as Being in the unconcealment he must listen to the Sage which for this can, but not necessarily will, give the right words.211 Now it is according to Heidegger among other things Dichtung (poetry) which says from the experience of Sage,212 and which therewith gives Being and founds [stiftet].213 This Dichtung must here not be thought as any poetry. Dichtung regards eventually the essence of all use of language, and poetry is therewith not necessarily Dichtung.214 When Heidegger thematises from that thought art he thus speaks about ‘great’ art, which means: art as Dichtung.215 In such art, where the essence of language is Dichtet, the Being of beings is set present.216 This coheres with the given that, in contrary to the everyday things around us, art cannot be understood as an on-hand [zuhanden] object for use. The things in the world are given us on-hand; we can do something with them.217 But this does not go for an artwork, and exactly this makes the Being of the artwork (that it is, and not not) pregnantly come to the fore.218 Without repeating Heidegger’s full analysis of the origin of the artwork it can be stated that in the being-created [Geschaffensein] of the work truth is fixated in the shape [Gestalt] of that truth.219 This fixation of truth doesn’t mean that truth so to speak for once and for all is established in the one or other form of colour or word combinations. For the artwork can lose its Being unclosing nature and denigrate into a simple at hand being. This happens for instance with art collectors who store (once great) artworks like potatoes in the celler.220 If the artwork wants to stay an artwork, and if it wants as a great artwork keep setting Being present, it must also as such be preserved by the Dasein.221 And this preservation of the artwork means simply: letting the artwork be an artwork.222 In the resignation with regards to the artwork, the artwork can stay an artwork and keep setting Being present.
The question may rise what the above explication on art and preservation has to do with the mystical Dasein. As mentioned earlier is true, great art, in whatever form, Dichtung. Nevertheless does Heidegger give a special place to poetry as form of art, and this has to do with the lingluisticality thereof. Language is original because it is through language that the world is unclosed.223 Artworks such as paintings, statues or architecture are as such already opened by language. A painting is understood as painting from the language in which both painting and the Dasein are placed. It is therefore that Heidegger sees poetry as more original than the other arts.224 Now in poetry as most original Dichtung it is that the inexpressible is said.225 It is there that the inexpressible secret, so that inexpressible around which mysticism pivots, is said.226 However poetry is not the only linguistic form in which the inexpressible can be said. It also takes place in what Heidegger distinctively from philosophy calls ‘thought’,227 but it also takes place in mysticism. For sub-paragraph 2.2.3 made clear that in the mystical teaching also for a saying of the inexpressible is striven. The present findings then make the in subparagraph 1.1.1 mentioned proximity of Heidegger’s thought with poetry and mysticism more concrete and more understandable. Also it becomes clear in which way the preservation of Being in the artwork has to do with the mystical Dasein and also how the phenomenological concepts of order, historicity, resignation and preservation are contained together in the wholeness of the mystical basic attitude. The mystical Dasein exists historically and is always contained in the language of his time, place and culture, wherefrom the world for him is in order. However the mystical Dasein is in contrary to the everyday Dasein not fully lost in that orderly world. The ordered beings of that world are in order, but are by the mystical Dasein so to speak encountered from the attitude of resignation. The mystical Dasein is not lost in, but resigned towards the him surrounding beings. Now to the language of his culture also belong the linguistic works which are available to him. To those linguistic works subsequently also belong poetic, religious and mystical works. For as far as these works are able to say the inexpressible they have to be preserved as such by the Dasein. This shall not happen with the everyday Dasein. This one is completely lost in the beings and won’t see the works as essential Seinsgeschick which sends and founds history.228 This is different with the mystical Dasein who in the work, in his case perhaps a mystical or religious work, preserves the inexpressible secret that Being may now perhaps hold itself back, but can send itself nevertheless also in an original way. And this then all in the resignation of letting the work be a work. In the mystical basic attitude the mystical Dasein preserves orderly, historicitic and resigned the inexpressible secret.
In paragraph 2.3 were two moments in mysticism distinguished: the mystical basic attitude and the mystical experience. The mystical basic attitude was characterized by order, and the mystical experience was characterized by chaos. In this characterization of the mystical experience and through the concept ‘chaos’ this concept however had to be understood in an ambiguous way. The everyday meaning of ‘unorderedness’ was acknowledged because in the chaos of the mystical experience indeed a disruption takes place of the order which holds sway in the mystical basic attitude. However also had ‘chaos’ to be understood in its more original meaning, namely as ‘void’ and ‘abyss’. A meaning which was also acknowledged by Heidegger.229 Among other things thanks to this acknowledgement could in sub-paragraph 3.1.4 ‘chaos’ be made phenomenologically understandable from Heidegger’s thought. There ‘chaos’ was understood as the nullifying (or not-ing) (which nullifies in the night as origin of the in secret waged battle between concealment and unconcealment). This nullifying, so we saw, lies at the base of the Being of the beings. That something is, means equal originally that it is not nothing. And this ‘nothing’ of the ‘not nothing’ indicates not only a negation of that nothing, but also a dependency thereon of the regarded ‘something’ (as truth as un-concealment is dependent upon the concealment).230 What Heidegger understands as the ‘nothing’ regards according to him thus the original ground for every being. At the same time it is as that ground however never itself a being. With that it is however a very remarkable ground. For it is exactly the nothing which holds the meanings of the beings back and stores them away within itself.231 As ground the nothing is thus an abys (or un-ground) [Ab-grund].232 This is very compatible to the Greek and Latin ascription of meaning of ‘abys’ to ‘chaos’. However Heidegger understands this abys of course from his thought in a phenomenological way. ‘Ab-grund’ is strictly translated ‘the (downward) leaving ground’.233 It is in that abys (or un-ground) in which the beings disappear. However beings that have disappeared are in Heidegger’s thought beings that are closed in concealment. The nullifying of the night because of which the night is seen as noxious is not a physical destruction of the beings but regards the nullifying (or not-ing) of the nothing.234 This nullifying of the nothing is however simply the closing of the inner-worldly beings which in their everydayness were only still unclosed in their meanings for the Dasein.235 Orderly meanings that in the night thus sink away in the chaos of the nothing.
In the mystical experience, and it is this which we want to understand from Heidegger’s thought, the void of the chaos made the entrance of the fullness of the transcendent possible. Through Heidegger’s thought this entrance can be understood as the Ereignis of Being. In the sinking away of the meanings of the world the Dasein sees himself placed in a chaos which however regards not just a disruption of the orderly living world but also the empty space in which Being makes its full entry when this Being is unclosed in an original way. In this way Heidegger’s paradoxical sounding statement can be understood that Being is both the (ontological different) ground for the beings and that Being is also the abys (or un-ground) for those beings.236 Being is the ground for the beings because no being ‘is’ without ‘Being’. And Being is the abys for those beings because the sinking away of the meanings of the beings is equal-original with the giving itself in an original way of Being in the anxiety and the Ereignis. Through another approach this apparent paradox can be made compatible by discerning between an ontic and a phenomenological thought. The ontic thought thinks of a ground as being a being. The first ground is for that thought a highest being; the idea of the good, God or the human subject for instance. For such a thought Being must be thought as abys (or un-ground) because Being itself is never a being.237 A phenomenological thought however doesn’t think Being as being, and can therewith think Being as ontological different ground of all beings. And this then is also the way in which the nothing nullifies (or not-ings) in the Being of beings,238 namely as grounding abys (or un-ground) or as un-grounding ground. In that sense the nothing and Being are thus equal-original.239
Above was that which the mystical experience characterizes; chaos in its ambiguity, already brought in relation to the Ereignis. This relation shall in this sub-paragraph evenly so be saved, whereby here however the emphasis shall be laid on the Ereignis. In paragraph 1.3.1 this was already mentioned and shortly elucidated. Let us here reiterate and work out further one and the other through a somewhat larger consideration on this concept. Heidegger uses the term ‘Ereignis’ to indicate the giving itself in an original way of Being. Literally it means ‘happening’, and the giving itself in an original way of Being is something which according to Heidegger thus ‘happens’. That Ereignis ‘happens’ means that there is something which is being sent by Being, namely Being itself. It is not something which the Dasein, in this context the ‘mystical’ Dasein, methodically brings to being. The only thing which the Dasein can do is keeping the openness for a possible Ereignis. This however takes place in the mystical ground attitude and is not a guarantee that Being will give itself in an original way.240 Here, in the given that Ereignis happens, thus shows a radical passivity of the mystical Dasein in the mystical experience. This is analogically to the way in which the passivity of the mystic is thematised.241
In ‘Ereigniss’ reverberates as mentioned earlier also the term ‘Eignen’, which has the meanings of ‘making one’s own’. Herein can be recognized the phenomenological of Heidegger’s thought. There is no transcendent Being which gives and shows itself to a from that Being isolated human or subject. The Dasein is equal-originally with Being contained in the Ereignis and the happening of Being is equal-originally an own happening. The happening is therewith thus no pure subjective experience which could be summoned by one or the other transcendent given. When the mystical experience is understood phenomenologically it must thus be understood in a more original way as mystical happening. (With such an expression it must be kept in mind that Heidegger’s thought borders to mystical thought, and that it is very well possible that also in mysticism the ontic thought is already left. This is in this consideration however not the subject of research).
That this happening is intimately own to the Dasein makes that we may understand and thematize Ereignis also as enfindingness. Now the enfindingness in which Being is unclosed for the Dasein in an original way Heidegger mentions (primarily in Sein und Zeit, but also in other works) as ‘anxiety’.242 This anxiety is distinguished from fear. Fear is ever fear of a particular inner-worldly being, however anxiety is anxiety for world as such.243 This ‘world as such’ can be understood as equal-original with the already elaborate thematised ‘nothing’.244 This ‘nothing’ wasn’t sketched as a result of a physical destruction of beings,245 but as an original given which holds back the meanings of those beings and makes possible the sinking away thereof.246 In anxiety the nothing is revealed,247 and in that revelation the beings as such and world as such occur.248 This world-as-such then is also not the world of meanings in which the Dasein is at home. In the anxiety the Dasein is not-home, the Dasein is Unheimlich.249 ‘World-as-such’ can here be understood as Heidegger’s phenomenological counter-paradigm of the metaphysical ‘nature’. ‘Chaos’ carries besides the meaning of ‘emptiness’ or ‘abys’ both in Greek as in Latin also the meaning of ‘unformed matter’.250 ‘Unformed matter’ is compatible with the earlier mentioned ‘unorderedness’. This ‘unformed matter’ is what metaphysically is understood as ‘nature’.251 However the Greek ‘physis’, which in metaphysical thought is translated with ‘nature’,252 has according to Heidegger originally a different meaning. Originally must ‘physis’ be understood as the treading from the concealment in the unconcealment. Here we of course recognize Heidegger’s analysis of truth and Being, and Being gives itself thus in the way of physis.253 In the uncovering thus the equal-originality of physis and alètheia,254 of Being and truth shows.255 And because the giving itself of Being (as physis) and world-as-such are equal-original, it shows how ‘world-as-such’ can be understood as the phenomenological counter-paradigm of the metaphysical ‘nature’. Except as ‘physis’ may ‘world-as-such’ further be understood also as ‘the whole of beings’ [das Seinde im Ganzen]. The whole of beings then must not be understood metaphysically as the totality of particular beings,256 but as the ungraspable horizon of understanding which makes the understanding of particular beings only possible.257 This whole of beings is never at hand given as are particular beings in their meanings, but only comes equal-originally with Being to the fore when the meanings of the particular beings fall away.
In the moment of Ereignis shows thus through the ambiguous meaning of ‘chaos’ (‘emptiness’, ‘abys’ at the one side and ‘unformed matter’ on the other side) the ambiguousness of the mystical experience. Thereby must those two meanings according to the phenomenological analysis also be thought equal-originally. Chaos is the emptiness of the nullifying (or not-ing) nothing as abys (or un-ground) wherein the covering meanings of the world fall away, through which Being gives itself grounding as world-as-such, as physis, as the whole of beings. This chaos goes along with Ereignis and with anxiety.
‘Chaos goes along with Ereignis and with anxiety’. With that remark the previous sub-paragraph was concluded. In that sub-paragraph ‘Ereignis’ was among diverse other concepts put central. Before that, in sub-paragraph 3.2.1, the concept ‘chaos’ was given full attention. And here then shall a phenomenological analysis of anxiety be the central point of departure, to from there arrive at an important other characteristic of the mystical experience. What does Heidegger exactly understand as ‘anxiety’? Already under sub-paragraph 1.1.2 (as also at other places, such as in the previous sub-paragraph) the concept was brought to the fore as being a certain enfindingness wherein the Dasein is in an authentic way and wherein he runs ahead to his own death. Also was seen that anxiety must be differentiated from fear. Fear is always fear for an inner-worldly being, and anxiety is anxiety for world-as-such. This last aspect of anxiety was already enough elucidated in the previous sub-paragraph. But what about the running ahead of the own death which takes place in anxiety? An answer to this question finds a beginning at the bringing to the forth of Heidegger’s thought about the notion of possibility. Possibility is according to Heidegger higher than reality, and equal-originally with the designing understanding of the world the Dasein understands himself in the possibilities which he sees from himself and which he is himself.258 To this can-be [Seinkönnen] of the Dasein belongs eventually as outer possibility also the own end, or the own death.259 The own death is for the Dasein thus the outer possibility to which he can design himself. This designing himself to the own death or the own end must be sharply distinguished from a simple dying away of the body. In place of a to-the-end-being it regards a being-to-the-end [Sein zum Ende], wherewith is indicated that the death which is here under consideration regards a way of being of the Dasein.260 And with this reaching for the outer possibility this being-to-the-end is equal-originally a being-whole [Ganzsein].261 For with the touching of the borders of the Dasein’s whole being (and those borders regard birth and death) the whole of the Dasein’s life is encompassed. The Dasein thus is in an authentic way when he is whole and to-the-end.
That this awareness of being-to-the-end is exactly taking place in the anxiety is understandable when it is taken in consideration that the Dasein and world take place equal-originally. The Dasein understands himself and his own identity, so as he designs himself, equal-originally with the designed meanings of the world. The falling away of the meanings of the world in the nothing of the abys (through which anxiety was elucidated already earlier) shall make the Dasein’s meaningful identity equal-originally fall away in that abys. This is comparable with the falling away of the from the orderly world derived personal identity of the mystic which in the mystical experience falls away.262 This in the nothing falling away of the meaningful identity on which the Dasein had designed himself is now of course excellently understandable as a being-to-the-end. And it is also understandable that the Dasein when the own death is in play, equal-originally with the anxiety, is set in an Unheimlichkeit. For what is more anxiety evoking and sinister than the own death?
Now in this being-to-the-end is contained a being-to-death [Sein zum Tode]. For being-to-death the Dasein is when he runs ahead to the own death.263 In this running ahead [Vorlaufen] the original temporality of the Dasein shows. For the Dasein is in his ground always temporal in the mode of futurity (or to-come-ness) [Zukünftigkeit].264 It is only on base of this futurity that something like designing on possibilities can be possible. Possibility demands futurity; without futurity everything would be actual, or perhaps actuality which has been, but every possibility would lack. The Dasein is with the futural designing himself to possibilities thus so to speak always ahead of himself.265 In the consideration of the Dasein’s futurity (or to-come-ness) as mode of temporality Heidegger however also includes the notion of becoming [Zukommen].266 In the futurity (or to-come-ness) of the Dasein something becomes him. And what becomes him in the futurity (or to-come-ness) of the running ahead of the own death in the anxiety is his most-own possibility.267 Now this most-own possibility is nothing else than the Dasein’s fate [Schicksal] which is embedded in the historicality.268 In the anxiety the Dasein takes on himself this fate (because it equal-originally becomes him). The taking on himself of this fate in the running ahead of death Heidegger calls ‘ahead-running resolve’ [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]. For in the moment of the authenticity where the Dasein takes on himself his fate not only a running ahead takes place, but equal-originally a resolve on a in the fate contained most-own design.269 The moment of authenticity is therewith on the one side a being taken back from the they to a designing to the must-own possibility, but that designing contains equal-originally also a return to the meaningful world of the they. For a design is ever a for the world meaningful design. Here it is that authentic history is founded. Heidegger understands Ereignis, and this is still equal-originally with the theme in this sub-paragraph taken along, as the essence of history.270 The ahead-running resolved designing to the must-own possibility in the taking on himself of the by Being sent own fate is the essence of history. This is something which especially takes place in poetry. As in sub-paragraph 3.1.4 already was mentioned it is in poetry that Being through language is founded. Being sends itself in poetry linguistically, and is in this way the authentic origin of historicality and history.271
What does this abstract figure of thought mean when we make it concrete through our consideration of the mystical Dasein? In the mystical basic attitude the mystical Dasein is historical in the sense that he is always standing in a particular culture and tradition. These he however doesn’t take on himself in an authentic way for he doesn’t run ahead to his own death and there is no Ereignis. He shall design the world, himself and equal-originally for instance his spiritual practises from the by the they delivered doctrine. (This by the way without getting lost therein, after all the mystical Dasein distinguished himself therein from the everyday Dasein). With this the mystical Dasein doesn’t take on himself his most-own fate.
This does happen in the mystical experience. There the mystical Dasein is taken back from the by the they delivered doctrine and takes ahead-running resolved his own fate on himself. This taking on himself of the own fate is however equal-originally a moment of designing, knowingly a poetic designing. The mystical Dasein in the mystical experience designs the world, himself and the doctrine poetically and founds therewith history. He shall speak new words and with that innovate the doctrine which historically though covering was delivered.
Following on what came to the fore in the previous sub-paragraph Heidegger’s statement is that actually only history takes place where about the essence of truth is resolved.272 Here we find three concepts equal-originally together, namely: ‘Ereignis’ (as essence of truth), ‘design’ (as resolve) and ‘history’. These three concepts we see equal-originally collected in another concept which was already mentioned under sub-paragraph 3.2.4, namely ‘fixation’ [feststellung]. ‘Fixation’, thus we saw there, is a concept which Heidegger uses in his discussion of the origin of the artwork and has there reference to the fixation of truth (and thus equal-originally ‘Being’) in the shape of an artwork.273 This fixation doesn’t mean that the truth of Being so to speak for once and for all is established in one or the other form of colours or word combinations. For the artwork, so we repeat, may lose its Being unclosing nature and degenerate into a simple at hand being when it is not preserved as Being unclosing. Then what is the way to think this fixation of Being? As an answer to this question the earlier mentioned concepts of ‘Ereignis’, ‘design’ and ‘history’ must be brought to the fore.
That Being must have given itself in an original way to the artist (the Dasein) in the Ereignis seems obvious. When the Dasein hasn’t made Being his own there is no possibility that he could fixate that Being as such in an artwork. That thus means that for the art creating Dasein the meanings of the world and equal-originally the meanings of the own identity have sunk away. It is therefore that Heidegger can say that in the coming to being of great art the artist so to speak is nullified (or en-not-inged) for himself and with that is a medium for Being to set itself (Beings self) in the work.274 This is of course also a very mystical thought because the mystic usually sees the works which he accomplishes as being brought to being through him, whereby he himself is present at the most as instrument of the transcendent or of God.275
Now the Being which gives itself to the Dasein in Ereignis should not be seen as the actual but as the possible.276 Therein contained is the design. When Being gives itself unconcealed in Ereignis this doesn’t mean so much that Being is given to the Dasein simply in its actuality, but this rather means that the Dasein designs himself and the world to his must-own possibilities. The beings in Ereignis in an authentic way designing, the unconcealment of Being is so to speak thrown into the beings.277 This is what takes place in the fixation. Being is in its most-own possibility fixated in the authentic design of the artwork. Herewith is the shape of such a great artwork thus actually the fixation of the sending of Being [Seinsgeschick]. This sending of Being is also that which makes out the authentic historicality of a people. This according to Heidegger takes especially place in the poetic art because this regards a linguistic artform.278 Still eventually every artwork can be considered as poetry,279 and this goes thus also for great mystical artworks. In any way the mystic finds in art a possibility for expression of the inexpressible,280 however this goes especially for linguistic expressions such as for instance prayer, theology or philosophy. For there he tries to say the inexpressible.281 And this is exactly which Heidegger concerns in his thought about poetizing and history founding poetry. For therein must the inexpressible in the spoken speak along.282
In this way are in the fixation thus Ereignis, design and history contained. This fixation of the unconcealment of Being, as in a great artwork or in a mystical deliverance, must therewith however be preserved. Being can after fixation in the artwork of the deliverance not give itself in an original way when Being therein is not preserved in an original way. This preservation already was thematized in sub-paragraph 3.1.4 and there we saw that it was especially the mystical Dasein in his mystical ground attitude who kept himself resigned and preserving open for the giving itself of Being in an original way. Here however the mystical experience was under consideration. This was phenomenological made understandable through the characteristics of chaos, Ereignis, foundation and fixation. In the mystical experience is the in chaos Ereigneted Being history founding fixated.
Titles of works are both attuned and attuning. Attuned they are to the essence of the content of the work and attuning they are with regards to the possible reader who, when not distuned, is attuned to a questioning for the essence of the regarded work. The attuned attuning title of this consideration read ‘a Heideggerian mysticism’, and attuned therewith to a questioning for the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism. The research question was from there formulated as: ‘How can mysticism be designed and understood from or by Heidegger’s thought?’ Therein contained then were also the sub-questions for the Heideggerian and mysticism.
In chapter 1 the question for the Heideggerian was asked. The goal was especially to sketch a general image of Heideggers though (which characterizes the Heideggerian), wherefrom in chapter 3 then the main question could be asked. This sketching of a general image of Heideggers thought was consequently done through a few important characteristics which can be recognized in that thought.
As main characteristic ‘ontological difference’ was mentioned. Therewith Heidegger wanted to point out that the Being of the beings is itself not a being. These main characteristics Heidegger worked out with reference to form through neologisms and poetic / mystic / mystical sounding use of language. With reference to the content two to each other related characteristics were brought to the fore. In the first characteristic Being is thematised as origin and essence of the beings, whereby (usually) the beings cover that origin. And to that characteristic related Heidegger then thinks also a certain wholeness which is never given concretely and at hand but which as horizon is the condition of possibility for the concrete beings to appear meaningful. These characteristics where consequently anchored and concretely indicated in Heidegger’s early thought in Sein und Zeit and in his later thought. Hereby was departed from a unity in that thought. For the question whether die Kehre is a turnaround of or in Heidegger’s thought was decided in the advantage of the latter possibility.
In chapter 2 consequently the question for mysticism was asked. The concept ‘mysticism’ turned out not to be graspable in definitions and general descriptions would as a fundament for a further consideration not be solid enough. Therefore a search was started to the central given of mysticism, to that around which mysticism pivots. Through an etymological analysis the pivotal points of ‘secret’ and ‘concealment’ came to the fore. Herein the essence of mysticism would be contained. Consequently mysticism was further thematised in some important sub-aspects because the whole must be elucidated through its parts. As three basic elements of mysticism were the transcendent, the mystic and the doctrine found, and as the two central moments in mysticism were the mystical basic attitude and the mystical experience brought to the fore. The mystical basic attitude was characterized by an orderly longing and strife for union with the transcendent, and the mystical experience was characterized by chaos and emptiness of the orderly world and by union with the entering fullness of the transcendent.
The findings which came to the fore in the thematising of the two sub-questions for the Heideggerian and for mysticism were conclusively taken along to chapter 3. There was anticipated to the whole of the consideration, was the question asked for a Heideggerian mysticism, and was mysticism designed and made understandable from Heidegger’s thought. This designing took place through Heidegger’s original thought wherein was no place for covering ontic conceptions. For the thematising of isolated from each other thinkable things was no place, and thinking from the wholeness sub-aspects in their mutual coherency had to be brought to the fore.
In the first paragraph then the essence of mysticism was phenomenologically made understandable through the in chapter 2 found concealment and secret as that around which mysticism pivots. As essence of mysticism however was in the end a whole genealogy of gods found from Chaos to the offspring of Eris (among whom Lèthè en Limos). Understood from Heidegger’s thought was thereto the meaning ascribed that concealment (Lèthè) and the staying away of the gift of Being (Limos) are grounded in the battle which in secret is waged between concealment and unconcealment (Eris), which is grounded itself in the nullifying (or not-ing) in the night (Nyx), which in its turn eventually is to be traced back to the gaping void of the nothing (Chaos). In short: The nullifying (or not-ing) of the nothing in the night as origin of the in secret waged battle between concealment and unconcealment is around which a Heideggerian mysticism pivots, is the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism.
In the second paragraph the mystical basic attitude was made phenomenologically understandable. Order was there understood from the everydayness wherein the Dasein is lost in the they. The mystical Dasein however was not everyday-ish everyday-ish and thus a further refinement was needed. Without losing sight of the coherency were the characteristics of historicality, resignation and preservation brought to the fore. Historically the mystical Dasein is from the by Being sent and by the people delivered doctrine, resigned he is with regards to the beings which from the deliverance are ordered, and preserving he is because he preserves the secret in the delivered doctrine. In the mystical basic attitude the mystical Dasein preserves orderly, historically and resigned the inexpressible secret.
Conclusively in the third paragraph a phenomenological design took place of the mystical experience. Chaos turned out to unite within itself ground and abys (or un-ground) because in the sinking away of the meanings of the world in the abys (or un-ground) Being as ground makes its entrance, and this chaos was thereby paired with Ereignis and with anxiety. Chaos is the void of the nullifying (or not-ing) nothing as abys (or un-ground) wherein the covering meanings of the world fall away, through which Being gives itself grounding as world-as-such, as physis, as the whole of beings. This chaos is paired with Ereignis and with anxiety. Besides Ereignis were the other two important characteristics which in their mutual coherence with Ereignis were thematised foundation and preservation. For the mystical Dasein in the mystical experience turned out to be history founding in the fixation of Being in the mystical doctrine. In the mystical experience the in the chaos Ereigneted Being is history founding fixated.
When conclusively the two moments of mysticism are again taken together in the wholeness of their essence, then from Heidegger’s thought may be come to the following delineation of mysticism. Mysticism is the openness for the secret that Being in the order of the everydayness covering holds itself back, but in the nothing of the chaos can send itself and give itself in an original way.
This final conclusion may as closed definition be accepted or rejected, or may perhaps attune to a deeper questioning for a Heideggerian mysticism. As Being sends itself, thus it will befall.