ARVINDUS

Academic Philosophy

A Heideggerian Mysticism

CONTENT

INTRODUCTION
                                                          
1. HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT
1.1 General Characteristics
1.1.1 Ontological Differentiation
1.1.2 Unity in Diversity
1.2 Sein und Zeit                                     
1.2.1 From the Dasein to Being
1.2.2 Unauthenticity and Authenticity
1.3 Later Works
1.3.1 From Being to the  Dasein
1.3.2 Alètheia, Pseudos and Lèthè

2. MYSTICISM
2.1 Mysticism as Such
2.1.1 In Search for a Definition
2.1.2 Etymological Analysis
2.2 The three Basic Elements of Mysticism
2.2.1 The Transcendent
2.2.2 The Mystic
2.2.3 The Teaching
2.3 The two Moments in Mysticism
2.3.1 The Mystical Basic Attitude
2.3.2 The Mystical Experience

3. A HEIDEGGERIAN MYSTICISM
3.1 Phenomenology of the Essence of Mysticism
3.1.1 Concealment
3.1.2 Secret
3.1.3 Night
3.1.4 Chaos
3.2 Phenomenology of the Mystical Basic Attitude
3.2.1 Order
3.2.2 Historicity
3.2.3 Resignation
3.2.4 Preservation
3.3 Phenomenology of the Mystical Experience
3.3.1 Chaos
3.3.2 Ereignis
3.3.3 Foundation
3.2.4 Fixation

CONCLUSION

Notes

Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

Titles of works, for instance of movies, books or – as in this case – master thesis’s, are both attuned and attuning. Attuned is a title to the content of the regarded work. A title mentions the work, and in that mentioning a trace of the essence of the content is to be found. It is this mentioning with the in it contained trace of the essence of the content, the title, which is at the same time also attuning; namely with regards to the possible viewer or reader. For this one is by the title attuned to the essence of the content of the work. It is then consequently against the background of this attuning that notion is taken of the concrete content of the work. The attuning of the title is hereby an attuning to a questioning and an open attitude. It attunes to a questioning for the essence which the title mentioning presents, and it attunes at the same time to an openness for the taking notion of this through the concrete content. When the title attunes to a being closed with regards to the content – for this is also possible – then can instead of an attuning be spoken of a distuning. In that case shall the work usually not be taken at hand. Because the reader of these words however arrived already beyond the taking notice of the title and started with the exploration of the content of this thesis it is likely that in this case the title has attuned and not distuned.

Now the title of this consideration reads: ‘A Heideggerian Mysticism’. This title mentions and carries within itself the essence of this consideration, and the special question to which this title attunes is the question for the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism. Here we see: it doesn’t regard the question for a comparison between Heidegger’s thought and mysticism, not the question for which mystical elements can be found in Heidegger’s thought and not the question whether Heidegger can be seen as a mystic (although hints as answers to these questions may implicitly be present in this consideration). It is the question for a Heideggerian mysticism. A Heideggerian mysticism; so also not the question for the Heideggerian mysticism. This consideration is thus not completely normative in the sense that here a sketch shall be given of how Heideggerian mysticism should look like in any case. Rather it regards the question for how mysticism can be designed and understood from or through Heidegger’s thought, and how a thus designed and understood mysticism then can look like. It is this question to which the title attunes and it is this question which will resound in the background in the further elaboration. Also is that for which this question questions the essence which will be present in the further thematising and concrete elaboration.

The above regards the main question and research question in this consideration. ‘How can mysticism be designed and understood from or by Heidegger’s thought?’ This main question however also carries within itself sub-questions, and the putting of the main question by itself calls forth these sub-questions. Thus the question for a Heideggerian mysticism calls forth for instance the question for the Heideggerian. We may have heard of Eastern mysticism, Western mysticism, Hinduistic mysticism, Islamic mysticism, Christian mysticism, Rhineland mysticism and possibly also about many other kinds of mysticism, but ‘Heideggerian mysticism’ shall not occur in a general accepted summarization or division of mysticisms. This shall thus call forth the sub-question for the Heideggerian. What makes something, for instance mysticism, Heideggerian? The Heideggerian shall without doubt have to do with the philosopher Martin Heidegger and with his thought. With this perhaps already much has been said, but at the same time little or nothing contentual elaborated. And the question for the Heideggerian exactly does ask for a further and a more elaborate thematising of it. Thus shall Heidegger’s thought be put central in the first chapter of this consideration to give in this way an idea of the Heideggerian in a Heideggerian mysticism. Together with the question for the Heideggerian comes to the fore the question for mysticism as such. Of what must we think or in which direction must we let our thoughts go when something is mentioned as ‘mystic’? This also asks further than a simply mentioning for a more elaborate thematising. This then shall be done in the second chapter, where we shall provide ourselves a view on mysticism as such and on several aspects which we can recognize in it. In the third chapter conclusively we take the above sub-questions back into their whole to against the background of the main question design and make understandable mysticism from the Heideggerian, to further thematise a Heideggerian mysticism and to elaborate the essence of it in its whole. The elaborating of the essence of this consideration in its whole does not mean that everything shall be explicated what can be objectively seen and explicated about the subject. Rather it is so that especially in the third chapter the essence of this whole consideration can be presented in its wholeness. This means: especially in the third chapter shall be anticipated to the wholeness of this consideration, on its essence. Because it is however not meant here to Heideggerian mystify a Heideggerian mysticism we shall after these to questioning attuning words in a pragmatic way make a true start with the concrete elaboration.

1. HEIDEGGER'S THOUGHT

In the introduction we saw that the question for a Heideggerian mysticism brings with it the sub-question for the Heideggerian. To deepen out and thematise that question shall in this chapter Heidegger and his thought be thematised. Martin Heidegger (1889 – 1976) was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century and may without doubt be included in the list with names of great philosophers from the history of Western philosophy.1 A history in which he did not really include himself; he didn’t considered his oeuvre to belong to philosophy but to what he named distinguishingly ‘thought’.2 This makes the need to bring to the forth the characteristics of Heidegger’s thought only greater. To do this shall in the first paragraph of this chapter some of the most important characteristics be mentioned and still rather generally be treated. In the two following paragraphs shall these characteristics however be anchored in more concrete descriptions of Heidegger’s thought. The space to do this very elaborate lacks here, for enough space must be saved for the thematising of the main question in chapter 3. It is there that mysticism eventually shall be made understandable from Heidegger’s thought, and there also can the specific of Heidegger’s thought be further and more elaborately be brought to the fore in a thematically way (namely with as leading theme ‘mysticism’). The goal of this chapter then is also especially to sketch a general image of Heidegger’s thought and to give an idea of it. This to sketch the context from where, or by which, in chapter 3 mysticism can be Heideggerian designed and made understandable.

1.1 General Characteristics

1.1.1 Ontological Differentiation3
Heidegger’s thought may very concisely be summarized in the words which he wrote in Sein und Zeit: “The Being of the beings ‘is’ itself no being.”4 Metaphysics has forgotten the question for Being as such according to Heidegger and thematises Being as if it were itself a being, and then the highest being.5 Examples of such a metaphysical consideration of Being as highest being regard: the idea of the good with Plato, the unmoved mover with Aristotle, God with the middle agers and the human subjects since Descartes. The whole history of Western philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche has been governed by this metaphysical thought.6 Now Heidegger wants to go beyond those metaphysics and philosophy (metaphysics and philosophy are for Heidegger exchangeable terms)7 and leave these eventually to themselves by taking up in his thought again the question for Being.8 Thus Heidegger aims in his thought to leave metaphysical philosophy and ask the question for the sense of Being.9 What Heidegger hereby in fact aims at is an ontological differentiation. Being is ontologically different from the beings. To bring that ontological differentiation to the fore, to ask the question for Being and to thematise Being Heidegger makes use of both form and content. His works are both in form and content characteristic. In a certain sense can form and content in Heidegger’s thought not really be separated. For Heidegger writes contentual about the thought that conquers metaphysics, and he does this in a form which exactly constitutes that metaphysics conquering thought. Although thus form and content in Heidegger’s thought can be difficultly separated may with a separate bringing to the fore of the characteristics of those two the specific of that thought be depicted more clearly.  

Then what typifies the form of Heidegger’s thought? Approximately it can be stated that Heidegger thematises the ontological differentiation in a form which borders on poetry10 and mysticism11 (for according to Heidegger it is in disciplines like mysticism and especially poetry that an experience of Being is the case).12 This thematising in that specific form he does among other ways through the use of countless neologisms.13 These neologisms may be already existing words which by Heidegger however get assigned an unusual and often an ambiguous meaning (for instance ‘Dasein’ and ‘Sage’), or by Heidegger new created words on base of already existing words (for instance ‘Geworfenheit’ and ‘Eigentlichkeit’). He also makes use in his later works (such as for instance in ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie’)14 of in meanings difficult to phantom and recover terms that often sound very mystical or poetic (for instance ‘der letzte Gott’ and ‘die Zukünftigen’). Hereby Heidegger lets himself be inspired by poets, and then especially by Hölderlin,15 and by the pre-Socratic Greeks.16 He then usually works out his thought through on the one hand interpretations of poems of Hölderlin (which are considered to present a certain originality), and on the other hand own etymological analyses which carry him back to according to him original meanings of pre-Socratic Greek use of language. These analyses are thereby considered to bare an originality in the metaphysical use of language. Further in this consideration we shall encounter lots of examples concerning this.

Contentual it is so that Heidegger thematises and comes to an ontological differentiation by considering Being as the origin of the beings which is always present in them and usually, but not always, is covered itself by those beings. So: Being is the origin and ground of every being,17 Being is as that ground always present in the beings, Being is usually covered by the beings,18 but Being is not necessarily and always covered by the beings. It is this think figure of originality and covering which every time returns in Heidegger’s thought about metaphysics. For the thought by traditional metaphysics of Being as being a being is by Heidegger considered as a thought which finds its ground in Being itself, but as derivation of it at the same time covers that Being and the question for it.19 Being is the ground for metaphysical thought, for after all it is Being from which the beings derive their being. No being is without Being. Even a highest being, the central subject of metaphysics, must when it ‘is’ derive its being from Being. With that finds as said thus the metaphysical thematising of Being as highest being its origin and ground in Being itself. An origin and ground which is by metaphysics at the same time covered by not thematising Being as Being itself but as highest being. Heidegger then considers metaphysics as first philosophy also as the root of the tree of philosophy which itself however is rooted in the ground of Being.20 That the original thought of Being does not necessarily need to be covered by metaphysics also clearly comes to the fore in Heidegger’s thought. For Heidegger stays especially in his later philosophy concerned with the thematising of a new beginning where the leap to such a thought of Being can be made.21

Equal original with the above sketched characteristic of originality and covering is in Heidegger’s thought also always a certain wholeness in play which stands in close relation with the originality of Being. Heidegger uses for the indicating of this wholeness terms like ‘world as such’ [Welt als solche] and ‘beings as a whole’ [Seinde im Ganzen]. This wholeness then must explicitly not be thought as a sum of parts, which is the way in which metaphysics thematises the whole. For the wholeness which Heidegger aims at is never concrete, graspable and at hand given, but is as background always present as ground of the concrete, separate and meaningful beings. This wholeness can be considered as the horizon against which background separate beings can appear meaningful, whereby the horizon itself however is never concrete and meaningful at hand.22 So the parts are thereby understood against the background and in the context of the whole in which they stand. It is thus by grace of that wholeness, which is ungraspable in the background, that the separate beings can be disclosed and understood.23 A sentence in a linguistic work (to elucidate the think figure with a concrete example) derives its specific meaning from the whole of that work, in which context that sentence is contained. However for the reader who reads the regarded sentence is that work only given at the background and not as at hand and rounded off whole. If the reader wants to relate to the work in its whole then he must so to speak let his relation to the concrete particular sentences go and transfer his concrete attention or focus to a considering of the whole.

In this then the close relationship is shown between Being and the world-as-such, between origin and whole. For Being and world-as-such are both (though not necessary) covered when the meaningful beings step up to the foreground. This close relationship shall later in this chapter and after that in chapter 3 increasingly clearer and more concrete be brought to the fore. For now it is of importance to note that originality and wholeness in relation to the content of Heidegger’s thought are two important characteristics with which Heidegger wants to come to the ontological difference between beings and Being.

When we concisely summarize the above words it turns out that the main characteristic of Heidegger’s thought is that of ontological difference. This Heidegger wanted to achieve in relation to the form of his thought through neologisms and mystical terms that bring his thought at the border with poetry and mysticism. Contentually he thematised the ontological difference through a basic structure of originality and covering. In that structure does the originality not necessarily need to be covered, although this usually is the case. In this covering this originality however still stays present as ground for that covering. In close relation with this originality as ground Heidegger then also thinks a wholeness which as horizon makes the unclosing and the understanding of the separate (and covering) beings possible. In short; in Heidegger’s thought we find the main characteristic of ontological difference, which regarding form is worked out through neologisms and poetic / mystic / mystical use of language, and which regarding content is worked out in the structure of originality and covering in which a notion of an original wholeness is included. It are these characteristics which will be further elucidated and concretised in the following two paragraphs (1.2 and 1.3) where successively Heidegger’s early thought at the time of Sein und Zeit and his later thought of after Sein und Zeit shall be subject of consideration.

1.1.2 Unity in Diversity
Before turning to a concretisation of the general and abstract thematised characteristics should here first be gone deeper into the above mentioned earlier and later thought of Heidegger. For when is spoken of Heidegger’s thought a discernment is made between his earlier thought at the time of his best known work ‘Sein und Zeit’ and his later works of after that, in which period a numerous amount of other works were written. For after Sein und Zeit a turnaround takes place in Heidegger’s thought. That such a turnaround has taken place is not a subject of discussion among academics. Also Heidegger himself mentions this turnaround, namely as ‘die Kehre’,24 a term which by academics is still often used to refer to this turnaround. Still a subject of discussion is the question whether this Kehre is a turnaround of or a turnaround within Heidegger’s thought; whether die Kehre regards a radical turnaround of Heidegger’s thought itself or a turnaround within a unity of his thought. There are important signs which decide this discussion in the advantage of the last assumption; the assumption that die Kehre takes place within a unity of Heidegger’s thought way. In the first place did Heidegger himself explicitly state that after die Kehre his point of view of Sein und Zeit is not deserted.25 It is an utterance which we see acknowledged in his works which tirelessly keep handling the same theme: “Being is never a being.”26 And also the mentioned characteristics stay present both in Sein und Zeit and in his later works.

Within this given unity of Heidegger’s thought we do however find a clear difference in his concrete elaboration of the mentioned characteristics. Where in Sein und Zeit the being-human (by Heidegger indicated with ‘Dasein’)27 is the point of departure to ask the question of Being, there this becomes in Heidegger’s later works Being itself.28 These two points of departure and the elaborations thereof however can be considered as being complementary to each other, thus claims not in the last place Heidegger himself.29 It then is also on basis of the mentioned directions that here shall be departed from the unity of Heidegger’s thought. This unity shall further become clear when connections can be laid between the point of departure in Heidegger’s earlier thought (Dasein) and his later thought (Being). This shall happen in the coming two paragraphs, near the concretization of the earlier mentioned characteristics. With the thematising of Sein und Zeit shall the road be gone from the Dasein to Being, and with the thematising of the later works shall the road be gone from Being to the Dasein. Although in this sub-paragraph already enough arguments have been given to come to a decision, shall in the thematising of the two mentioned roads the unity in diversity in Heidegger’s thought as plausible point of departure be able to show itself clearer and more concrete.

1.2 Sein und Zeit

1.2.1 From the Dasein to Being
Two tasks were set out for this paragraph. On the one side it must be shown how Heidegger in Sein und Zeit walks the road from the Dasein to Being. This on behalf of the thinking of a unity in Heidegger’s earlier and later thought. On the other side it must be made concrete how the in sub-paragraph 1.1.1 mentioned characteristics in Sein und Zeit are to be recognized. This to not let these characteristics float in abstract propositions but to anchor them concretely in Heidegger’s thought, or to point them out. The first task shall be executed in this sub-paragraph and the second in the next. That we have to be concise was already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. How does Heidegger, so we ask thus the question here, in Sein und Zeit find his way from the Dasein to Being?

As mentioned in the previous paragraph Heidegger aims in Sein und Zeit to ask the question of Being from the point of departure from the being-human. It is then also there that Heidegger introduces his specific term ‘Dasein’ for that being human. A term which is preserved also in the entirety of his later works. This term, which can also be read as ‘Da-sein’, expresses for Heidegger perfectly the way of being of the being-human. The Dasein (by Mark Wildschut in Dutch translated as ‘erzijn’,30 and in English translatable as ‘being-there’) is namely always there. The Dasein is always already in the world; with the things and with the others.31Dasein’ is ‘being-in-the-world’ [In-der-Welt-sein].From this Da-sein also speaks Heidegger’s phenomenological method. Heidegger does not think in metaphysical subject-object relations but takes subject and object as contained in the occurrence of phenomena. Phenomenology he then understands as that which shows itself from itself and as the revealed.32 The revelation of the things and the being-in-the-world are equal-original with the Dasein. For this being-in-the-world of the Dasein is grounded in the given that the Dasein encountering beings in the world are always unclosed to him. ‘Unclosedness’ [Erschlossenheit] means that the Dasein always understands [versteht] the encountering beings and the world in a specific way.33 But the beings derive that unclosedness only from Being itself (without Being the beings are not), and thus belongs more original than the understanding of beings to the Dasein also an understanding of Being.34 This is not an understanding of one or the other transcendent given but exactly an intimate understanding of the own being.35 This understanding of the own being is however also again not a deep introspection in which the world is left behind. Being-in-the-world and understanding of Being fall together as the original basic aspects of the way of being of the Dasein. The being which matters for this being in its being is being its ‘there’.36 When for instance the Dasein is with a scissor and with another whose hair he cuts with that scissor against a pay, then he shall equal-originally with this way of being-in-the-world understand himself as being a haircutter.

The unclosing of the beings and of Being thus carries within itself the being-in-the-world and the understanding of Being, and this as one way of being of the Dasein. Now this unclosing is however, as the example of the haircutter already indicates, never an indifferent happening. For it always takes place through a certain attuning [Stimmung] and enfindingness [Befindlichkeit].37 This enfindingness can be understood as a specific, attuned and unclosing attitude or way of being. In German ‘Befindlichkeit’ simply means ‘mood’, however Heidegger recognizes in his conception of enfindingness also the finding oneself and the finding. For in the enfindingness the Dasein finds himself attuned in-the-world and has in a specific attuned way unclosed and found himself.38 Enfindingness is an important core concept in Sein und Zeit but also keeps playing an important role in the later works (be it perhaps more implicitly than in Sein und Zeit).

The nature of this specific enfindingness from which the world and the Dasein thus are unclosed in a specific way is itself however grounded in again another given, namely in ‘thrownness’ [Geworfenheit].39 ‘Thrownness’ here basically indicates the tradition and the personal history from which the world and the Dasein are unclosed. The Dasein is always already very specifically thrown in the world from the cultural setting and the personal context in which he was raised. He understands the world and himself from his cultural roots. However besides thrown in the world the Dasein is also thrown in a designing [Entwerfen].40 This designing relates to the Dasein’s understanding of himself and the possibilities on which he from this understanding designs himself.41 This notion of possibility is crucial in Heidegger’s thought because therein possibility is seen as higher than reality.42 For being is by Heidegger not thought as actuality but from the Dasein’s thrown designing understood possibility.43 Something ‘is’ from its design. One and the same being or object can be designed on different possibilities. A nail file shall by a pedicure be designed in the meaning coherence of the caretaking of nails, however can by a prisoner be designed as an instrument for escape from his prison. Dependent upon the tradition, the environment and the attuning can objects in different ways be understood in their being. The things which make out the world and equal-original the in the world being being (the Dasein) are from the cultural roots and the context specifically designed on their being from possibilities. In this way is in Sein und Zeit then from the point of departure of the Dasein eventually arrived at Being (as possibility), and this through the Dasein’s way of being of the thrown designing on the possibility according to which he understands and uncloses himself and the world.

1.2.2 Unauthenticity and Authenticity
With the previous sub-paragraph are the ontological difference of Being and the contentual characteristics of the asking of the question of Being in Heidegger’s early thought of Sein und Zeit already somewhat concretized and has also the characteristic of the form which Heidegger handles already come to the fore in diverse neologisms. What until now however has not become recognizable regards the structure of originality and covering, and this shall be put central here. This then asks for a thematising of unauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit] and authenticity [Eigentlichkeit], for it is therein that in Sein und Zeit this structure can be recognized. We trace the structure from the above analysis of the Dasein. The world is, as we saw, for the Dasein, by the Dasein and as the Dasein44 unclosed from a thrown designing on the understood possibility. This thrown designing is itself in its specification however rooted in again another specific given. In his everydayness [Alltäglichkeit], as the Dasein usually is, regards this given ‘the they’ [das Man].45 The they can be understood as the others in their generality with which the Dasein is in-the-world. It regards so to speak the general ruling public opinion. Here everyone is the other and nobody is himself.46 It is here that the Dasein is set in the mode of being of unauthenticity.47 This unauthentic way of being in which the Dasein is lost in the they is in a certain sense a way of being which covers. For in this way of being it is that Being is covered by a preoccupation with beings. It regards a way of being in which a consideration of ontological difference is not the case because the question of Being here is not asked. Heidegger then speaks in this context also of unburdening of being.48 The they unburdens the Dasein so to speak from asking for the being of his own being. For in the ground of his being the Dasein is designing on possibilities, and it is exactly the designing which the they takes over from the Dasein and of which it unburdens him. For the they designs in the unauthenticity for the Dasein his possibilities. This unburdening is thereby also a covering, for the by the they handed over possibility covers the original possibility on which the Dasein can design himself in his ground.49

Now in the above mentioned ground is the Dasein set when he is in an authentic way. ‘Ground’ here is a suitable term, for as Being lies at the ground of the beings, so lies authenticity at the ground of unauthenticity. The understanding of authenticity as ground however becomes only accessible from the analysis so far. Therein the Dasein was sketched primarily as an on possibilities designing and Being understanding being, which usually is designing from the they. To the possibilities of the Dasein on which he designs himself belongs however also the outmost possibility of his can-be [Sein-können]. And that outmost possibility regards the own death. For further than death do the possibilities of the Dasein not reach. With this reaching out to the outmost can-be and the own death the Dasein touches equal-original his own wholeness (for the wholeness of his life stretches from his birth to his death).50 Now in this anticipating of the wholeness of his can-be it is that the Dasein is set in his original, authentic way of being.51 The designing himself on the own possibilities does now not take place anymore from the they, but the Dasein is by the anticipation of his outmost can-be taken back from that they and thrown in a designing himself on his most-own [eigenste] possibility.52 Here the Dasein has taken on himself his own being (which always regards the being from a possibility, for Being must be understood as possibility). This most-own possibility can thereby also be understood as possibility as such.53 This means that the Dasein in the authenticity acknowledges his most-own possibility also as possibility. And because Being must be understood from possibility it also becomes understandable in this way how for the Dasein in authenticity Being is unclosed as Being (namely acknowledged as possibility). This makes the earlier mentioned characteristics clear. Being is the original ground of the beings. But Being is possibility. When set in his most-own possibility the Dasein is set for possibility as possibility (so for Being as Being), and is the Dasein set in an authentic way. A way of being which is covered when he lets himself being unburdened by a designing from the they. Then Being as possibility is covered and is a preoccupation with beings the case. The Dasein here doesn´t concern himself with his possibility as possibility but lets himself being carried away by the they from where the inner-worldly beings receive their general and obvious meanings. The wholeness which in Sein und Zeit is therewith equal-originally thought is the wholeness of the Dasein; the wholeness of his own life. But because the Dasein is equal-originally with the world, the wholeness of the Dasein is equal-original with the wholeness of world-as-such [Welt-als-solche]. Here the meanings of the inner-worldly beings which the they delivered to the Dasein have sunk away because equal-originally the Dasein is taken back from the they.

Now this original way of being Heidegger understands also as a specific enfindingness which he calls ‘Angst’ [anxiety].54 This anxiety must be distinguished from fear [Furcht]. Fear is always fear of a specific being while anxiety regards an undetermined anxiety for world-as-such.55 In chapter 3 this original way of being shall be addressed elaborately and worked out further. For the forming of a general impression of Heidegger’s thought here with regards to Sein und Zeit has been written enough. And in that writing then are also the contentual characteristics of originality and covering and of wholeness, as also the formal characteristic through the used neologisms, brought to the fore.

1.3 Later Works

1.3.1 From Being to the Dasein
Just like for the previous paragraph are for this paragraph two tasks set out. In this paragraph must for the sake of the thought of a unity in Heidegger’s earlier and later thought be made clear how Heidegger in his works of after Sein und Zeit goes the way from Being to the Dasein. Also it must be made concrete how the in sub-paragraph 1.1.1 mentioned characteristics are recognizable in Heidegger’s later work. Thus to take the characteristics out of the abstract and show them concretely in Heidegger’s thought. This latter shall be done in the next paragraph, and here it shall be brought to the fore how Heidegger in his later thought goes the way from Being to the Dasein

We earlier already saw that in Sein und Zeit the point of departure is at the Dasein to come from there to the asking of the question of Being. Although the concept ‘Dasein’ in Heidegger’s later thought certainly not disappears is there as point of departure for the asking of the question of Being thus Being itself taken. As in Sein und Zeit Being came in sight from the Dasein there comes in Heidegger’s later works the Dasein in sight from Being. Exemplary this given shows itself in Heidegger’s concept of ‘Ereignis’. For in the Ereignis it is that Being gives itself to the Dasein and that Being is unclosed for the Dasein. In itself ‘Ereignis’ is a German word which has the meaning of ‘happening’, and indeed does Heidegger think in the Ereignis the unclosing of Being as something which happens. Heidegger’s conception of ‘Ereignis’ however goes further than that. For in ‘Ereignis’ the word ‘Eignen’ reverberates, and this has the meaning of ‘making one’s own’. This refers recognizably to the Dasein for who in the Ereignis Being becomes his.56 However with this ereignen also an Enteignis [expropriation] takes place.57 Namely the Ereignis hides as Ereignis the given that it ereignet, hides the given that Being is being brought out of the hidden into the unhidden.58 In the next sub-paragraph shall this hiddenness with regards to Being be further elucidated. Further then in ‘Ereignis’ also the word ‘Eigen’ reverberates, and in this clearly the kinship can be recognized of the Eigentlichkeit from Sein und Zeit with the Ereignis from the later work. Eigentlichkeit and Ereignis regard both the same moment, be it that the first is thought from the Dasein and the second from Being.

That Ereigenis thus must be thought as original and authentic seems, given what was discussed in relation to the structure of originality and covering, to imply that Being gives itself not necessarily as Being but shall do this in the everydayness in a covering way. Heidegger acknowledges this in his later thought. Also thought from Being is in the everydayness a being lost in the surrounding beings the case.59 There, just as in the unauthentic moment in Sein und Zeit, the question of Being is not asked.60

Important in the bringing to the fore of Being as point of departure in Heidegger’s later thought is also the concept ‘Geschick’. In Sein und Zeit, after a deepening analysis of the Dasein, the choice as resolve [Entschlossenheit] is still put very central as answer to the question what may be the reason for the being of the Dasein in an authentic way.61 However because this resolve in the moment of authenticity regards a (on the own death) anticipating resolve is here the timeliness brought into play. And it is this timeliness exactly which Heidegger relates to the fate [Schicksal] of the Dasein.62 The Dasein’s anticipating and timely running ahead of the own death and the own wholeness makes the resolved chosen most-own possibility understandable as the Dasein’s fate.63 For someone’s most-own possibility which can be his only true possibility is someone’s fate. But this fate of the Dasein is closely related to what Heidegger calls ‘historicality’ [Geschichtlichkeit].64 For the Dasein’s fate is contained in the collective destined fate of the people to which he belongs. This collective destined fate regards the whole of the individual destined fates, and Heidegger indicates this with the term ‘order of fate’ [Geschick].65 The order of fate of a people is thus closely related to the individual fate of the Dasein who belongs thereto, and the taking on himself of this fate by the Dasein (when he anticipates to the own death) is for the people then also of historical meaning.

Where in Sein und Zeit the fate, the order of fate and the historicality is thought from the analysis of the Dasein, there are these in the later work thought from Being itself. ‘Geschick’ Heidegger now reads as ‘Ge-schick’ whereby ‘schick’ (‘schicken’ means ‘sending’) indicates that in the order of fate there is something which is being sent by Being.66 Heidegger speaks in this context of a roaming [wesen] of Being.67 In the sending itself, Being roams. Whether subsequently Being sends itself as Being itself or covered depends in Heidegger’s later thought thus primarily on Being itself. The Dasein cannot bring about the Ereignis himself and can at the most keep an open place therefor.68 The term which Heidegger uses for that open place is ‘Lichtung’. For ‘Lichtung’ indicates in German an open place in the woods where the light can fall in, and this image of the (possible) falling in of light in the open place in the woods Heidegger adopts in his thought about the lighting of Being in the by the Dasein open held place.69 That Being not necessarily Ereignet itself, that Being not necessarily is lighted as Being but also can give itself covered as being and therewith also can withhold itself as Being is something which Heidegger indicates with ‘secret’ [Geheimnis].70 Nevertheless the Dasein can keep himself open for Being as Being, independent whether Being sends itself in an original way or covered as being. This keeping open of the Dasein for the secret that Being can send itself in an original way or covered is by Heidegger indicated with ‘resignation’ [Gelassenheit].71 This resignation can be understood as a form of enfindingness. As there is an openness in the anxiety for Being whereby Being uncloses itself, there is in the resignation also an openness for Being. This however without Being giving and unclosing itself necessarily as Being.72

In chapter 3 concepts like ‘Ereignis’, ‘Geschick’ and ‘Gelassenheit’ shall be elucidated still further. Here their mentioning had the mark of the sketching of the road from Being to the Dasein in Heidegger’s later thought. Being sends itself covered or not in the Geschick or order of fate in the openness which the Dasein in his ground has for Being as Lichting. That Being gives itself covered as being or not and therewith withholds itself as Being is the secret for which the Dasein however always can hold himself open in resignation. The ontological difference of the asking of the question of Being as also the characteristic form have therewith come clearly to the fore. Also the structure of originality and covering is already recognizable. This latter can however in the next sub-paragraph be set sharper with the handling of Heidegger’s conception of truth.

1.3.2 Alètheia, Pseudos and Lèthè
In the previous paragraph where the road was gone from Being to the Dasein the ontological difference and the asking of the question of Being, as also the characteristic form of Heidegger’s thought already came recognizable to the fore. Under this paragraph the structure of originality and covering shall be anchored and indicated in the later thought of Heidegger. Because Heidegger’s later thought is much more encompassing than Sein und Zeit and knows in itself also a diversity different perspectives are possible. The clearest this structure however comes to the fore in the thematising of the concepts ‘alètheia’, ‘pseudos’ and ‘lèthè’. ‘Alètheia’, ‘pseudos’ and ‘lèthè’ are three of the from Greek derived concepts which are inseparable connected to each other in Heidegger’s conception of truth.73 Already in Sein und Zeit,74 but especially in his later work, Heidegger thinks truth as unconcealment [Unverborgenheit] from the Greek ‘alètheia’.75 This unconcealment may regard both an unconcealment of beings and of Being itself.76 Being and truth then are also equal-original.77 This is a thought which is already found with Aristotle, be it there still in (according to Heidegger) a less original way.78 In the not original conception of truth is truth understood as correspondence of an utterance with a being and not as unconcealment. Heidegger thinks this truth as correspondence as being derived from the more original and pre-given truth as unconcealment. For the correspondence of an utterance with a being only becomes possible when this being is unconclealed.79

Truth according to Heidegger is thus unconcealment of Being, however in the everydayness Being gives itself in the beings in a way of covering [Verdeckung] and displacement [Verstellung].80 For this giving itself of Being in a covering and displacing way Heidegger gives the Greek name of ‘pseudos’.81 In these two concepts of alètheia and pseudos clearly the structure of originality and covering can be recognized. In the covering and derived pseudos the original revealing alètheia is present. Herewith do alètheia and pseudos thus in structure correspond with Being and the beings, and with authenticity and unauthenticity.

In his later work Heidegger however goes further in his analysis of originality than in Sein und Zeit. For it shows that unconcealment itself is also grounded in another given, namely in concealment. Heidegger came to his notion of truth as unconcealment through the Greek word ‘alètheia’. This word itself however simply means ‘truth’ and seems as such not to carry a meaning within itself such as ‘unconcealment’.82 Heidegger however reads ‘alètheia’ also as ‘a-lètheia’. Now ‘lètheia’ being reduced to ‘lèthè’ means in Greek ‘concealment. When the ‘a-‘ thus expresses the opposite of ‘lèthè’ may ‘alètheia’ as ‘truth’ also be interpreted as ‘un-concealment’. It is in this way that Heidegger comes to his notion of truth as unconcealment. The ‘a-‘ however not only indicates a negation of the thereafter placed word.83 It also indicates a dependency thereof.84 Unconcealment is dependent upon the more original concealment and is therein grounded.85 Concealment turns out to be more original than unconcealment. Thus we recognize in alètheia and pseudos very clearly the structure of originality and covering, whereby Heidegger gives this structure with lèthè a further depth.

Herewith then enough words have been given to the sketching and bringing to the fore of the characteristic of Heidegger’s thought and are thus enough words given to the sketching and bringing to the fore of the characteristic of the Heideggerian in a Heideggerian mysticism. The findings in this chapter can be brought along to chapter 3, where mysticism shall be designed and made understandable from Heidegger’s thought. First however an impression must be gained of mysticism. This task shall be undertaken in the next chapter, where the other sub-question in the question for a Heideggerian mysticism shall be asked; the question for mysticism.

2. MYSTICISM

In the introduction it was already asserted that in the question for a Heideggerian mysticism together with the question for the Heideggerian also the question for mysticism as such comes to the fore. In the previous chapter the Heideggerian was thematised, and in this chapter then shall mysticism be the explicit subject of consideration. Mysticism shall in this chapter be thematised in three steps and sub-themes. Some coherency of these sub-themes shall already be found, however especially in chapter 3 shall this coherency come to the fore. This is however not yet the case in this chapter where mysticism shall be the subject of consideration in a more usual way. The three sub-themes of this chapter regard: ‘mysticism as such’, ‘the three basic elements of mysticism’ and ‘the two moments in mysticism’. Hereby shall ‘mysticism as such’ thematise mysticism in its whole, and shall in the two other sub-themes aspects be brought to the fore which are contained in mysticism as such.

2.1 Mysticism as Such

2.1.1 In Search for a Definition
What is that: ‘mysticism’? Of what must we think with mysticism? In which direction must we let our thoughts go? When we are going to search for the specifics of mysticism in books and texts that have mysticism as subject we may encounter plentiful definitions and descriptions. Mysticism then may relate to not understandable utterances of an illogical speaker, the twisted visions of someone with schizophrenia, hallucinations or by drugs caused visions, spiritual visions or to the quiet experience of a holy darkness or void.86 Other examples of definitions regard: “immediate, inner experience of the divine or transcendental reality”,87 “supernatural actions and situations, which human meddling and powers never can accomplish”,88 “a special, religious experience of unity-communion-presence wherefrom flow out undeterminability and inexpressibility”89 and “knowledge from experience about god”.90 More often however do authors choose to refrain from giving a definite definition, and those who do hurry themselves usually to nuance the definiteness and to bring to the fore the difficulty of a definite all saying definition. Almost always the author is thus explicitly nuanced with regards to a given definition. Apparently mysticism is a phenomenon that lets itself not being caught easily in concrete, not even wide concrete, definitions.91

This difficulty can be met by giving descriptions of mysticism and thematising aspects within mysticism further. Also in this consideration shall in the next two paragraphs aspects within mysticism be thematised, but for this is no place in a paragraph which has as subject ‘mysticism as such’. What seems to remain then is the giving of a general description. However a general description could offer too less grip and could as basis for a further thematising turn out to be not solid enough. For this reason we choose here for the option which countless other authors also chose, namely tracing and mentioning that where all descriptions of mysticism pivot around. What is this central given, thus we ask the question. What is mysticism all about? Following many other authors may that around which mysticism pivots be brought to the fore through an etymological analysis. This is the standard instrument with which we can gain an opening to and a sight on the essence of mysticism where definitions and descriptions lack. 

2.1.2 Etymological Analysis
Three kinds of sources are at our disposal with the execution of an etymological analysis of the word ‘mysticism’, namely: dictionaries, etymological dictionaries and earlier executed etymological analyses of other authors. Let us start with a collected inventory of what the dictionaries have to tell us, starting with the dictionary of the Dutch language. As noun two definitions are given, namely: “passionate strife for the special, personal union of God with the human soul” and “the teaching of this strife”.92 Because definite definitions however already were found to be insufficient we may take notice of these definitions (which we surely must do), but leave them for the moment for what they are. To ‘mystiek’ [‘mystic’] as adjective this same dictionary gives the meanings of “secretive” and “puzzling”.93 So something which is mystic is considered to be secretive and puzzling. When we add translating dictionaries of to Dutch akin languages, such as German and English, we see that the German dictionary translates ‘Mystik’ besides as ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] also figuratively as ‘speculation’.94 The English dictionary translates the English ‘mysticism’ besides as ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] also as ‘mysticisme’ [‘mysticness’], which then is given the meaning of ‘faith in miracles’.95 ‘Mysticisme’ [‘mysticness’] knows in Dutch however itself the meaning of ‘tendency to mysticism’. Here we must pause with our collected inventory to explicate a difference between two ways in which mysticism in contemporary Dutch language is used. Both the German and the English dictionary give two Dutch translations for their own linguistic use of the word ‘mysticism’. The German dictionary gives the two meanings of ‘mysticism’ and ‘speculation’ (figurative) and the English dictionary gives the two meanings of ‘mysticism’ and ‘faith in miracles’. Apparently is in this case the Dutch language better able to explicate a difference between a figurative and a literary, or perhaps better; original notion of mysticism. When we relate the meaning of ‘faith in miracles’ to the meaning of ‘speculation’ (and this is plausible) then we can keep the Dutch ‘mysticisme’ [‘mysticness’] to such a figurative use of language. The Dutch ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] then can be kept free in this way for its original meaning without the need to think of speculation or faith in miracles. Attribution of meanings to ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] we thus reserve for terms such as ‘secretive’ and ‘puzzling’.

Above we already took notion of a more original meaning of mysticism, and therewith we actually already went on the road of etymology. Let us proceed on this road by consulting the etymological dictionary of J. de Vries. This dictionary follows a line from the Dutch ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] through the French ‘mystique’ and the Latin ‘mysticus’ back to the Greek ‘mysticos’. The meaning of this original word ‘mysticos’ turns out to be ‘secret’.96 A meaning which, given the above conclusion, evidently is kept in the use of ‘mystiek’ [‘mysticism’] in contemporary Dutch. Other authors turn out however to carry through their etymological analysis still further. For usually they trace the Greek ‘mysticos’ back to the Greek root words ‘mýein’ (‘muo’) and ‘myeín’ (‘mueo’). The meaning of the first root word is ‘closing’ (and then especially of the mouth and the eyes), the meaning of the second root word has reference to the being initiated into the mysteries.97 Eventually the diverse authors come usually to the original meanings of which ‘secret’ and ‘concealment’ are part.98 Meanings to which we also came in our analysis, and which we may thus consider as generally accepted.

In this way we have the central given around which mysticism pivots, and therewith its essence, brought to the fore. ‘Mysticism’ showed to be a concept being too ungraspable to fit in a tight definition, and descriptions could stay too general and therewith offer no solid basis. We therefore chose to bring to the fore the central given around which mysticism pivots. This we did through an etymological analysis. Core concepts which we found here were ‘secret’ and ‘concealment’. This is what mysticism is about.99 This is what can be considered as the essence of mysticism. With this bringing to the fore of the core points and the essence of mysticism we however still stay rather abstract. Mysticism in its whole, mysticism as such, is herewith elucidated, though a clear understanding of mysticism as such needs a certain explication of more concrete sub-aspects. Like sub-aspects are understandable against the background of the whole (which we thus brought to the fore here) must the whole be elucidated through the sub-aspects which constitute that whole.100 Not for nothing we indicated in the previous sub-paragraph that a further thematising of aspects within mysticism can give a clearer view on mysticism. For this was no place within paragraph 2.1 with as subject ‘mysticism as such’. Now that place is however present in the following two paragraphs. There shall from our gained view on the whole several sub-aspects in their coherency with the whole be elucidated.

2.2 The Three Basic Elements of Mysticism

In sub-paragraph 2.1.2 we found at the start of the etymological analysis in the dictionary of the Dutch language two definitions. These definitions we left at that moment aside as they were and took notice of them. Without invalidating earlier statements about the insufficiency of definitions of mysticism we here bring the found and as notice taken definitions again to the fore. Not to still define mysticism, from this we refrained and shall keep refraining, but for the purpose of the given that these definitions can put us on track towards that which under this paragraphs shall be thematised. As definitions for ‘mysticism’ as noun the dictionary gave: “passionate strife for the special, personal union of God with the human soul” and “the teaching of this strife”. In these definitions, in which ‘strife’ plays a central role to define ‘mysticism’, can three basic elements be descried. The first definition brings the first two basic elements to the fore and the second definition brings up the third. The three basic elements regard here: ‘the transcendental’ (God), ‘the mystic’ (the human soul) and ‘the teaching’. In the recognition of these three basic elements we are not alone. We find them implicit or explicit also in other works (such as fir instance that of Kees Waaijman).101 In the three sub-paragraphs that follow shall these three basic elements be shortly elucidated.

2.2.1 The Transcendent
Mentioning must be set apart from the indicating use of terms. For terms can be used to indicate something without having the intention to also directly mention.102 It is in this way here that for the first basic element of mysticism we use the term ‘the transcendent’. There are two reasons why we here indicate instead of mention with the term ‘the transcendent’. The first reason has to do with the multitude of terms which in the different mysticisms are used for the central given of the intention in the mystical longing and the mystical strife. Among the better known terms are found: ‘the absolute’, ‘ultimate reality’, ‘the unending spirit’, ‘God’ and ‘the holy’.103 This we could perhaps, given our etymological analysis, complement with ‘the concealed’ and ‘the secret’. Dependent upon the religious setting in which the mysticism occurs and dependent upon the mystic himself can however also names be found of a more personal nature. In this we may think of for instance Krishna and other Hindu figures in the East and of Christ in the West. Such a mysticism is known as ‘bridal mysticism’, which is differentiated from the earlier brought to the fore ‘essential mysticism’.104 All in all however may ‘the transcendent’ here count as a generic term for the great diversity of terms and names which in the different mysticisms are used to indicate the central given of intention in the mystical longing and strife. Hereby we do not decide upon the question whether in the different mysticisms we have to do with mystical experiences of different natures (empiricism) or of the same nature (essentialism).105 Thus using ‘the transcendent’ as a generic term a wide but specific collection of positive terms and names is indicated.

However like among many also Richard of St. Victor brought to the fore is a usage of positive terms as sketched above not the only way of considering the central given of intention in mysticism.106 And here we then touch upon the second reason why we indicate and not mention. For this reason has to do with the nature (for as far as can be spoken here of ‘nature) of what here eventually is indicated. For the transcendent is both in theology and philosophy, as also in mysticism, often described as indescribable. It is indicated as inexpressible. Exemplary here are the negative theology of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,107 the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein108 and the mysticism of Meister Eckhart.109 Thus is here the term and expression ‘the transcendent’ used to indicate what cannot be expressed. Taken together we thus indicate what cannot be expressed and perhaps therefore is subject to an enormous diversity of expressions. To keep the indication neutral (as far as possible) is here the common term ‘the transcendent’ used.

Now what mysticism typifies is the explicit thematising of this transcendent as the at the same time immanent.110 This may perhaps also take place in theology and certainly also in philosophy, however in mysticism the transcendent shall as the immanent never stay only a theoretical consideration of it, but this shall always be accompanied with an intrinsic longing and strife for it.111 And this then brings us to the second basic element of mysticism: the longing and striving mystic.

2.2.2 The Mystic
What we in the previous sub-paragraph indicated with ‘the transcendent’ is in mysticism the central given of intention in the mystical longing and the mystical strife. With this the second basic element is brought in view, namely the one who longs and strives: the mystic. This longing and strife for union with the transcendent is that which the mystic thus characterises and with that also what distinguishes him. For with this he distinguishes himself from both the everyday man and the enlightened master or the saint. For the everyday man does not relate consciously to the transcendent. Nor a longing nor a strife for it are in the life of the everyday person present. And where an everyday practitioner of religion is the case attention is according to external guidelines especially directed at the transcendent as transcendent and not so much experienced by oneself as immanent.112 An anticipation to a possible union is here not the case. The enlightened master (in a more Eastern orientation) or the saint (in a more Western orientation) distinguishes himself equally so from the mystic. For the enlightened master or saint lives in a continuous unity with the transcendent and knows as such also no longing and strive for it.113 The mystic in contrary lives neither in an everydayness where no conscious relation to the transcendent occurs, nor in an enlightened state of consciousness in which he lives continuous in unity with the transcendent. The mystic relates consciously to the transcendent in a longing and a strife for that continuous unity which has not yet come to him.

With the above then an important general characteristic of the mystic is indicated, however with this it is not said that there are no differences to be discerned; for this is certainly the case. Of course this is the case because different mystics are different persons who lead different personal lives. An Eckhart isn’t Maimonides, isn’t Rumi, no Mira Bai and no Krishnamurti, to bring to the fore a few individuals from the long list of known mystics. They differ from each other in their personal individuality, in place, time and cultural setting. Also they differ from each other in their teachings. For the mystics that have become known to us have become so through their mystical teachings which they have left us.114 In these we recognize them as mystics because of the longing and the strife for the transcendent that speaks therefrom, but also we recognize in this their difference. This brings us to the third basic element of mysticism: the teaching.

2.2.3 The Teaching
Mystics differ from each other and this difference is recognizable in the teaching which they left us. Also recognizable in that teaching is the cultural setting in which the regarded mystic was placed.115 More specific recognizable in the teaching of the mystic is the religious tradition in which he stood, and this also means: the religious teaching which the mystic imbibed. For just like non-mystics did also the mystic grow up in a specific culture with its specific religious (or perhaps agnostic) doctrines.116 Usually then the mystic is connected to one or other specific religion or conception of truth. It is this given of the cultural and religious rootedness of the mystic which forms the ground for the discussion between empiricists and essentialists. For in that discussion the empiricists take the stand that mystical experiences are different on base of the cultural and religious particularities from which these experiences are considered to sprout, and do the essentialists take the stand that mystical experiences transcend cultural and religious particularity and that they are in essence of the same nature.117 As mentioned earlier in this consideration is with regards to these stands no position taken, and this mainly because this would need an elaborate discourse on itself.

Now the religious teaching in which the mystic is rooted is not the only teaching with which we have to do in mysticism. For as second teaching there are also the own deliverances of the mystic as they have been established on base of his mystical experience(s). This own teaching contains, as we saw, usually still the traces of the religious teaching in which the mystic is grounded.118 For the traditional teaching provides to the mystic as basis the possibility to express himself and to bring his mystical experience(s) to words. Nevertheless do the deliverances of the mystic usually differ from the conventional doctrines in which he is grounded, for the latter always lack.119 Characteristic for the mystical deliverances is that these are considered by the mystic in any case to fall short in expression because the mystical experience is simply not expressible in words.120 Because the mystic however feels that he nevertheless must express himself does he do this in a way that deviates from the conventional teaching.121 This deviation may relate to both content and form, for except contentual diverse are mystical deliverances also diverse in form (think for instance of different forms like poetry, autobiography, philosophy, theology, prayer, etc.).122 These mystical deliverances are with regards to form and content thus almost always renewing for the conventions of the time and place in which they are delivered in first instance. With this we may thus recognize in the deliverances of the mystic both a conservativeness and innovation.123 A conservativeness because in the mystical deliverance usually a trace of the conservative religion of the regarded time and place is found, and an innovation because the mystical deliverance with regards to the conventional religion of the regarded time and place is usually renewing in form and / or content.124 It are these two elements which also bring us on the track of what shall be elucidated in the next paragraph: the two moments in mysticism.

2.3 The Two Moments in Mysticism

In the deliverances of the mystic we recognized in the previous paragraph two elements: conservativeness and innovation. It are two elements which usually are very concretely recognizable in the mystical deliverances. There is however still a third element which can be recognized and which also is the most essential of the three, namely the mystical experience. It is this experience which is the incentive for the mystic to innovate the conventional teaching. This cycle of conservativeness, mystical experience and innovation needs however not to be kept limited to only the teaching but can be brought in relation to the whole life of the mystic. In this case this cycle of conservativeness, mystical experience and innovation regards the mystical road which the mystic goes in his life.125 This is not a straight road but is gone through as a spiral which every time visits the three moments of conservativeness, mystical experience and innovation.126 In the first moment of this cycle, the conservative moment, is everything in life in order. Everything which occurs in that life has its obvious meaning and with that its given place.127 In the second moment, that of the mystical experience, a disruption of that order takes place. The obviousnesses that guaranteed the order are blown away and the mystic sees himself from out of the risen chaos placed in a mystical night128 in which, exactly through the space which with the falling away of the obviousnesses comes to being, the transcendent can tread in in an indescribable intensity.129 Conclusively in the third moment from that mystical experience a reordering of the world takes place in which everything receives a renewed meaning. A reordering where however the mystical experience in reverberates and thus shall never lead to the same order as that of before the mystical experience.130 Nevertheless the third moment is again a moment of order. This cycle of three moments can thus actually also be reduced to two essential moments: a moment of order and a moment of chaos. Both moments in the life of the mystic shall under this paragraph be give a further elucidation under the names of ‘the mystical basic attitude’ and ‘the mystical experience’.

2.3.1 The Mystical Basic Attitude
In the introduction of this paragraph the mystical road was concisely elucidated and sketched as a spiralling road of life which every time visits three moments which eventually can be reduced to two essential moments: a moment of order and a moment of chaos. The moment of order is what here shall be elucidated further as ‘the mystical basic attitude’. In this naming of ‘mystical basic attitude’ are three aspects to be recognized which characterize this mystical basic attitude. In the first place the mystical basic attitude is an attitude. With ‘attitude’ here is meant a certain way in which a human relates to the world and how he behaves within it.131 And that attitude then is a basis for something, therefor: ‘basic attitude’. For a basis this attitude is for all other attitudes and behaviours which are less general and basic and more incidental and based.132 That by which this basic attitude, which is the basis for more incidental attitudes and behaviours, then consequently is characterized is that is regards a mystical basic attitude. The basic attitude of the mystic distinguishes itself obviously from the basic attitude of everyday man as also from the basic attitude of the enlightened master or saint, exactly as the mystic distinguishes himself from everyday man and the enlightened master or saint.133 What the mystic distinguishes from the latter two was his longing and strife for union with the transcendent, and equally so shall the mystical basic attitude then be characterised by this. Thus as first characteristic of the mystical basic attitude can be explicated here the longing and strife for union with the transcendent.

Now in the introduction of this paragraph we however already found a characteristic, namely the order. In the mystical basic attitude an order holds sway; all things in the world have there their own place and their obvious meaning. When these two characteristics are taken together the mystical basic attitude can be characterized as an orderly and ordered longing and strife for union with the transcendent. Behaviours and actions of the mystic in the world, when he is set in that mystical basic attitude, shall thus be based upon this mystical basic attitude, shall be grounded in an orderly and ordered longing and strife for union with the transcendent.  Now such actions are recognizable as spiritual exercises. For in his prayers, his practises of virtue, in his contemplations and in his meditations it is that the mystic orderly and ordered strives for that union.134 That the mystic in the mystical basic attitude longs and strives and exercises himself spiritually indicates the given that in the mystical basic attitude the transcendent has not given itself in its wholeness to the mystic. Said differently; the transcendent keeps itself for the mystic concealed and secret. Thus we recognize in the mystical basic attitude in this way the central given around which mysticism pivots, we recognize in the mystic basic attitude pre-eminently the essence of mysticism.

2.3.2 The Mystical Experience
The mystical experience distinguishes itself from the mystical basic attitude. Where the mystic in the mystical road usually finds himself in the mystical basic attitude, there forms the mystical experience a (short though intense)135 break of this which among other things is characterized by chaos, thus we saw in the introduction of this paragraph. When it is stated that the mystical experiences is characterized by a chaos then the meaning of the use of ‘chaos’ must be understood here in the right way, and this means in this case: ambiguous. The best known meaning which in the everydayness is ascribed to ‘chaos’ regards the meaning of ‘disorder or confusion’.136 To the more original meanings of ‘chaos’ belong however ‘void’ and ‘abyss’. Such attributions of meaning we find in Greek,137 with the people in the near East,138 as also in Latin.139 When we then in the context of a consideration of mysticism profess a term like ‘chaos’ we must not take it only in the everyday meaning which makes us think of a scattering of things. The moment of the mystical experience may indeed be characterized by a disorder of the living world of the mystic, but this is coupled also with the setting in of a void. With the falling away of the ordered world a void sets in. And it is then from this chaos as void that the in the introduction of this paragraph mentioned mystical night is born, analogue to the myth in Hesiods ‘Theogonia’ where Chaos (void) makes his offspring Erebus (darkness) and Nyx (night) being born.140 Aspects like chaos, void and night are thus all included in the moment of the mystical experience.  

Nevertheless this night in which the order is blown away is not only a gaping void. For paradoxically the mystic sees himself in the mystical experience placed in the full presence of the transcendental given.141 The chaos and emptiness of the world have created the space for the fullness of the transcendent to make its entrance. This is not a given which the mystic fully creates himself, as for instance with this spiritual exercises.142 The mystical experience is exactly characterized by a radical passivity on the side of the mystic.143 How could it be otherwise? For the living world and the personal identity which are derived therefrom are in the moment of the mystical experience blown away. With this blowing away of the personal acting identity it is however also that the deepest self breaks through.144 For the most transcendent is for the mystic at the same time the most immanent.145 With this are already two (of the undoubtable countless) paradoxes in the mystical experience mentioned. Namely the seeing oneself at the same time set in a void and a fullness and the breaking through of the transcendent as at the same time the immanent. Apparently the mystical experience is of such an inexpressible nature that an attempt to linguistic explication of it ends in paradoxical descriptions.146 The mystic then after this experience does not find the words to express himself adequately and shall, as mentioned in sub-paragraph 2.2.3, try to express his experience in an innovative way. This expressing however is not part anymore of the mystical experience itself, which after all was characterized by a radical passivity.

3. A HEIDEGGERIAN MYSTICISM

Meanwhile are the two sub-questions which the main question for a Heideggerian mysticism calls forth treated in the previous chapters. In chapter 1 the sub-question for the Heideggerian was thematised. The Heideggerian had to do with the philosopher Martin Heidegger and his thought, and several characteristics of that thought were brought to the fore. Primarily Heidegger’s thought, which was taken as one road of thought despite differences of emphasis between his earlier and later thought, was characterised by a thematising of ontological difference. This took place with regards to form through the use of neologisms and poetic / mystic / mystical use of language. Contentual the ontological difference was thematised through the characteristic of originality and covering, in which an original wholeness was also thought. In chapter 2 subsequently the sub-question for mysticism was thematised. Through an etymological analysis the central point around which mysticism pivots was brought to the fore in two core concepts, knowing: secret and concealment. Subsequently this still abstract characterization was concretized through sub-aspects which are found in mysticism. We found three basic elements of mysticism; the transcendent, the mystic and the teaching, and we found also two essential moments: the mystical basic attitude and the mystical experience. Now in this chapter shall be anticipated to the whole of this consideration. Here the main question of this investigation, the question for a Heideggerian mysticism, shall be asked. In this thematising of the main question then shall the findings of the previous chapters be taken in consideration. In other words it shall be here that mysticism shall be designed and made understandable from, or through, Heidegger’s thought.

An accountability for the to be handled method for this understandable making asks for a short elucidation. As in chapter 1 already brought to the fore is in Heidegger’s thought the reaching of an ontological difference through a structure of originality and covering characteristic. Now this same structure we find again in the way in which things according to Heidegger can be understood. Things can be understood in an original way or in a covering way. Characteristic for the metaphysical thought is that it understands things in a way which covers that original thought. For metaphysics understands phenomena in a thingmatic way as subject-object relations.147 Subject and object are for metaphysics primary givens. This covering thought Heidegger calls ‘ontic’ thought, and he places it against an original existential-ontological [existenzial-ontologisch] thought which thinks from the phenomenon in which subject and object are already contained.148 The term ‘Dasein’ expresses for instance clearly this phenomenality because it expresses that being-human is always being-there [Da-sein].149 This original thought is thus obvious the thought which constitutes Heidegger’s thought. When we then want to understand mysticism from Heidegger’s thought this means that we want to understand it through the original and phenomenological thought, where principally is no place for ontic and thingmatic conceptions.

The above mentioned thought of Heidegger is also a thought from wholeness.150 When thus the diverse aspects of mysticism such as found in the previous chapter would be made understandable separately from each other through Heidegger’s thought, then would that wholeness be deprived and would the phenomenological method fall short. Thus it is important to thematise the different phenomenological aspects and structures which are all present in mysticism in their mutual coherence, and not only separately and isolated from each other. Thinking from the wholeness it must however at the same time not be neglected that that wholeness must be elucidated though the parts.151 Thus it is also important to lay the emphasis in different paragraphs on different parts of the wholeness, and this then without losing sight of their mutual coherence.

From these considerations we may eventually come to a following design. In the first paragraph shall the central given around which mysticism pivots phenomenologically be analysed and made understandable. This central given regards, as came to the fore in sub-paragraph 2.1.2, concealment and secret. This concealment and secret can therewith also be understood as the horizon against which background further sections only become visible. The central given is at the same time the horizon, the essence and the wholeness. The two moments in mysticism, the mystical basic attitude and the mystical experience, then shall be included in- and can only become understandable against the background of that wholeness. Thus in this chapter shall in the first paragraph mysticism be sketched in its wholeness. Against the background thereof then may in the subsequent paragraphs the two moments in mysticism be thematised. Hereby shall then also both times the three basic elements of mysticism be included and worked out phenomenological in their mutual coherence (so not as from each other to be isolated elements). It may be expected that in this way a mysticism shall be designed which shall carry within itself the Heideggerian characteristics of ontological difference, originality and covering, wholeness and neologisms.

3.1 Phenomenology of the Essence of Mysticism

3.1.1 Concealment
In sub-paragraph 2.1.2 was through an etymological analysis the central given bought to the fore around which mysticism pivots. The two concepts which constituted that central point regarded ‘concealment’ and ‘secret’. The question which we question here is how concealment and secret according to Heidegger can be understood phenomenological. In sub-paragraph 1.3.2 the concept ‘concealment was already touched upon. ‘Concealment’ is made understandable by Heidegger through its coherence with the concepts ‘unconcealment’ and ‘covering’. These concepts all have a place in Heidegger’s analysis of truth. Truth as un-concealment is grounded in concealment. The question is how that concealment must be thought phenomenological. On itself the concept ‘concealment’ seems to pre-eminently lend itself for a phenomenological explanation. For it cannot be thought as an on itself standing being, and evenly so it is not obvious to think concealment predicative as a quality of the one or other being. Rather the concept ‘concealment’ calls forth the phenomenological association with a Being understanding being which the Being of the beings doesn’t understand. In that Being understanding being we may of course recognize the Dasein. But a being which in its ground always has an understanding of Being, but which at a certain moment nevertheless doesn’t understand Being, thereof it can be said that it in those moments has forgotten Being. This is apparently also Heidegger’s thought when he understands concealment as aa forgetting [Vergessung].152 So the forgetting can be understood as phenomenological concealment, and what is forgotten in that moment regards Being. So forgetting has here in relation to concealment not in first instance reference to the forgetting of the one or the other particular being. The concealment regards the forgetting of Being itself, and that means equal-originally also: The Dasein’s own being.153

Hesiod’s Theogonia taken in consideration Heidegger sees lèthè thereby equal-originally with limos. Limos is usually translated as ‘hunger’, however according to Heidegger this must be correctly understood as the failure of occurrence of gift and appointment.154 This failure of occurrence of gift and appointment of course has reference to Being, which holds itself back and doesn’t give itself. For the unconcealment of Being Heidegger sees as a gift of Being.155 Thus Heidegger sees lèthè and limos, oblivion in which truth is grounded and the failure of occurrence of the gift of Being, as equal-original. In the forgetting (of Being) Being has not given itself to the Dasein.

3.1.2 Secret
The above mentioned equal-originality of concealment as forgetting and the failure of occurrence of the gift of Being Heidegger thinks through lèthè and limos as they occur in Hesiod’s Theogonia. For therein they are two of a considerable number of children of the goddess Eris.156 Now Eris is the goddess of battle.157 Battling, according to Heidegger, is however the essence of truth.158 For it is in battle with concealment that unconcealment is wrested from.159 This doesn’t mean that it is so to speak ‘man’ who wrests from concealment unconcealment. For then Being could not be thought as gift. Who delivers this battle and how this battle is delivered however stays in the dark.160 This staying in the dark of the one who battles and how is battled Heidegger indicates with the term ‘secret’ [Geheimnis].161 This secret, the battle of unconcealment with concealment, carries within itself the nature of concealment.162 Now ‘Geheimnis’ does not stand on itself but carries within itself the word ‘Heim’, which has a kinship in meaning with the Dutch word ‘thuis’ (and the English word ‘home’).163 ‘Home’ the Dasein is in his unauthentic modus, when he is in the everyday world with its meanings. When the him known meanings however fall away, as in anxiety, then the Dasein feels ‘Unheimlich’,164 or translated to Dutch terms; ‘akelig’, ‘eng’ of ‘onheilspellend’ (in English ‘ghastly’, ‘scared’ or ‘sinister’),165 but according to Heidegger thus also ‘not-home’. It is such an anticipation to a not-being-home and to a scary, sinister attuning which also reverberates in ‘Geheimnis’, where the battle with concealment and forgetting is waged.166

3.1.3 Night
Secret thus regards the battle of unconcealment with concealment, a battle which in Hesiod’s Theogonia is represented by the goddess Eris. Eris however was born from Nyx, the goddess of the night,167 and also Heidegger brings concealment in relation to nightliness. For the night keeps Being back in concealment. It is for this reason that according to Heidegger the night got the nickname of noxiousness. The night is noxious because it destroys (or en-not-s). ‘To destroy’ (or ‘to en-not’) here means that the night hides Being.168 Here we have traced a remarkable aspect of a possible way of being of the Dasein. For it is nightly that Being is kept back in concealment. The night lets everything disappear. In the everydayness (everydayness), when the Dasein is in an unauthentic mode, Being sends itself in a covering way and is the Dasein lost in the him surrounding beings. Set in the moment of authentnicity Being is for the Dasein unclosed and gives Being itself thus not in a covering way. In the night as mode of being of the Dasein however none of those two moments are the case. Being has not given itself covered and the Dasein is not unauthentic, but Being also has not given itself originally and the Dasein also isn’t authentic. In the night are both covering of Being and uncovering of Being held back in concealment. At the same time the night is however also the origin and condition of possibility for the giving itself of Being in an original way. For when the covering so to speak is destroyed (or en-not-ed), then the space is created for Being to give itself in an original way.169 Here clearly can be recognized the mystical night as it was thematised in the introduction of paragraph 2.3. For in the mystical night the order of the things in the word fell away, because of which an entrance in the transcendent became possible.170 Thus there too the mystical night was not equalled to the mystical union, although they both were contained in the mystical experience.171

3.1.4 Chaos
We saw that the night got the nickname of ‘noxiousness’ because it destroys (en-not-s). This ‘destroying’ (en-not-ing) we must, when we want to understand mysticism from Heidegger’s thought, however not understand in an everyday way as if in the night so to speak a destruction of beings would take place. For the destructing (en-not-ing) by the night Heidegger rather understands as a ‘nullifying’ (‘not-ing’) of the nothing.172 The notion of a nothing which in the night would be nullifying (not-ing) however means that this nothing must be seen as more original than a simple negation of the whole of beings.173 For Heidegger wants to understand the nothing phenomenologically and not metaphysically. It is not so that in the night the whole of beings is nullified (not-ing-ed) to make the nothing possible. Rather the contrary is the case. In the night the nothing is nullifying (not-ing) by keeping the meanings of the beings back in itself, to be thus the ground and the condition of possibility for the whole of beings; namely that the being is, and not nothing.174 Something is, so to speak, on ground of the given that it isn’t nothing. With that the nullifying (not-ing) of the nothing is always as original given contained in the being of the beings.175 As the un-concealment grounds in the concealment,176 so the not-nothing grounds in the nothing. And this nothing can also be understood as the void, for as far as this is understood in a phenomenological and non-metaphysical way.177 That this void or this nothing nullifies (not-s) by keeping the meanings of the beings back may already calls forth a recognition of earlier executed analyses, but one and the other shall in paragraph 3.3 further be elucidated. Here it is of import to follow the trace of the nothing and the void without being distracted. For in subparagraph 2.3.2 it was explained that ‘(gaping) void’ can be ascribed as original meaning to ‘chaos’, a meaning which Heidegger also acknowledges.178 The nothing is the gaping void, is the chaos. Here the pieces of the puzzle seem to fall together. For in Hesiod’s Theogonia it is the chaos which makes the night be born.179 Thus we find here as that around which mysticism pivots a whole genealogy from Chaos to the offspring of Eris (among which Lèthè and Limos). Chaos gives birth to Nyx, who subsequently lets Eris be born, who conclusively among others bears Lèthè and Limos. Understood from Heidegger’s thought this means that concealment (Lèthè) and the staying away of the gift of Being (Limos) are grounded in the battle which is waged in secret between concealment and unconcealment (Eris), which itself is grounded in the nullifying (not-ing) in the night (Nyx), which in its turn can eventually be traced back to the gaping void of the nothing (Chaos). When we thus dare to make such a sketch we must beware that we don’t understand that sketch in a metaphysical way; the mentioned concepts are aspects of the Dasein’s mode of being. The nullifying (not-ing) of the nothing in the night as origin of the in secret waged battle between concealment and unconcealment is around which a Heideggerian mysticism pivots, is the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism.

3.2 Phenomenology of the Mystical Basic Attitude

3.2.1 Order
The previous paragraph was concluded with a typifying of the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism, namely ‘the nullifying (not-ing) of the nothing in the night as origin of the in secret waged battle between concealment and unconcealment’. This is around which a Heideggerian mysticism pivots. The question now rises how this central given is present in the mystical basic attitude and how in the mystical experience. This paragraph must make that question in relation to the mystical basic attitude clear.

In paragraph 2.3 we saw how the mystical road is usually characterized by the moment of the mystical basic attitude. In mysticism usually the mystical basic attitude is the case. For the mystical experience may be an intense, however even so a short break of it. This means that the mystic in the life of ever day sees himself set in this mystical basic attitude. And in that everydayness order holds sway. All things in the world have there their owned place. The mystic is home there.180 This characteristic of order connects to Heidegger’s findings when he thematises the mode of being of the Dasein in his everydayness. In that everydayness the Dasein is lost in the they.181 From the they, which thus regards the others in their generality with whom the Dasein is in-the-world, are the him surrounding beings unclosed and understood. The world with the beings which therein encounter the Dasein have for the Dasein all a familiar meaning, and it is also through that familiar world that the Dasein also understands himself and is familiar with himself.182 In this way lost in the they the Dasein fled into the him surrounding beings which are so familiar to him.183 It is here where the Dasein feels at home [Heim, Zuhause].184 And also the Dasein is set here in an unauthentic mode of being.185 A mode of being in which a lostness in the beings is the case and in which Being as such is not unclosed for the Dasein.

Now it is certainly not so that, despite a seemingly striking similarity of the unauthentic mode of being with the mystical basic attitude, the phenomenological analysis of the mystical basic attitude is therewith executed. For the mystic was distinguished from everyday man and is in his everydayness still also not ordinarily ordinary (everyday-ish everyday-ish). Thereby it is so that one on one translations of by metaphysical thought characterized concepts to Heidgger’s phenomenological concepts are not possible. In chapter 2 a normally ontic use of language was busied wherein beings, despite a perhaps thematised coherence nevertheless can be understood isolated from each other. This is in contrast with the use of langue of Heidegger which exactly primarily aims at expressing the wholeness in which separate beings are contained and wherein they are grounded.186 The Dasein as the Da-sein of the being-human is what only makes a thought in terms of subject-object relations possible. The mystic as relating himself to the transcendent is not phenomenologically understood by translating these two concepts (to for instance Dasein and Being). One must seek for a more original use of language which the understanding of the mystic as relating to the transcendent only makes possible. What in this paragraph up till now has been analysed phenomenologically regards the orderliness which is characteristic for the mystical basic attitude. The everydayness with its mentioned aspects may therein be considered as phenomenological orderliness in its generality. However like the Dasein as point of departure in Sein und Zeit is thereafter further analysed in his structures of being, so must here the phenomenological understood orderliness as characteristic of the mystical basic attitude also be elucidated in its divers phenomenological structures. This is then which will make up the continuation of this paragraph.

3.2.2 Historicity
We saw that the mystic in his everydayness at the same time is not ordinary (everyday-ish). Now what is it which the mystical Dasein in his everydayness has especially in common with the Dasein as such in his everyday mode of being? In the first place this is the order, as already was made clear. The world with the beings which encounter the Dasein therein have for him all a familiar meaning. The Dasein is at home in the world. This world (and equal-originally the Dasein, but that doesn’t have to be repeated every time) is towards its possibilities designed from a thrownness. Thrown designing the Dasein, also the mystical Dasein, is in-the-world.

As brought to the fore in sub-paragraph 1.1.2 the point of departure is here that Heidegger’s thought in Sein und Zeit and that in his later works are complimentary to each other. The eventual incentive for the being-in-the-world can from this point of departure then also be found in Heidegger’s later thought. There in relation to the being-in-the-world language plays an important role. In sub-paragraph 1.3.2 already through alètheia, pseudos and lèthè the structure was sketched of Heidegger’s thought about truth. For truth (and the equal-original Being) Heidegger thinks as unconcealment. Now this happening of truth, of un-storing, takes place in language.187 It is language which uncloses the inner-worldly [innerweltliche] beings and makes them appear.188 For at the moment of birth the Dasein is already immediately initiated in the coherence of meaning and the essence of the language which hold sway at that time and place. The Dasein then is never located outside language, but also within it.190 Now language may, equal-originally with truth, un-store and unclose Being covered or in an original way.191 Thus for instance Being has given itself from Plato to Nietzsche through metaphysical use of language in a non-authentic way.192 Heidegger speaks in this context of ‘Seinsgeschick’. Now ‘Geschick’ means ‘fate’, and the incentive for Being to give itself in a covering or original way Heidegger characterizes then as a groundless play of Being itself.193Geschick’ carries within itself also the notion of ‘schicken’ or ‘sending’, and ‘Seinsgeschick’ then also indicates that something is being sent by Being.194 Now this schicken of Being, in which Being sends itself either or not in an original way, is what composes according to Heidegger the essence of all history.195 This thus means that the Dasein already from birth is contained in the regarded Seinsgeschick, in the essence of the history, which together with the others of that time and place is the fate of his people or culture.196 This means that the fate of the Dasein [Schicksal] hangs together with the fate of the culture [Geschick] in which he is born and grows up. This most-own fate the Dasein can take on himself when he running-ahead of the own death is set in an authentic mode of being, but the Dasein may also unburden himself of his fate when he is set lost in the they in an unauthentic way of being.197 Whatever the case, authentic or unauthentic, in his ground the Dasein is always temporal and historicitic.198 There is history because the Dasein is historicitic, but the Dasein is historicitic from the original or covering history of Being through language.199 It is this historicity which lies at the base of the Dasein’s thrownness, as already was brought to the fore in sub-paragraph 1.2.1. The thrown Dasein is always located in a by Being sent culture and tradition. This shall not be different for the mystical Dasein. The mystical Dasein shall thrown see himself in any case always set in a through language opened orderly world in which he is home. This may be a Christian world, an Islamic world, a Hinduist world, a Humanistic world, or any other (religious-) cultural world. The mystical Dasein simply cannot escape his cultural, delivered thrownness.200 When the mystical basic attitude thus is understood phenomenological this character of the historicity of the mystical Dasein must be considered also. Thereby is that historicity the original condition of possibility for the thingmatic thought of the teaching and the mystic who subsequently related to each other. 

3.2.3 Resignation
In its generality the mystical Dasein sees himself from his historicity set in an orderly being-in-the-world at home. This also goes for the Dasein as such. The Dasein’s historicity is the original ground from where the beings in the world in their meanings are unclosed. The world is in order and the Dasein feels himself at home there. Herewith the commonality is brought to the fore of the Dasein as such and of the mystical Dasein. However herewith it has not become clear in which way the mystical Dasein in his everydayness differs from the Dasein as such; so in which way the mystical Dasein in his everydayness is not ordinary (everyday-ish). The Dasein as such is everyday-ish when he is lost in the they, so when he is set in an unauthentic mode of being. Non-ordinary (non-everyday-ish) he is when he is set in an authentic mode of being; the mode of being in which the Dasein is taken back from the they and in which Being is unclosed for him. That seems to imply that a non-ordinary (non-everyday-ish) everydayness must regard a mode of being which somewhere holds the middle between those two extremes. Is there from Heidegger’s thought a mode of being thinkable whereby the Dasein is taken back from the they, but wherein Being has not necessarily given itself originally to the Dasein? According to Heidegger’s later thought this is possible, namely when the Dasein is set in the attitude of resignation (or letting-ness) [Gelassenheit]. This term was already mentioned in sub-paragraph 1.3.1, and Heidegger derives that term from Meister Eckhart’s mysticism. Eckhart indicates there a detachment with regards to the things which the birth of Christ in the soul hinder and an open and receptive attitude with regards to that birth.201 Although Heidegger’s use of this term may differ from that of Eckhart,202 is at the same time that use by Heidegger to be mentioned as exemplary for the sketching of the in paragraph 1.1 mentioned proximity of Heidegger’s thought to mysticism.203 What does Heidegger aim at with the use of this term? Just like with Eckhart is with Heidegger in the ‘letting’ in ‘letting-ness’ (resignation) too an ambiguity indicated of on the one side a detachment and on the other side an open anticipation. The detachment here has relation with the beings and the open anticipation here has relation with the ereignen of Being. Ereignis is however not produced by the openness of the Dasein.204 Resignation (letting-ness) does not necessarily bring about Ereignis. For Being can in the resignation also hold itself back. Rather the resignation is thus an openness for the battle between concealment and unconcleament and therewith an openness for secret.205 This resignation can be clearly distinguished from the unauthentic mode of being in which the Dasein is lost in the they. In the lostness in the they an anticipation to a possible Ereignis is not at all the case. The Dasein is lost there in the beings and the question of Being is there not asked. At the same time must the attitude of resignation be distinguished from the anxiety, in which Being is unclosed for the Dasein every time. The resignation must therewith be contained in the phenomenological analysis of the mystical basic attitude. For the mystical Dasein in the attitude of resignation distinguishes himself from the Dasein in his everydayness and from the Dasein in Ereignis in analogy with the manner in which the mystic distinguishes himself from the everyday man and from the enlightened master or saint.206 For the mystical Dasein in the attitude of resignation is non-ordinarily ordinary (non-everyday-ish everyday-ish). Ordinary he is for so far as Being has not given itself in an original way to him, non-ordinary he is for so far as he isn’t lost in the him surrounding beings.207 In first instance this resignation seems therewith perhaps a little like the in sub-paragraph 3.1.3 thematized experience of the night. For also there neither authenticity nor unauthenticity were the case. Resignation however does distinguish itself from the experience of the night. For in resignation are the meanings of the world not so much held back, but the Dasein is with regards thereto only attuned resigned. The experience of the night destroys meanings which make out the world, resignation lets them be for what they are without keeping them back in concealment.

With this then the second characteristic of this phenomenology of the mystical basic attitude has been brought to the fore. These characteristics must, although thematised in different sub-paragraphs, not be considered as separate from each other. In the end they regard one mode of being of the mystical Dasein in his mystical basic attitude. Resignment then is also no indifferent openness for secret, but must be thought in relation with the earlier thematised historicity. Further must here too resignation be thought in an original way, which subsequently an ontic thought of the transcendent, the mystic and their resigned relation only makes possible.

3.2.4 Preservation
Towards the end of the previous sub-paragraph already mention was made that the characteristics of historicity and resignation in relation to the mystical basic attitude must be thought together in one mode of being. The thematising of this third characteristic, that of preservation [Bewahrung],208 will make this assignment perhaps somewhat easier. Through language and art we may get a trace of this third characteristic.

In sub-paragraph 3.1.2 already Heidegger’s thought about language was discussed. Language uncloses and uncovers Being, and does this either or not in an original way. Since Plato this has happened in the history of the Western culture mainly in a covering way. However that this uncovering of Being also may happen in an original way is clear; in his question for the sense of Being the whole of Heidegger’s thought is directed towards unclosing Being in an original way. Then Heidegger in his thought distincts between ‘speaking’ [Sprechen] as covering use of language and ‘saying’ [Sagen] as original use of language.209 Sage is for Heidegger therewith also the essence of language as Being is the essence of the beings.210 Sage then must not be understood as a concrete sequence of words, like Being must not be understood as a being or a sequence of beings. Sage shows itself in the words, usually covering, but not necessarily covering. If man wants to find the words which don’t cover but which bring Being as Being in the unconcealment he must listen to the Sage which for this can, but not necessarily will, give the right words.211 Now it is according to Heidegger among other things Dichtung (poetry) which says from the experience of Sage,212 and which therewith gives Being and founds [stiftet].213 This Dichtung must here not be thought as any poetry. Dichtung regards eventually the essence of all use of language, and poetry is therewith not necessarily Dichtung.214 When Heidegger thematises from that thought art he thus speaks about ‘great’ art, which means: art as Dichtung.215 In such art, where the essence of language is Dichtet, the Being of beings is set present.216 This coheres with the given that, in contrary to the everyday things around us, art cannot be understood as an on-hand [zuhanden] object for use. The things in the world are given us on-hand; we can do something with them.217 But this does not go for an artwork, and exactly this makes the Being of the artwork (that it is, and not not) pregnantly come to the fore.218 Without repeating Heidegger’s full analysis of the origin of the artwork it can be stated that in the being-created [Geschaffensein] of the work truth is fixated in the shape [Gestalt] of that truth.219 This fixation of truth doesn’t mean that truth so to speak for once and for all is established in the one or other form of colour or word combinations. For the artwork can lose its Being unclosing nature and denigrate into a simple at hand being. This happens for instance with art collectors who store (once great) artworks like potatoes in the celler.220 If the artwork wants to stay an artwork, and if it wants as a great artwork keep setting Being present, it must also as such be preserved by the Dasein.221 And this preservation of the artwork means simply: letting the artwork be an artwork.222 In the resignation with regards to the artwork, the artwork can stay an artwork and keep setting Being present.

The question may rise what the above explication on art and preservation has to do with the mystical Dasein. As mentioned earlier is true, great art, in whatever form, Dichtung. Nevertheless does Heidegger give a special place to poetry as form of art, and this has to do with the lingluisticality thereof. Language is original because it is through language that the world is unclosed.223 Artworks such as paintings, statues or architecture are as such already opened by language. A painting is understood as painting from the language in which both painting and the Dasein are placed. It is therefore that Heidegger sees poetry as more original than the other arts.224 Now in poetry as most original Dichtung it is that the inexpressible is said.225 It is there that the inexpressible secret, so that inexpressible around which mysticism pivots, is said.226 However poetry is not the only linguistic form in which the inexpressible can be said. It also takes place in what Heidegger distinctively from philosophy calls ‘thought’,227 but it also takes place in mysticism. For sub-paragraph 2.2.3 made clear that in the mystical teaching also for a saying of the inexpressible is striven. The present findings then make the in subparagraph 1.1.1 mentioned proximity of Heidegger’s thought with poetry and mysticism more concrete and more understandable. Also it becomes clear in which way the preservation of Being in the artwork has to do with the mystical Dasein and also how the phenomenological concepts of order, historicity, resignation and preservation are contained together in the wholeness of the mystical basic attitude. The mystical Dasein exists historically and is always contained in the language of his time, place and culture, wherefrom the world for him is in order. However the mystical Dasein is in contrary to the everyday Dasein not fully lost in that orderly world. The ordered beings of that world are in order, but are by the mystical Dasein so to speak encountered from the attitude of resignation. The mystical Dasein is not lost in, but resigned towards the him surrounding beings. Now to the language of his culture also belong the linguistic works which are available to him. To those linguistic works subsequently also belong poetic, religious and mystical works. For as far as these works are able to say the inexpressible they have to be preserved as such by the Dasein. This shall not happen with the everyday Dasein. This one is completely lost in the beings and won’t see the works as essential Seinsgeschick which sends and founds history.228 This is different with the mystical Dasein who in the work, in his case perhaps a mystical or religious work, preserves the inexpressible secret that Being may now perhaps hold itself back, but can send itself nevertheless also in an original way. And this then all in the resignation of letting the work be a work. In the mystical basic attitude the mystical Dasein preserves orderly, historicitic and resigned the inexpressible secret.

3.3 Phenomenology of the Mystical Experience

3.3.1 Chaos
In paragraph 2.3 were two moments in mysticism distinguished: the mystical basic attitude and the mystical experience. The mystical basic attitude was characterized by order, and the mystical experience was characterized by chaos. In this characterization of the mystical experience and through the concept ‘chaos’ this concept however had to be understood in an ambiguous way. The everyday meaning of ‘unorderedness’ was acknowledged because in the chaos of the mystical experience indeed a disruption takes place of the order which holds sway in the mystical basic attitude. However also had ‘chaos’ to be understood in its more original meaning, namely as ‘void’ and ‘abyss’. A meaning which was also acknowledged by Heidegger.229 Among other things thanks to this acknowledgement could in sub-paragraph 3.1.4 ‘chaos’ be made phenomenologically understandable from Heidegger’s thought. There ‘chaos’ was understood as the nullifying (or not-ing) (which nullifies in the night as origin of the in secret waged battle between concealment and unconcealment). This nullifying, so we saw, lies at the base of the Being of the beings. That something is, means equal originally that it is not nothing. And this ‘nothing’ of the ‘not nothing’ indicates not only a negation of that nothing, but also a dependency thereon of the regarded ‘something’ (as truth as un-concealment is dependent upon the concealment).230  What Heidegger understands as the ‘nothing’ regards according to him thus the original ground for every being. At the same time it is as that ground however never itself a being. With that it is however a very remarkable ground. For it is exactly the nothing which holds the meanings of the beings back and stores them away within itself.231 As ground the nothing is thus an abys (or un-ground) [Ab-grund].232 This is very compatible to the Greek and Latin ascription of meaning of ‘abys’ to ‘chaos’. However Heidegger understands this abys of course from his thought in a phenomenological way. ‘Ab-grund’ is strictly translated ‘the (downward) leaving ground’.233 It is in that abys (or un-ground) in which the beings disappear. However beings that have disappeared are in Heidegger’s thought beings that are closed in concealment. The nullifying of the night because of which the night is seen as noxious is not a physical destruction of the beings but regards the nullifying (or not-ing) of the nothing.234 This nullifying of the nothing is however simply the closing of the inner-worldly beings which in their everydayness were only still unclosed in their meanings for the Dasein.235 Orderly meanings that in the night thus sink away in the chaos of the nothing.

In the mystical experience, and it is this which we want to understand from Heidegger’s thought, the void of the chaos made the entrance of the fullness of the transcendent possible. Through Heidegger’s thought this entrance can be understood as the Ereignis of Being. In the sinking away of the meanings of the world the Dasein sees himself placed in a chaos which however regards not just a disruption of the orderly living world but also the empty space in which Being makes its full entry when this Being is unclosed in an original way. In this way Heidegger’s paradoxical sounding statement can be understood that Being is both the (ontological different) ground for the beings and that Being is also the abys (or un-ground) for those beings.236 Being is the ground for the beings because no being ‘is’ without ‘Being’. And Being is the abys for those beings because the sinking away of the meanings of the beings is equal-original with the giving itself in an original way of Being in the anxiety and the Ereignis. Through another approach this apparent paradox can be made compatible by discerning between an ontic and a phenomenological thought. The ontic thought thinks of a ground as being a being. The first ground is for that thought a highest being; the idea of the good, God or the human subject for instance. For such a thought Being must be thought as abys (or un-ground) because Being itself is never a being.237 A phenomenological thought however doesn’t think Being as being, and can therewith think Being as ontological different ground of all beings. And this then is also the way in which the nothing nullifies (or not-ings) in the Being of beings,238 namely as grounding abys (or un-ground) or as un-grounding ground. In that sense the nothing and Being are thus equal-original.239

3.3.2 Ereignis
Above was that which the mystical experience characterizes; chaos in its ambiguity, already brought in relation to the Ereignis. This relation shall in this sub-paragraph evenly so be saved, whereby here however the emphasis shall be laid on the Ereignis. In paragraph 1.3.1 this was already mentioned and shortly elucidated. Let us here reiterate and work out further one and the other through a somewhat larger consideration on this concept. Heidegger uses the term ‘Ereignis’ to indicate the giving itself in an original way of Being. Literally it means ‘happening’, and the giving itself in an original way of Being is something which according to Heidegger thus ‘happens’. That Ereignis ‘happens’ means that there is something which is being sent by Being, namely Being itself. It is not something which the Dasein, in this context the ‘mystical’ Dasein, methodically brings to being. The only thing which the Dasein can do is keeping the openness for a possible Ereignis. This however takes place in the mystical ground attitude and is not a guarantee that Being will give itself in an original way.240 Here, in the given that Ereignis happens, thus shows a radical passivity of the mystical Dasein in the mystical experience. This is analogically to the way in which the passivity of the mystic is thematised.241

In ‘Ereigniss’ reverberates as mentioned earlier also the term ‘Eignen’, which has the meanings of ‘making one’s own’. Herein can be recognized the phenomenological of Heidegger’s thought. There is no transcendent Being which gives and shows itself to a from that Being isolated human or subject. The Dasein is equal-originally with Being contained in the Ereignis and the happening of Being is equal-originally an own happening. The happening is therewith thus no pure subjective experience which could be summoned by one or the other transcendent given. When the mystical experience is understood phenomenologically it must thus be understood in a more original way as mystical happening. (With such an expression it must be kept in mind that Heidegger’s thought borders to mystical thought, and that it is very well possible that also in mysticism the ontic thought is already left. This is in this consideration however not the subject of research).

That this happening is intimately own to the Dasein makes that we may understand and thematize Ereignis also as enfindingness. Now the enfindingness in which Being is unclosed for the Dasein in an original way Heidegger mentions (primarily in Sein und Zeit, but also in other works) as ‘anxiety’.242 This anxiety is distinguished from fear. Fear is ever fear of a particular inner-worldly being, however anxiety is anxiety for world as such.243 This ‘world as such’ can be understood as equal-original with the already elaborate thematised ‘nothing’.244 This ‘nothing’ wasn’t sketched as a result of a physical destruction of beings,245 but as an original given which holds back the meanings of those beings and makes possible the sinking away thereof.246 In anxiety the nothing is revealed,247 and in that revelation the beings as such and world as such occur.248 This world-as-such then is also not the world of meanings in which the Dasein is at home. In the anxiety the Dasein is not-home, the Dasein is Unheimlich.249 ‘World-as-such’ can here be understood as Heidegger’s phenomenological counter-paradigm of the metaphysical ‘nature’. ‘Chaos’ carries besides the meaning of ‘emptiness’ or ‘abys’ both in Greek as in Latin also the meaning of ‘unformed matter’.250 ‘Unformed matter’ is compatible with the earlier mentioned ‘unorderedness’. This ‘unformed matter’ is what metaphysically is understood as ‘nature’.251 However the Greek ‘physis’, which in metaphysical thought is translated with ‘nature’,252 has according to Heidegger originally a different meaning. Originally must ‘physis’ be understood as the treading from the concealment in the unconcealment. Here we of course recognize Heidegger’s analysis of truth and Being, and Being gives itself thus in the way of physis.253 In the uncovering thus the equal-originality of physis and alètheia,254 of Being and truth shows.255 And because the giving itself of Being (as physis) and world-as-such are equal-original, it shows how ‘world-as-such’ can be understood as the phenomenological counter-paradigm of the metaphysical ‘nature’. Except as ‘physis’ may ‘world-as-such’ further be understood also as ‘the whole of beings’ [das Seinde im Ganzen]. The whole of beings then must not be understood metaphysically as the totality of particular beings,256 but as the ungraspable horizon of understanding which makes the understanding of particular beings only possible.257 This whole of beings is never at hand given as are particular beings in their meanings, but only comes equal-originally with Being to the fore when the meanings of the particular beings fall away.

In the moment of Ereignis shows thus through the ambiguous meaning of ‘chaos’ (‘emptiness’, ‘abys’ at the one side and ‘unformed matter’ on the other side) the ambiguousness of the mystical experience. Thereby must those two meanings according to the phenomenological analysis also be thought equal-originally. Chaos is the emptiness of the nullifying (or not-ing) nothing as abys (or un-ground) wherein the covering meanings of the world fall away, through which Being gives itself grounding as world-as-such, as physis, as the whole of beings. This chaos goes along with Ereignis and with anxiety.

3.3.3 Foundation
‘Chaos goes along with Ereignis and with anxiety’. With that remark the previous sub-paragraph was concluded. In that sub-paragraph ‘Ereignis’ was among diverse other concepts put central. Before that, in sub-paragraph 3.2.1, the concept ‘chaos’ was given full attention. And here then shall a phenomenological analysis of anxiety be the central point of departure, to from there arrive at an important other characteristic of the mystical experience. What does Heidegger exactly understand as ‘anxiety’? Already under sub-paragraph 1.1.2 (as also at other places, such as in the previous sub-paragraph) the concept was brought to the fore as being a certain enfindingness wherein the Dasein is in an authentic way and wherein he runs ahead to his own death. Also was seen that anxiety must be differentiated from fear. Fear is always fear for an inner-worldly being, and anxiety is anxiety for world-as-such. This last aspect of anxiety was already enough elucidated in the previous sub-paragraph. But what about the running ahead of the own death which takes place in anxiety? An answer to this question finds a beginning at the bringing to the forth of Heidegger’s thought about the notion of possibility. Possibility is according to Heidegger higher than reality, and equal-originally with the designing understanding of the world the Dasein understands himself in the possibilities which he sees from himself and which he is himself.258 To this can-be [Seinkönnen] of the Dasein belongs eventually as outer possibility also the own end, or the own death.259 The own death is for the Dasein thus the outer possibility to which he can design himself. This designing himself to the own death or the own end must be sharply distinguished from a simple dying away of the body. In place of a to-the-end-being it regards a being-to-the-end [Sein zum Ende], wherewith is indicated that the death which is here under consideration regards a way of being of the Dasein.260 And with this reaching for the outer possibility this being-to-the-end is equal-originally a being-whole [Ganzsein].261 For with the touching of the borders of the Dasein’s whole being (and those borders regard birth and death) the whole of the Dasein’s life is encompassed. The Dasein thus is in an authentic way when he is whole and to-the-end.

That this awareness of being-to-the-end is exactly taking place in the anxiety is understandable when it is taken in consideration that the Dasein and world take place equal-originally. The Dasein understands himself and his own identity, so as he designs himself, equal-originally with the designed meanings of the world. The falling away of the meanings of the world in the nothing of the abys (through which anxiety was elucidated already earlier) shall make the Dasein’s meaningful identity equal-originally fall away in that abys. This is comparable with the falling away of the from the orderly world derived personal identity of the mystic which in the mystical experience falls away.262 This in the nothing falling away of the meaningful identity on which the Dasein had designed himself is now of course excellently understandable as a being-to-the-end. And it is also understandable that the Dasein when the own death is in play, equal-originally with the anxiety, is set in an Unheimlichkeit. For what is more anxiety evoking and sinister than the own death?

Now in this being-to-the-end is contained a being-to-death [Sein zum Tode]. For being-to-death the Dasein is when he runs ahead to the own death.263 In this running ahead [Vorlaufen] the original temporality of the Dasein shows. For the Dasein is in his ground always temporal in the mode of futurity (or to-come-ness) [Zukünftigkeit].264 It is only on base of this futurity that something like designing on possibilities can be possible. Possibility demands futurity; without futurity everything would be actual, or perhaps actuality which has been, but every possibility would lack. The Dasein is with the futural designing himself to possibilities thus so to speak always ahead of himself.265 In the consideration of the Dasein’s futurity (or to-come-ness) as mode of temporality Heidegger however also includes the notion of becoming [Zukommen].266 In the  futurity (or to-come-ness) of the Dasein something becomes him. And what becomes him in the futurity (or to-come-ness) of the running ahead of the own death in the anxiety is his most-own possibility.267 Now this most-own possibility is nothing else than the Dasein’s fate [Schicksal] which is embedded in the historicality.268 In the anxiety the Dasein takes on himself this fate (because it equal-originally becomes him). The taking on himself of this fate in the running ahead of death Heidegger calls ‘ahead-running resolve’ [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]. For in the moment of the authenticity where the Dasein takes on himself his fate not only a running ahead takes place, but equal-originally a resolve on a in the fate contained most-own design.269 The moment of authenticity is therewith on the one side a being taken back from the they to a designing to the must-own possibility, but that designing contains equal-originally also a return to the meaningful world of the they. For a design is ever a for the world meaningful design. Here it is that authentic history is founded. Heidegger understands Ereignis, and this is still equal-originally with the theme in this sub-paragraph taken along, as the essence of history.270 The ahead-running resolved designing to the must-own possibility in the taking on himself of the by Being sent own fate is the essence of history. This is something which especially takes place in poetry. As in sub-paragraph 3.1.4 already was mentioned it is in poetry that Being through language is founded. Being sends itself in poetry linguistically, and is in this way the authentic origin of historicality and history.271

What does this abstract figure of thought mean when we make it concrete through our consideration of the mystical Dasein? In the mystical basic attitude the mystical Dasein is historical in the sense that he is always standing in a particular culture and tradition. These he however doesn’t take on himself in an authentic way for he doesn’t run ahead to his own death and there is no Ereignis. He shall design the world, himself and equal-originally for instance his spiritual practises from the by the they delivered doctrine. (This by the way without getting lost therein, after all the mystical Dasein distinguished himself therein from the everyday Dasein). With this the mystical Dasein doesn’t take on himself his most-own fate.

This does happen in the mystical experience. There the mystical Dasein is taken back from the by the they delivered doctrine and takes ahead-running resolved his own fate on himself. This taking on himself of the own fate is however equal-originally a moment of designing, knowingly a poetic designing. The mystical Dasein in the mystical experience designs the world, himself and the doctrine poetically and founds therewith history. He shall speak new words and with that innovate the doctrine which historically though covering was delivered.

3.2.4 Fixation
Following on what came to the fore in the previous sub-paragraph Heidegger’s statement is that actually only history takes place where about the essence of truth is resolved.272 Here we find three concepts equal-originally together, namely: ‘Ereignis’ (as essence of truth), ‘design’ (as resolve) and ‘history’. These three concepts we see equal-originally collected in another concept which was already mentioned under sub-paragraph 3.2.4, namely ‘fixation’ [feststellung]. ‘Fixation’, thus we saw there, is a concept which Heidegger uses in his discussion of the origin of the artwork and has there reference to the fixation of truth (and thus equal-originally ‘Being’) in the shape of an artwork.273 This fixation doesn’t mean that the truth of Being so to speak for once and for all is established in one or the other form of colours or word combinations. For the artwork, so we repeat, may lose its Being unclosing nature and degenerate into a simple at hand being when it is not preserved as Being unclosing. Then what is the way to think this fixation of Being? As an answer to this question the earlier mentioned concepts of ‘Ereignis’, ‘design’ and ‘history’ must be brought to the fore.

That Being must have given itself in an original way to the artist (the Dasein) in the Ereignis seems obvious. When the Dasein hasn’t made Being his own there is no possibility that he could fixate that Being as such in an artwork. That thus means that for the art creating Dasein the meanings of the world and equal-originally the meanings of the own identity have sunk away. It is therefore that Heidegger can say that in the coming to being of great art the artist so to speak is nullified (or en-not-inged) for himself and with that is a medium for Being to set itself (Beings self) in the work.274 This is of course also a very mystical thought because the mystic usually sees the works which he accomplishes as being brought to being through him, whereby he himself is present at the most as instrument of the transcendent or of God.275

Now the Being which gives itself to the Dasein in Ereignis should not be seen as the actual but as the possible.276 Therein contained is the design. When Being gives itself unconcealed in Ereignis this doesn’t mean so much that Being is given to the Dasein simply in its actuality, but this rather means that the Dasein designs himself and the world to his must-own possibilities. The beings in Ereignis in an authentic way designing, the unconcealment of Being is so to speak thrown into the beings.277 This is what takes place in the fixation. Being is in its most-own possibility fixated in the authentic design of the artwork. Herewith is the shape of such a great artwork thus actually the fixation of the sending of Being [Seinsgeschick]. This sending of Being is also that which makes out the authentic historicality of a people. This according to Heidegger takes especially place in the poetic art because this regards a linguistic artform.278 Still eventually every artwork can be considered as poetry,279 and this goes thus also for great mystical artworks. In any way the mystic finds in art a possibility for expression of the inexpressible,280 however this goes especially for linguistic expressions such as for instance prayer, theology or philosophy. For there he tries to say the inexpressible.281 And this is exactly which Heidegger concerns in his thought about poetizing and history founding poetry. For therein must the inexpressible in the spoken speak along.282

In this way are in the fixation thus Ereignis, design and history contained. This fixation of the unconcealment of Being, as in a great artwork or in a mystical deliverance, must therewith however be preserved. Being can after fixation in the artwork of the deliverance not give itself in an original way when Being therein is not preserved in an original way. This preservation already was thematized in sub-paragraph 3.1.4 and there we saw that it was especially the mystical Dasein in his mystical ground attitude who kept himself resigned and preserving open for the giving itself of Being in an original way. Here however the mystical experience was under consideration. This was phenomenological made understandable through the characteristics of chaos, Ereignis, foundation and fixation. In the mystical experience is the in chaos Ereigneted Being history founding fixated.

CONCLUSION

Titles of works are both attuned and attuning. Attuned they are to the essence of the content of the work and attuning they are with regards to the possible reader who, when not distuned, is attuned to a questioning for the essence of the regarded work. The attuned attuning title of this consideration read ‘a Heideggerian mysticism’, and attuned therewith to a questioning for the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism. The research question was from there formulated as: ‘How can mysticism be designed and understood from or by Heidegger’s thought?’ Therein contained then were also the sub-questions for the Heideggerian and mysticism.

In chapter 1 the question for the Heideggerian was asked. The goal was especially to sketch a general image of Heideggers though (which characterizes the Heideggerian), wherefrom in chapter 3 then the main question could be asked. This sketching of a general image of Heideggers thought was consequently done through a few important characteristics which can be recognized in that thought.

As main characteristic ‘ontological difference’ was mentioned. Therewith Heidegger wanted to point out that the Being of the beings is itself not a being. These main characteristics Heidegger worked out with reference to form through neologisms and poetic / mystic / mystical sounding use of language. With reference to the content two to each other related characteristics were brought to the fore. In the first characteristic Being is thematised as origin and essence of the beings, whereby (usually) the beings cover that origin. And to that characteristic related Heidegger then thinks also a certain wholeness which is never given concretely and at hand but which as horizon is the condition of possibility for the concrete beings to appear meaningful. These characteristics where consequently anchored and concretely indicated in Heidegger’s early thought in Sein und Zeit and in his later thought. Hereby was departed from a unity in that thought. For the question whether die Kehre is a turnaround of or in Heidegger’s thought was decided in the advantage of the latter possibility.

In chapter 2 consequently the question for mysticism was asked. The concept ‘mysticism’ turned out not to be graspable in definitions and general descriptions would as a fundament for a further consideration not be solid enough. Therefore a search was started to the central given of mysticism, to that around which mysticism pivots. Through an etymological analysis the pivotal points of ‘secret’ and ‘concealment’ came to the fore. Herein the essence of mysticism would be contained. Consequently mysticism was further thematised in some important sub-aspects because the whole must be elucidated through its parts. As three basic elements of mysticism were the transcendent, the mystic and the doctrine found, and as the two central moments in mysticism were the mystical basic attitude and the mystical experience brought to the fore. The mystical basic attitude was characterized by an orderly longing and strife for union with the transcendent, and the mystical experience was characterized by chaos and emptiness of the orderly world and by union with the entering fullness of the transcendent.

The findings which came to the fore in the thematising of the two sub-questions for the Heideggerian and for mysticism were conclusively taken along to chapter 3. There was anticipated to the whole of the consideration, was the question asked for a Heideggerian mysticism, and was mysticism designed and made understandable from Heidegger’s thought. This designing took place through Heidegger’s original thought wherein was no place for covering ontic conceptions. For the thematising of isolated from each other thinkable things was no place, and thinking from the wholeness sub-aspects in their mutual coherency had to be brought to the fore.

In the first paragraph then the essence of mysticism was phenomenologically made understandable through the in chapter 2 found concealment and secret as that around which mysticism pivots. As essence of mysticism however was in the end a whole genealogy of gods found from Chaos to the offspring of Eris (among whom Lèthè en Limos). Understood from Heidegger’s thought was thereto the meaning ascribed that concealment (Lèthè) and the staying away of the gift of Being (Limos) are grounded in the battle which in secret is waged between concealment and unconcealment (Eris), which is grounded itself in the nullifying (or not-ing) in the night (Nyx), which in its turn eventually is to be traced back to the gaping void of the nothing (Chaos). In short: The nullifying (or not-ing) of the nothing in the night as origin of the in secret waged battle between concealment and unconcealment is around which a Heideggerian mysticism pivots, is the essence of a Heideggerian mysticism.

In the second paragraph the mystical basic attitude was made phenomenologically understandable. Order was there understood from the everydayness wherein the Dasein is lost in the they. The mystical Dasein however was not everyday-ish everyday-ish and thus a further refinement was needed. Without losing sight of the coherency were the characteristics of historicality, resignation and preservation brought to the fore. Historically the mystical Dasein is from the by Being sent and by the people delivered doctrine, resigned he is with regards to the beings which from the deliverance are ordered, and preserving he is because he preserves the secret in the delivered doctrine. In the mystical basic attitude the mystical Dasein preserves orderly, historically and resigned the inexpressible secret.

Conclusively in the third paragraph a phenomenological design took place of the mystical experience. Chaos turned out to unite within itself ground and abys (or un-ground) because in the sinking away of the meanings of the world in the abys (or un-ground) Being as ground makes its entrance, and this chaos was thereby paired with Ereignis and with anxiety. Chaos is the void of the nullifying (or not-ing) nothing as abys (or un-ground) wherein the covering meanings of the world fall away, through which Being gives itself grounding as world-as-such, as physis, as the whole of beings. This chaos is paired with Ereignis and with anxiety. Besides Ereignis were the other two important characteristics which in their mutual coherence with Ereignis were thematised foundation and preservation. For the mystical Dasein in the mystical experience turned out to be history founding in the fixation of Being in the mystical doctrine. In the mystical experience the in the chaos Ereigneted Being is history founding fixated.

When conclusively the two moments of mysticism are again taken together in the wholeness of their essence, then from Heidegger’s thought may be come to the following delineation of mysticism. Mysticism is the openness for the secret that Being in the order of the everydayness covering holds itself back, but in the nothing of the chaos can send itself and give itself in an original way.

This final conclusion may as closed definition be accepted or rejected, or may perhaps attune to a deeper questioning for a Heideggerian mysticism. As Being sends itself, thus it will befall.

Notes
  1. Charles B. Guinon, ‘Introduction’, in: Charles B. Guinon (editor), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge / New York / Oakleigh, 1993, p. 1.“As the twentieth century draws to a close, it is increasingly clear that Heidegger will stand out as one of the greatest philosophers of our times.”
  2. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, Band 9, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1967, p. 364. “Das künftige Denken ist nicht mehr Philosophie, weil es ursprünglicher denkt als die Metaphysik, welcher Name das gleiche sagt.”
  3. Sub-paragraph 1.1.1 shall bring a consideration of ‘being’ in play, which stays of crucial meaning in the rest of this chapter and in chapter 3. To differentiate therein ‘being’ as subject of consideration from the use of ‘being’ in the use of language of that consideration shall in the first case ‘being’ be written with a capital ‘B’. This way of writing doesn’t aim at reducing ‘being’ to a substantive and to strip it from a verbal reading, but serves purely the readability of the consideration. When an ambiguous reading of ‘being’ as subject and as use of language is unavoidable the way of writing with a small ‘b’ shall be maintained in the assumption that the context will make the ambiguity readable.
  4. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 1927, uitgave: Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1967, p. 6. “Das Sein des Seienden »ist« nicht selbst ein Seiendes.”
  5. Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Disclosure and Displacement. Truth and Language in the Work of Heidegger, Ricoeur, and Derrida, Proefschrift, Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen, 2008, p. 15. “Heidegger’s central critique of the metaphysical tradition is that it interprets being as a (highest) being, […].”
  6. Frans van Peperstraten, Sublieme Mimesis. Kunst en politiek tussen nabootsing en gebeurtenis: Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Lyotard, Damon, Budel 2005, p. 134. “Het betreft in Heidegger’s visie weliswaar een groot tijdperk, namelijk grofweg van Plato tot en met Nietzsche, maar niettemin een tijdperk: het tijdperk van de metafysica.”
  7. Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, p. 38. “Wir lassen diese Wortfolge, die sich spatter zum Ausdruck »Metaphysik« zusammengeschlossen hat, zunächst unübersetzt. Wir halten nur fest: Er dient zur Bezeichnung von Philosophie.”
  8. John David Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio, 1978, p. 5.
  9. Dorothea Frede, ‘The question of being: Heidegger’s project’, in: Charles B. Guinon (editor), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge / New York / Oakleigh, 1993, p. 43. “[…], and the question that fascinated him throughout his long philosophic life can be stated simply: what is the meaning of being?”
  10. Ben Vedder, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion. From God to the Gods, Duquesne University Press, Pittsberg, 2007, p. 265. “It is my view that Heidegger’s thinking on religion occupies a place between the forms of poetic and philosophical speaking.”
  11. John David Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, p. 6. “As a matter of fact, when one does examine the relationship of Heidegger to the mystic, it becomes quite clear that a deep and far-reaching affinity exists between thinking and mysticism.”
  12. Ibidem, p. 235. “A poet such as Hölderlin, like the thinker and the mystic, has made the step back out of metaphysics. He poetizes out of an experience of the truth of Being, of the genuine dwelling place of mortals.”
  13. Jan Aler, ‘Heidegger’s conception of language in Being and Time’, in: Christopher Macann (editor), Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments. Volume III: Language, Routledge, London / New York, 1992, p. 19. “[…]. This is why Heidegger’s close affiliation with the German idiom reserves for itself a language-creating freedom in opposition to the conventional.”
  14. Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Zum Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe, Band 65,  Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1989.
  15. Timothy Clark, Martin Heidegger, Routledge, London / New York, 2002, p. 74. “Such a notion of language informs the extraordinary importance Heidegger gives certain poets (Homer, Hölderlin).”
  16. Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy, Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham / London, 2000, p. 102. “In his interpretation Heidegger tries to understand the pre-metaphysical thought of the early Greek thinkers from a post-metaphysical standpoint.”
  17. Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, Gesamtausgabe, Band 10, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1997, p. 169. “Nichts ist ohne Grund. Sein und Grund: das Selbe.”
  18. Ibidem, p. 81. “Das Sichverbergen des Wesens des Seins bleibt jedoch zugleich gerade die Weise, wie Sein sich im Seienden uns zuwendet, zuschickt.”
  19. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 365. “Das metaphysische Vorstellen verdankt diese Sicht dem Licht des Seins.”
  20. Ibidem, p. 366. “Gleichwohl spricht die Metaphysik in ihren Antworten auf ihre Frage nach dem Seienden als solchen aus der unbeachteten Offenbarkeit des Seins. Die Wahrheit des Seins kann deshalb der Grund heiβen, in dem die Metaphysik als die Wurzel des Baumes der Philosophie gehalten, aus dem sie genährt wird.”
  21. Ben Vedder, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion, p. 159. “Thinking the question of being from the other beginning means dispensing with thinking about being in terms of entities or substance.”
  22. Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Disclosure and Displacement, p. 17. “Heidegger does not only point us to this metaphysical perspective of the whole as present totality or a totality of presence, but he also tries to reappropriate the notion of the whole in relation to his question of being. Heidegger often uses the notion of a horizon to describe this thinking of being beyond the totality envisioned by the tradition.”
  23. Ibidem, p. 205. “The whole [according to Heidegger] cannot be encompassed by thought as a totality. Rather, the whole is the element to which we belong. It is the element that precedes every appearance and in which every being is given to us as a present being.”
  24. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford / Massachusetts, 1999, p. 8. “Heidegger often spoke of 'the turn', die Kehre.”
  25. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 328. “Diese Kehre ist nicht eine Änderung des Standpunktes von »Sein und Zeit«, […].”
  26. Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, Gesamtausgabe, Band 4, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1981, p. 41. “Das Sein ist niemals ein Seiendes.”
  27. Walter Biemel, ‘Heidegger’s Concept of Dasein’ in: Frederick Elliston (editor), Heidegger’s Existential Analytic, Mouton Publishers, The Hague / Paris / New York, 1978, p.112. “In his chief work Being and Time Heidegger avoids the concepts I, subject, person, consciousness, man. Instead of these we find the concept Dasein.”
  28. George Pattison, The Later Heidegger, Routledge, London / New York, 2000, p. 12. “It is likewise easy to see an analogy between the later Heidegger’s preoccupation with the oblivion of Being in an age of technological enframing and the effort made in Being and Time to re-open the question of Being in an age dominated intellectually by positivism and absorbed at an everyday level in the various modes of ‘falling’ (idle chatter, etc.). In each case the aim is a reawakening of the encounter with Being, even if this is seen from the point of view of the human subject in the one case and from the point of view of the history of Being in the other.”
  29. Martin Heidegger in een schrijven gericht aan William J. Richardson, geciteerd naar: Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall (editors), ‘Series Introduction’, in: Heidegger Reexamined. Volume 4. Language and the Critique of Subjectivity, Routledge, New York / London, 2002, p. viii, ix, noot 1. “The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II.”
  30. Martin Heidegger, Zijn en tijd, Sun, Nijmegen, 1999, vertaling door Mark Wildschut uit: Sein und Zeit, 1927, uitgave: Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1986, p. 26. “Voor dit zijnde dat we zelf telkens zijn, en dat onder andere de zijnsmogelijkheid heeft van het vragen, kiezen we de term erzijn [Dasein].”
  31. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 54. “In-Sein ist demnach der formale existenziale Ausdruck des Seins des Daseins, das die wesenhafte Verfassung des In-der-Welt-seins hat.”
  32. Ibidem, p. 28. “Als Bedeutung des Ausdrucks »Phänomen« ist daher festzuhalten: das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende, das Offenbare.”
  33. Ibidem, p. 86. “Das vorgängige Erschließen dessen, woraufhin die Freigabe des innerweltlichen Begegnenden erfolgt, ist nichts anderes als das Verstehen von Welt, zu der sich das Dasein als Seiendes schon immer verhält.”
  34. Ibidem, p. 12. “Seinsverständnis ist selbst eine Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins.
  35. Ibidem. “Diesem Seienden [Dasein] eignet, daß mit und durch sein Sein dieses ihm selbst erschlossen ist.”
  36. Ibidem, p. 133. “[…] das Sein, darum es diesem Seienden in seinem Sein geht, ist, sein »Da« zu sein.”
  37. Ibidem, p. 136. “Die Stimmung hat je schon das In-der-Welt-sein als Ganzes erschlossen und macht ein Sichrichten auf... allererst möglich.” En: ”In der Befindlichkeit liegt existenzial eine erschließende Angewiesenheit auf Welt, aus der her Angehendes begegnen kann.
  38. Ibidem, p. 135. “In der Befindlichkeit ist das Dasein immer schon vor es selbst gebracht, es hat sich immer schon gefunden, nicht als wahrnehmendes Sich-vor-finden, sondern als gestimmtes Sichbefinden.”
  39. Ibidem, p. 136. “Die Befindlichkeit erschließt das Dasein in seiner Geworfenheit […].”
  40. Ibidem, p. 145. “Und als geworfenes ist das Dasein in die Seinsart des Entwerfens geworfen.”
  41. Ibidem. “Das Verstehen ist, als Entwerfen, die Seinsart des Daseins, in der es seine Möglichkeiten als Möglichkeiten ist.”
  42. Ibidem, p. 38. “Höher als die Wirklichkeit steht die Möglichkeit.
  43. Ben Vedder, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion, p. 178. “But in opposition to the metaphysical understanding of being as actuality, Heidegger’s offers his counterparadigm of the possible: […].”
  44. See: note 41.
  45. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 129. “Das Man, das kein bestimmtes ist und das Alle, obzwar nicht als Summe, sind, schreibt die Seinsart der Alltäglichkeit vor.”
  46. Ibidem, p. 128.
  47. Ibidem. “In den genannten Modi seiend hat das Selbst des eigenen Daseins und das Selbst des Andern sich noch nicht gefunden bzw. verloren. Man ist in der Weise der Unselbständigkeit und Uneigentlichkeit.”
  48. Ibidem, p. 128. “In den herausgestellten Seinscharakteren des alltäglichen Untereinanderseins, Abständigkeit, Durchschnittlichkeit, Einebnung, Öffentlichkeit, Seinsentlastung und Entgegenkommen liegt die nächste »Ständigkeit« des Daseins. Diese Ständigkeit betrifft nicht das fortwährende Vorhandensein von etwas, sondern die Seinsart des Daseins als Mitsein.”
  49. Ibidem, p. 127. “Abständigkeit, Durchschnittlichkeit, Einebnung konstituieren als Seinsweisen des Man das, was wir als »die Öffentlichkeit« kennen. […]. Die Öffentlichkeit verdunkelt alles und gibt das so Verdeckte als das Bekannte und jedem Zugängliche aus.”
  50. Chrisjan Bremmers, Overgankelijkheid. Heideggers ontwerp van een fundamentele ontologie en de kwestie van de ethiek, Damon, Best, 2000, p. 181. “Heidegger zoekt in de dood als het einde van het leven de mogelijkheid om het leven als ‘geheel’ te verstaan.”
  51. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 234. “Mit der Aufweisung eines eigentlichen Ganzseinkönnens des Daseins versichert sich die existenziale Analytik der Verfassung des ursprünglichen Seins des Daseins, […].”
  52. Ibidem, p. 263. “Das Vorlaufen erweist sich als Möglichkeit des Verstehens des eigensten äußersten Seinkönnens, das heißt als Möglichkeit eigentlicher Existenz.
  53. Ibidem, p. 161. “Im Sein zum Tode dagegen, wenn anders es die charakterisierte Möglichkeit als solche verstehend zu erschließen hat, muß die Möglichkeit ungeschwächt als Möglichkeit verstanden, als Möglichkeit ausgebildet und im Verhalten zu ihr als Möglichkeit ausgehalten werden.”
  54. Ibidem, p. 187. “Die Angst benimmt so dem Dasein die Möglichkeit, verfallend sich aus der »Welt« und der öffentlichen Ausgelegtheit zu verstehen. Sie wirft das Dasein auf das zurück, worum es sich ängstet, sein eigentliches In-der-Welt-sein-können.” En: Ibidem, p. 189. “[…]: zur wesenhaften Daseinsverfassung des In-der-Welt-seins, die als existenziale nie vorhanden, sondern selbst immer in einem Modus des faktischen Daseins, das heißt ner Befindlichkeit ist, gehört die Angst als Grundbefindlichkeit.”
  55. Ibidem, p. 186. “Wie unterscheidet sich phänomenal das, wovor die Angst sich ängstet, von dem, wovor die Furcht sich fürchtet? Das Wovor der Angst ist kein innerweltliches Seiendes.” En: p. 187. “[…]:das Wovor der Angst ist die Welt als solche.
  56. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 57. “Being appropriates man and makes him Da-sein, the site of being’s revelation: ‘Beyng as Er-eignis. […]’.”
  57. Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, Gesamtausgabe, Band 14, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2007, p. 28. “Zum Ereignis als solchem gehört die Enteignis.”
  58. Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Disclosure and Displacement, p. 53. “Every appropriation also implies expropriation (Enteignis) because the event of giving itself withdraws behind the gift it presents. This gift, reaching, or advent withdraws itself in the gift of presencing (Anwesen).”
  59. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe, Band 36/37, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2001, p. 133. “Der Mensch in der Alltäglichkeit verliert sich selbstvergessen in den Andrang der Dinge.”
  60. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 332.“Das Vergessen der Wahrheit des Seins zugunsten des Andrangs des im Wesen unbedachten Seienden ist der Sinn des in »S. u. Z.« genannten »Verfallens«.”
  61. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 296. “Diese ausgezeichnete, im Dasein selbst durch sein Gewissen bezeugte eigentliche Erschlossenheit […]nennen wir die Entschlossenheit.”
  62. Ibidem, p. 385. “Nur eigentliche Zeitlichkeit, die zugleich endlich ist, macht so etwas wie Schicksal, das heißt eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit möglich.
  63. Ibidem, p. 384.
  64. Ibidem. “Nur wenn im Sein eines Seienden Tod, Schuld, Gewissen, Freiheit und Endlichkeit dergestalt gleichursprünglich zusammenwohnen wie in der Sorge, kann es im Modus des Schicksals existieren, das heißt im Grunde seiner Existenz geschichtlich sein.”
  65. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 68. “Geschick is collective 'destiny' composed of individual fates: […]”
  66. Ibidem. “Later, Geschick becomes more important than Schicksal, and has to do with being rather than DASEIN. Heidegger derives it directly from schicken as 'what is sent', often writing Ge-Schick:[…].”
  67. Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy, p. 72. “COMING TO PRESENCE (Wesen).Heidegger uses wesen as a verb, although it is seldom used as such in modern German.”
  68. John David Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, p. 162. “Man can in no way effect this event of himself; he can only make a “clearing” in which it might take place.”
  69. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 238.“Lichtung and lichten stem from Licht, 'light', but have since lost this link and mean, in standard usage, a 'clearing, glade' in a forest and 'to clear' an area. Heidegger restores their association with light, so that they mean 'light(en)ing; to light(en)'.” En: John David Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, p. 162. “The great being of Dasein is to be the place of truth, the clearing in which the “event of appropriation” (Ereignis), the event of truth, comes to pass.”
  70. Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy,p. 152. “MYSTERY (Geheimnis).Why Being reveals itself to us in the being of entities and yet at the same time withholds itself as such in concealment is a mystery for Heidegger.”
  71. Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit, Verlag Günther Neske, Pfullingen, 1959, p. 26. “Ich nenne die Haltung, Kraft deren wir uns für den in der technischen Welt verborgenen Sinn offen halten: die Offenheit für das Geheimnis.Die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen und die Offenheit für das Geheimnis gehören zusammen. Sie gewähren uns die Möglichkeit, uns auf eine ganz andere Weise in der Welt aufzuhalten.”
  72. John David Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, p. 26. “In both anxiety and Gelassenheit Dasein is brought to a halt, withdraws from its outer running about with beings (Umtreiben an das Seiende), and enters into relation with that which is other than any being. Gelassenheit is not the counter-concept to anxiety; it is its further refinement.”
  73. To prevent confusion (especially in the later chapters) here a remark about the way of writing in this thesis of Greek terms must be made. Some Greek terms, like ‘lèthè’, are ambiguous in meaning because they indicate both a Greek concept and a Greek god or goddess. When terms are used as concept, then these shall be written without capital and cursively because it regard non-English terms (lèthè). When the terms are used as name of a god or goddess, then they will be written uncursively and with a capital (Lèthè).
  74. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 33.
  75. Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy, p. 221. “Unconcealment is the word Heidegger uses to translate the Greek word for truth, ‘alètheia’.”
  76. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 237. “Unverborgenheit is a generic term: beings of any type, and being itself, may be unverborgen, […].”
  77. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 230. “Sein – nicht Seiendes – »gibt es« nur, sofern Wahrheit ist. Und sie ist nur, sofern und solange Dasein ist. Sein und Wahrheit »sind« gleichursprünglich.”
  78. Ben Vedder, Metafysica, Een weg naar het enthousiasme. Syllabus Metafysica, Dictatencentrale Radboud Universiteit, Nijmegen, 2006, p. 30, 31. “Aristoteles onderscheidt vier hoofdbetekenissen van zijn: […]. 3) Zijn als waar zijn of het geval zijn; en niet-zijn als niet waar of niet het geval zijn.”
  79. Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1943, p. 11. “Die Aussage hat ihre Richtigkeit zu Lehen von der Offenständigkeit des Verhaltens; denn nur durch diese kann überhaupt Offenbares zum Richtmaβ werden für die vor-stellende Angleichung.”
  80. Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Disclosure and Displacement, p. 40. “The fundamental meaning (Grundbedeutung) of pseudos is Verstellen, that is, displacement or disguise.”
  81. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe, Band 54, Vittorio Klostermann, Franfurt am Main, 1982, p. 45. “Bereits unter dem Zwang des Wesenszusammenhänge, die das griechische ψεΰδος nennt, haben wir jetzt »wie von selbst« von »Verdecken« und »Verhüllen«, zugleich aber von »Erscheinenlassen« gesprochen.”
  82. Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy, p. 44. “‘Alètheia’ is the Greek word for truth.”
  83. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 183. “Das α in ά-λήϑεια sagt keineswegs nur das unbestimmt allgemeine »Un-« und »Nicht«.
  84. Willy Bretschneider, Sein und Wahrheit. Über die Zusammengehörigkeit von Sein und Wahrheit im Denken Martin Heideggers, Verlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan, 1965, p. 143. “Dieser Charakter des Entbergens drückt sich im griechischen Wort für die Wahrheit, άλήθεια, durch das “a” aus, das das Gegenüber zur λήθη und zugleich die Angewiesenheit auf diese meint.”
  85. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 185. “[…]: Denn die ά-λήϑεια, die es zu erfahren gilt, ist selbst in ihrem Wesen in die λήϑη gegründet. Zwischen beiden ist nichts Vermittelndes und kein Übergang, weil beide in sich ihrem Wesen nach unmittelbar zueinandergehören.”
  86. Robert K.C. Forman, ‘Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting’, in: Robert K.C. Forman (editor), The problem of pure consciousness: mysticism and philosophy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990, p. 5. “Part of the problem in this field is that “mysticism” is defined so variously. It may be applied to the unintelligible statements of an illogical speaker, the strained visions of a schizophrenic, hallucinations or drug-induced visions, the spiritual visions of a Julian of Norwich or a Mechthild of Magdeburg, and the quiet experiences of a divine “darkness” or emptiness as described by a Meister Eckhart or a Zen roshi.”
  87. Hermann Kochanek, Die Botschaft der Mystik in den Religionen der Welt, Kösel, München, 1998, p. 15. “Ganz algemein formuliert, könnte man unter Mystik die unmittelbare, innere Erfahrung der göttlichen oder transzendenten Wirklichkeit verstehen.”
  88. A. Poulain, geciteerd naar: Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit. Vormen, grondslagen, methoden, Kok, Carmelitana, Kampen, Gent, 2000, p. 671.
  89. G. Moioli, geciteerd naar: Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit, p. 837.
  90. Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit, p. 839. “Pas de definitie ‘ervaringskennis van God’ (Gerson) komt [volgens Dupré] tegemoet aan het moderne verstaan: een staat van bewustzijn die de gewone ervaring overstijgt door de vereniging met een transcendente werkelijkheid.”
  91. L. Dupré, geciteerd naar: Denise Lardner Carmody, John Tully Carmody, Mysticism: holiness east and west, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, p. 6. “No definition could be both meaningful and sufficiently comprehensive to include all experiences that, at some point or other, have been described as mystical.”
  92. Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Hedendaags Nederlands, Zoeksoftware, versie 2.0, Van Dale lexicografie bv, Utrecht / Antwerpen, 2002.
  93. Ibidem.
  94. Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Duits-Nederands Nederlands-Duits, Zoeksoftware, versie 2.0, Van Dale lexicografie bv, Utrecht / Antwerpen, 2002.
  95. Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Engels-Nederands Nederlands-Engels, Zoeksoftware, versie 2.0, Van Dale lexicografie bv, Utrecht / Antwerpen, 2002.
  96. J. de Vries, F. Tollenaere, met medewerking van A.J. Persijn, Etymologisch Woordenboek, Het Spectrum B.V., Utrecht, 1997, p. 260. “mystiek (1776) < fra. mystique (c. 1376) < lat. mysticus < gr. musticos ‘geheim’.”
  97. Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit, p. 353. “Oorspronkelijk hangt het woord ‘mystiek’ samen met de Griekse werkwoorden muo (= sluiten van de ogen en de mond) en mueo (= inwijden in de mysteriën).”
  98. Eckard Wolz-Gottwald, Transformation der Phänomenologie. Zur Mystik bei Husserl und Heidegger, Passagen, Wien, 1999, p. 25. “Der Begriff Mystik ist sprachgeschichtlich abgeleitet vom griechischen Stammwort mýein: sich schlieβen (vor allem von Lippen und Augen) oder auch myeín: in das Mysterium einweihen, beziehungsweise von dem Adjektiv mystikós (lat.: mysticus): zum Geheimwissen (mystérion) gehören, geheim, geheimnisvoll, verborgen.”
  99. Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit, p. 841. “Het woord ‘mystiek’ heeft [volgens A. de Sutter] altijd iets van ‘geheim’.”
  100. Ben Vedder, Metafysica, p. 23. “Deze cirkel [de hermeneutische cirkel] kan als volgt worden uitgelegd: Een afzonderlijke term, gebeurtenis of situatie moet altijd begrepen worden tegen de achtergrond van het geheel waarin ze staat, gesproken wordt of voorkomt. Het afzonderlijke wordt begrepen vanuit een voorgegeven geheel. Omgekeerd geldt echter, dat het geheel op zijn beurt toegelicht moet worden vanuit de delen; vanaf dit laatste moment zit men in een cirkelverhouding. Geheel en deel beïnvloeden elkaar wederzijds en wel zodanig dat de cirkel niet statisch blijft maar de gestalte aanneemt van een spiraalvormige beweging, waarin de delen steeds worden belicht vanuit het geheel dat de betekenis van deze delen verduidelijkt.”
  101. Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit, p. 401. “Het specifieke van mystiek is, dat de Oneindige Geest de eindige geest doordringt, wat zich in eerste instantie openbaart in ervaringen van contingentie en vergankelijkheid, maar ten slotte tot de mystieke vereniging voert. Nooit stelt deze mystieke weg zich echter buiten het leerstellige of institutionele element.”
  102. Ben Vedder, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Religion, p. 45, 46. “Formal indication is not a concept in the usual sense of the word. It is rather a reference or a guide that offers us a first glimpse of a particular phenomenon.”
  103. Denise Lardner Carmody, John Tully Carmody, Mysticism: holiness east and west, p. 10. “Having bent over backward to be balanced and open-minded, what do we suggest as a working description of mysticism? We suggest: “direct experience of ultimate reality.” “Ultimate reality” can connote “God,” “the Tao,” “nirvana,” “the sacred,” or any of the other terms that religious people have coined to indicate what is unconditioned, independent of anything else, most existent, dependable, valuable.”
  104. Kees Waaijman, ‘Mystieke ervaring en mystieke weg’, in: Joris Baers (redactie), Encyclopedie van de mystiek. Fundamenten, tradities, perspectieven, Uitgeverij Kok / Lannoo, Kampen / Tielt, 2003, p. 59. “De typologie ging functioneren als een criteriologie: wat is echte en wat is onechte mystiek? Binnen zo’n doelstelling werden bepaalde opposities ontworpen: wezensmystiek versus bruidsmystiek […].”
  105. Denise Lardner Carmody, John Tully Carmody, Mysticism: holiness east and west, p. 6. “Although the range of the term “mysticism” does indeed stretch forth endlessly, it seems fair to group the theories of mysticism into two broad camps: essentialist and empiricist.”
  106. Sonya Sikka, Forms of Transcendence. Heidegger and Medieval Mystical Theology, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1997, p. 11. “It [three forms of contemplation corresponding to three aspects of God]is drawn by Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173), among others, in the Benjamin Minor; where he speaks of three “days” of knowledge, which constitute three ways of apprehending God: through physical objects, through the mind, and above the mind.”
  107. David Luscombe, Medieval Thought. A History of Western Philosophy: II, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p. 27. “In the Divine Names Denis presents two ways of speaking about God, the negative and the positive. The first arises from God’s unknowability; the second arises from God’s self-revelation to creation. […]. Negative theology emancipates God from anthropomorphism – that is, from the imposition of human characteristics to God; it ends in silence. Positive or affirmative theology uses names such as light or beauty but only as metaphors or symbols of God. Negative theology does not eliminate affirmative theology but purifies the concepts and symbols which human beings imperfectly apply to God.”
  108. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Athenaeum – Polak & Van Gennep, Amsterdam, 2006, vertaling door W.F. Hermans uit: Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1961, p. 150, 153. “6.522 Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische. […]. 7 Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muβ man schweigen.”
  109. Meister Eckhart, geciteerd naar: John David Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, p. 224. “The most beautiful thing which man can express about God is found in the fact that, out of the wisdom of inner treasures, he is able to keep silent about God.”
  110. Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit, p. 680. “In de mystieke vereniging is de eenvoudige grond van de ziel één met de eenvoudige en eenzame grond van de Godheid, […].”
  111. Christos Yannaras, On the absence and unknowability of God. Heidegger and the Areopagite, T & T Clark International, London / New York, 2005,p. 31. “The great mystics of the Reformation era (Jakob Boehme, Angelus Silesius, etc.) follow along similar lines: the divine realm is only known by means of the human microcosm, through particular lived experiences, and not by means of the abstract conceptual structures of objective proofs.”
  112. Auke Jelsma, ‘Mystiek, geloof en religie. Enkele overwegingen’, in: Joris Baers, Auke Jelsma, Otger Steggink (redactie), Gerrit Brinkman (redactiesecretaris), Encyclopedie van de mystiek. Fundamenten, tradities, perspectieven, Uitgeverij Kok / Lannoo, Kampen / Tielt, 2003,  p. 887. “[…]. Toch heeft het zin onderscheid aan te brengen. Ook binnen het protestantisme blijkt een beperking van de omgang met God tot de geloofsbeleving van overgave en vertrouwen geen recht te doen aan wat zich in het leven van mensen kan voordoen. Soms worden mensen overvallen door een eenheidsbeleving, een aanraking met een transcendente werkelijkheid, een wegvoering naar het paradijs waar onuitsprekelijke woorden gehoord worden, een beslissende ontmoeting die tot een volledige ommekeer en een ongekende solidariteit met andere mensen leidt, kortom een mystieke ervaring waarop een mystieke weg volgen kan. Dit valt niet volledig samen met wat in het protestantisme onder geloofszekerheid verstaan wordt. Mystiek blijft daarom een apart fenomeen.”
  113. Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit, p. 320, 321. “Heilig is iemand die de overgang gemaakt heeft van het niet-heilige naar het heilige. […]. De heilige is verteerd door het heilige. […]. De heilige is opgenomen in de heiligheid van de Heilige.”
  114. Hilda Graef, Mystieken van onze tijd, n.v. Drukkerij De Spaarnestad, Haarlem, 1964, vertaling door Liesbeth van Waelde uit: Mystics of our times, Doubleday & Company, New York, 1962, p. 11. “De kennis over de mystieken hebben wij veelal door hun eigen geschriften of die van hun leerlingen. Ontbreken deze geschriften, dan beschikken wij eenvoudigweg niet over de gegevens die ons in staat stellen om te beoordelen of zij al dan niet mystici geweest zijn.”
  115. Denise Lardner Carmody, John Tully Carmody, Mysticism: holiness east and west, p. 9. “Certainly, the culture in which a mystic lives colors his or her sense of such ineffability, perhaps even shapes it decisively.”
  116. Ibidem, p. 14. “The majority of mystics have grown up in such systems because the majority of human beings have.”
  117. See: note 105.
  118. Auke Jelsma, ‘Mystiek, geloof en religie’, p. 880. “Steeds draagt volgens hen [andere auteurs] mystiek ‘het merkteken van een bepaalde religie’.”
  119. Kees Waaijman, ‘Mystieke ervaring en mystieke weg’, p. 69. “Er is een nieuwe werkelijkheid in de mysticus ontwaakt, maar hij beschikt niet over de taal om daaraan uitdrukking te geven.”
  120. Ibidem. “Al deze vormen van paradoxaliteit verwijzen echter naar deze ene fundamentele paradox: de mystieke ervaring is wezenlijk onuitsprekelijk.”
  121. Ibidem. “Talloos staat hij daar – aangevuurd door een onuitsprekelijke ervaringskern. Hij móét spreken en kan het niet. In die spanning van moeten en niet-kunnen wordt de mystieke taal geboren.”
  122. Steven T. Katz, ‘Mystical Speech and Mystical Meaning’, in: Steven T. Katz (editor), Mysticism and Language, Oxford University Press, New York / Oxford, 1992, p. 5. “Mystical literature comes in many forms, and the modality chosen as the means of communication in any instance is not incidental or tangential to its content. These diverse forms include biography, biblical exegesis, aphorisms, theoretical and theosophical treatises, poems, prayers, polemics, dogmatics, and didactic compositions.”
  123. Steven T. Katz, ‘The ‘Conservative’ Character of Mystical Experience’, in: Steven T. Katz (editor) Mysticism and Religious Traditions, Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York / Toronto / Melbourne, 1983, p. 3, 4. “[…], the aim of this paper is to reveal the two-sided nature of mysticism, that it is a dialectic that oscillates between the innovative and traditional poles of the religious life. To recognize only one of these poles – it does not matter which – is to misrepresent the phenomenon.”
  124. Josef Sudbrack, ‘Christliche Mystik – Vorüberlegungen’, in: Gerhard Ruhbach und Josef Sudbrack (editors), Grosse Mystiker. Leben und Wirken, C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, München, 1984, p. 13, 14. “Zum anderen resultiert die Verschiedenheit daraus, daβ der Mystiker Seine eigene historische Situation ernst nimmt, die Geschichte ebenso hineinnimmt in die mystische Erfahrung, wie er aus dieser zurückwirkt auf die Geschichte.”
  125. Kees Waaijman, ‘Mystieke ervaring en mystieke weg’, p. 57. “De mystieke weg is de doorwerking van de mystieke ervaring in het leven van de mysticus, het spoor dat de ervaring nalaat in zijn denken, willen, herinneren, voelen en handelen.”
  126. Ibidem, p. 68. “Bij de mystieke weg gaat het [volgens Blommestijn] dan ook niet ‘om een traject tussen twee punten, maar om een geestelijk proces dat zich spiraalsgewijs ontwikkelt, alle niveaus en alle dimensies van het menselijk bestaan omvattend’.
  127. Frans Maas, ‘Mystieke nachten’, in: Ellen van Wolde (redactie), Nacht, Gooi en Sticht, Baarn, 2000, p.34. “Hij [Dag Hammarskjöld] vergelijkt het met een binnentuin. […]. In de eigen binnentuin ben je thuis; je kent de codes en de woorden. Je bent er de baas.”
  128. Ibidem, p. 31. “Een mens raakt hier alle overzichtelijkheid kwijt, en bovendien het vermogen opnieuw overzicht tot stand te brengen. Dat is de nacht van het verstand.”
  129. Ibidem, p. 32. “Dit is de grondidee van de nacht van de geest: doordat houvast en overzichtelijkheid – juist ook gebaseerd op godsdienstigheid – teloorgaan, ontstaat ruimte voor het méér-dan-menselijke, iets weliswaar dat een mens in wezen niet vreemd is, maar waaraan hij veelal niet toekomt.”
  130. Ibidem, p. 38. “De levenskracht, niet van hem maar door hem heen als het ware, geeft nieuwe vorm aan de chaos.”
  131. Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Hedendaags Nederlands geeft als tweede betekenis voor ‘houding’: “gedrag”.
  132. Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Hedendaags Nederlands geeft als betekenis voor ‘grondhouding’: “houding waarop andere gedragingen, reacties gebaseerd worden.”
  133. See: sub-paragraph 2.2.2.
  134. Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit, p.670. “De mystieke dimensie van een spirituele vorm tekent zich af tegen de achtergrond van de spirituele oefeningen, de deugdbeoefening en het bidden.”
  135. Otger Steggink, Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit en mystiek. 1 Inleiding, B. Gottmer’s Uitgeversbedrijf, Nijmegen, 1985, p. 55. “De mystieke beleving is [volgens W. James] voorbijgaand en kort van duur; hoogtepunten duren zelden langer dan enkele uren en meestal niet langer dan een half uur.”
  136. Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Hedendaags Nederlands.
  137. Fred Muller, J.H. Thiel, Beknopt Grieks-Nederlands woordenboek, elfde druk, Wolters-Noordhoff bv, Groningen, 1969, p. 796.
  138. Susan Niditch, Chaos to Cosmos. Studies in Biblical Patterns of Creation, Scholars Press, Chico, 1985, p. 12. “In the ancient Near East chaos finds expression in pairs of essences such as Tōhû and Bōhû, “Empty” and “Void” […].”
  139. Fred Muller, E.H. Renkema, Beknopt Latijns-Nederlands woordenboek, tiende druk, J.B. Wolters, Groningen,  1963, p. 141.
  140. Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, translated by: Hugh G. Evelyn-White, William Heinemann Ltd., London / Harvard University Press, Cambridge / Massachusetts, 1967, p. 86, 87.
  141. Otger Steggink, Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit en mystiek, p. 103. “Die doorbraak is dubbelzinnig. Enerzijds is er een moment van afbraak: de wereld van de mysticus wordt afgebroken; de grondinspiratie, de tijdgeest, de zelfopvatting die tot dan toe een diepe vertrouwdheid gaven, blijken een farce; de zorgvuldig opgebouwde ‘identiteit’ blijkt niet tegen de storm bestand. Anderzijds breekt op het dieptepunt van de afbraak plotseling en onaangekondigd een nieuwe laag in het zelf door, een laag die echter gewekt is door de onmiddellijk ervaren Ander, door de Onuitsprekelijke, door de tot dan toe ongekende Kern van de Werkelijkheid.”
  142. Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit, p.839. “Hij [Dupré] sluit zich aan bij William James: de mystieke ervaring is onuitsprekelijk; bevat een uniek, alomvattend besef van integratie; kan niet worden bewerkt, maar overkomt je; is voorbijgaand.”
  143. Kees Waaijman, ‘Mystieke ervaring en mystieke weg’, p. 59.
  144. Otger Steggink, Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit en mystiek, p. 105. “Zijn diepste zelf is doorgebroken, dat is het enige dat hij weet.”
  145. See: note 110.
  146. See: notes 120, 142.
  147. Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Disclosure and Displacement, p. 14. “Truth as disclosure takes its distance from the traditional metaphysical concept of truth as an agreement between subject and object (veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus) and its ancillary conception of being.”
  148. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 11. “Ontologisches Fragen ist zwar gegenüber dem ontischen Fragen der positiven Wissenschaften ursprünglicher.”
  149. See: paragraph 1.2.
  150. See: chapter 1.
  151. See: note 100.
  152. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 106. “Denken wir die Vergessung nun als eine Verborgenheit, die einer eigentümlichen Verbergung zugehort, dann erst nahern wir uns dem, was die Griechen mit dem Wort λήϑη benennen.”
  153. Ibidem, p. 107. “Λήϑη, die Vergessung, ist eine Verbergung, die Wesentliches entzieht und den Menschen selbst ihm selbst, d.h. hier immer der Möglichkeit, in seinem Wesen zu wohnen, entfremdet.”
  154. Ibidem. “Λιμός meint nicht die Unbefriedigung eines Verlangens des Menschen und seines Zustandes, sondern das Geschehnis des Ausbleibs einer Gabe und Zuweisung.”
  155. Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy, p. 99. “The truth of Being is a gift of Being and as such is given to being-there, which is at the same time given over to its existence.”
  156. Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, p. 96, 97.
  157. Ibidem.
  158. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 26. “Wir begreifen daher nicht, inwiefern das Wesen der Wahrheit selbst, in sich selbst, ein Streit ist.”
  159. Ibidem, p. 25. “Die Unverborgenheit ist der Verborgenheit, im Streit mit ihr, abgerungen.”
  160. Ibidem. “Wer da streitet und wie die Streitenden streiten, ist dunkel.”
  161. See: note 70.
  162. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Wahrheit, p. 188. “Verborgenheit ist ein Charakter dessen, was wir Geheimnis nennen.”
  163. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 97.“Heim is 'home, dwelling-place'.”
  164. Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit, p. 343. “Die Angst ängstet sich um das nackte Dasein als in die Unheimlichkeit geworfenes.”
  165. Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Duits-Nederlands Nederlands-Duits, zoeksoftware versie 2.0, Utrecht / Antwerpen 2002.
  166. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 98. “We must try to restore the Geheimnis of man's Dasein, the Unheimlichkeit, on which the 'liberation of the Dasein in man' depends.”
  167. Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns and Homerica, p. 94, 95.
  168. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 108. “Ερις selbst ist die Tochter der Νύξ, die heist ὀλοή, ein Beiname, der oft bei Homer und Hesiod der Μοΐρα gehört. Man übersetzt »verderblich«. Das ist wiederum »richtig« und gleichwohl ungriechisch. Man versteht nicht, weshalb die Nacht »verderblich« sein soll. Verderben ist Zerstören, Vernichten, d. h. des Seins berauben, d. h. griechisch, die Anwesenheit wegnehmen. Die Nacht ist ὀλοή, weil sie alles Anwesende verschwinden läβt: durch eine Verbergung.”
  169. Martin Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrund des Denkens, Gesamtausgabe, Band 13, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, p. 29. “Nacht / Stillste reine / sternenreiche Nacht, / bring das Eine / mir, / was noch kaum in dir / je ein Denker / harrend überwacht: / die Ereignung / in den Tag des Seyns.”
  170. See: note 129.
  171. Otger Steggink, Kees Waaijman, Spiritualiteit en mystiek, p. 55, 56. “In tegenstelling tot William James ontwerpt Underhill een ideaaltypische beschrijving van de mystieke weg, waarin zij vijf stadia onderscheidt. […]. 4. De uiteindelijke zuivering volstrekt zich in de vierde fase: de donkere nacht van de ziel of de mystieke dood. […]. 5. De mystieke vereniging, […].”
  172. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 114. “Die Nichtung läβt sich auch nicht in Vernichtung und Verneinung aufrechnen. Das Nichts selbst nichtet.”
  173. Ibidem, p. 108. “Wir behaupten: das Nichts ist ursprünglicher als das Nicht und die Verneinung.”
  174. Ibidem, p. 114. “In der hellen Nacht des Nichts der Angst ersteht erst die ursprüngliche Offenheit des Seienden als eines solchen: daβ es Seiendes ist – und nicht Nichts.” En: p. 115. “Das Nichts ist die Ermöglichung der Offenbarkeit des Seienden als eines solchen für das menschliche Dasein.”
  175. Ibidem, 115. “Im Sein des Seienden geschieht das Nichten des Nichts.”
  176. See: sub-paragraph 1.3.2.
  177. Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 176. “Das Nichtige der Leere ist das Nichts des Entzugs.”
  178. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsches Lehre vom Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis, Gesamtausgabe, Band 47, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1989, p. 149. “Χάος meint anfänglich das Aufgähnende und weist in die Richtung des unabmeβbaren, stütze- und grundlosen Aufklaffenden, Offenen (vgl. Hesiod, »Theogonie«, 116).”
  179. See: sub-paragraph 2.3.2, en: noot 140.
  180. See: note 127.
  181. See: sub-paragraph 1.2.2.
  182. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 87. “Das im folgenden noch eingehender zu analysierende Verstehen (vgl. § 31) hält die angezeigten Bezüge in einer vorgängigen Erschlossenheit. Im vertrauten Sich-darin-halten hält es sich diese vor als das, worin sich sein Verweisen bewegt.”
  183. Ibidem, p. 189. “Nunmehr wird phänomenal sichtbar, wovor das Verfallen als Flucht flieht. Nicht vor innerweltlichem Seienden, sondern gerade zu diesem als dem Seienden, dabei das Besorgen, verloren in das Man, in beruhigter Vertrautheit sich aufhalten kann.”
  184. Ibidem, p. 188, 189. “Dieser Charakter des In-Seins wurde dann konkreter sichtbar gemacht durch die alltägliche Öffentlichkeit des Man, das die beruhigte Selbstsicherheit, das selbstverständliche »Zuhause-sein« in die durchschnittliche Alltäglichkeit des Daseins bringt.”
  185. Martin Heidegger, Der Begriff der Zeit, Gesamtausgabe, Band 64, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2004, p. 26. “Jeder ist zunächst in der Alltäglichkeit mit den anderen gleich uneigentlich.”
  186. See: note 23.
  187. Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Disclosure and Displacement, p. 2. “Heidegger understands the essence of language as the ability of language to bring beings forth out of concealment into unconcealment. Language, and especially poetic language, is therefore also the occurrence of truth.”
  188. Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe, Band 12, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1985, p. 153, en verder. “Kein ding sei wo das wort gebricht. […].”
  189. Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, p. 30. “Nur wo Sprache, da ist Welt, […].”
  190. Ibidem, p. 230. “So sind wir denn allem zuvor in der Sprache und bei der Sprache.”
  191. See: sub-paragraph 1.3.2. En: Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 87. “Language opens up, reveals and orders the world for us.”
  192. See: note 6.
  193. Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, p. 168. “Das Seinsgeschick: ein Kind, das spielt.”
  194. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 68. “Heidegger derives it [Geschick] directly from schicken as 'what is sent', often writing Ge-Schick:[…].”
  195. Martin Heidegger, Vorträge und Aufsätze, Gesamtausgabe, Band 7, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 2000, p. 25. “Wir nennen jenes versammelnde Schicken, das den Menschen erst auf einen Weg des Entbergens bringt, das Geschick. Von hier aus bestimmt sich das Wesen aller Geschichte.”
  196. See: note 65.
  197. See: sub-paragraph 1.2.2.
  198. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 385. “Nur Seiendes, das wesenhaft in seinem Sein zukünftig ist, so daß es frei für seinen Tod an ihm zerschellend auf sein faktisches Da sich zurückwerfen lassen kann, das heißt nur Seiendes, das als zukünftiges gleichursprünglich gewesend ist, kann, sich selbst die ererbte Möglichkeit überliefernd, die eigene Geworfenheit übernehmen und augenblicklich sein für »seine Zeit«. Nur eigentliche Zeitlichkeit, die zugleich endlich ist, macht so etwas wie Schicksal, das heißt eigentliche Geschichtlichkeit möglich.
  199. Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, p. 38. “Die Sprache ist ein Gut in einem ursprünglicheren Sinne. Sie steht dafür gut, das heiβt: sie leisted Gewähr, daβ der Mensch als geschichtlicher sein kann.”
  200. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 385, 386. “Die Wiederholung ist die ausdrückliche Überlieferung, […]. […]. Die Wiederholung kennzeichnen wir als den Modus der sich überliefernden Entschlossenheit, durch den das Dasein ausdrücklich als Schicksal existiert.”
  201. John David Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, p. 119. “The root of this word, lassen, means to let go, to relinquish, to abandon. The soul in Gelassenheit must relinquish everything which would impede God’s advent into the soul. But “lassen” also means to “let” or “permit,” and so it suggests openness and receptivity. Thus the soul which has left behind all the obstacles to the birth of God can at the same time permit or let the Father bear His Son there. The first moment is negative – to relinquish creatures – and the second is positive – to permit the Son’s birth.”
  202. Ibidem, p. 174. “Thus Heidegger’s acknowledgment of the source of this idea in Meister Eckhart is couched in the form of a criticism of Eckhart.”
  203. Ibidem. “The proximity of Heidegger to Eckhart and the mystical tradition is so great at this point that Heidegger can find no better word to express the relation of Dasein to Being than Meister Eckhart’s own term: Gelassenheit.”
  204. Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, Vittoria Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1955, p. 47. “Aber das Sein ist kein Erzeugnis des Denkens.”
  205. See: note 71.
  206. See: sub-paragraph 2.3.1.
  207. Martin Heidegger, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, Gesamtausgabe, Band 13, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, p. 57. “G[elehrter]: Wir hängen gleichsam zwischen beiden. L[ehrer]: Doch der Aufenthalt in diesem Zwischen ist das Warten. G: Dies ist das Wesen der Gelassenheit, […]”
  208. In de Nederlandse vertaling van Heideggers werk ‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’ wordt Heideggers neologistisch gebruik van de term ‘Bewahrung’ vertaald met ‘bewaring’. Ook in deze beschouwing moet ‘bewaring’ niet in zijn alledaagse betekenissen genomen worden. See: Martin Heidegger, De oorsprong van het kunstwerk, Boom, Amsterdam, 2002, vertaling door Mark Wildschut en Chris Bremmers uit: ‘Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes’, in: Holzwege, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1950.
  209. Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 241. “Sagen und Sprechen sind nicht das gleiche. Einer kann sprechen, spricht endlos, und alles ist nichtsagend. Dagegen schweigt jemand, er spricht nicht und kann im Nichtsprechen viel sagen.”
  210. Ibidem, p. 242. “Das Wesende der Sprache ist die Sage als die Zeige.”
  211. Ibidem, p. 254. “Die Sage braucht das Verlauten im Wort. Der Mensch aber vermag nur zu sprechen, insofern er, der Sage gehörend, auf sie hört, um nachsagend ein Wort sagen zu können.”
  212. Gert-Jan van der Heiden, Disclosure and Displacement, p. 124. “[…] poetry speaks out of an experience of language as saying.”
  213. Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, p. 43. “Die Ursprache aber ist die Dichtung als Stiftung des Seins.”
  214. Timothy Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot. Sources of Derrida’s notion and practice of literature, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1992. p. 29. “Dichtung is far from being ‘poetry’. It is rather a new notion of the poetic as at sway in the being of language: ‘Language itself is poetry in the essential sense.’”
  215. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe, Band 5, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1977, p. 24. “Gerade in der groβen Kunst, und von ihr allein ist hier die Rede, […].”
  216. Ibidem, p. 59. “Alle Kunst ist als Geschehenlassen der Ankunft der Wahrheit des Seienden als eines solchem im Wesen Dichtung.”
  217. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 69. “Die Seinsart von Zeug, in der es sich von ihm selbst her offenbart, nennen wir die Zuhandenheit. Nur weil Zeug dieses »An-sich-sein« hat und nicht lediglich noch vorkommt, ist es handlich im weitesten Sinne und verfügbar.”
  218. Timothy Clark, The Poetics of Singularity. The Counter-Culturalist Turn in Heidegger, Derrida, Blanchot and the later Gadamer, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2005, p. 52. “So the work is not just an unconcealment of beings but a making explicit ‘that an unconcealment of beings has happened’ (emphasis added).”
  219. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 51. “Geschaffensein des Werkes heiβt: Festgestelltsein der Wahrheit in die Gestalt.”
  220. Ibidem, p. 3. “Beethovens Quartette liegen in den Lagerräumen des Verlagshauses wie die Kartoffeln im Keller.”
  221. Ibidem, p. 56. “Die eigenste Wirklichkeit des Werkes kommt dagegen nur da zum Tragen, wo das Werk in der durch es selbst geschehenden Wahrheit bewahrt wird.”
  222. Ibidem, p. 54. “Dieses: das Werk ein Werk sein lassen, nennen wir die Bewahrung des Werkes.”
  223. See: sub-paragraph 3.2.2.
  224. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 62. “Die Sprache selbst ist Dichtung im wesentlichen Sinne. Weil nun aber die Sprache jenes Geschehnis ist, in dem für den Menschen jeweils erst Seiendes als Seiendes sich erschließt, deshalb ist die Poesie, die Dichtung im engeren Sinne, die ursprünglichste Dichtung im wesentlichen Sinne. Die Sprache ist nicht deshalb Dichtung, weil sie die Urpoesie ist, sondern die Poesie ereignet sich in der Sprache, weil diese das ursprüngliche Wesen der Dichtung verwahrt. Bauen und Bilden dagegen geschehen immer schon und immer nur im Offenen der Sage und des Nennens. Von diesem werden sie durchwaltet und geleitet. Deshalb bleiben sie eigene Wege und Weisen, wie die Wahrheit sich ins Werk richtet. Sie sind ein je eigenes Dichten innerhalb der Lichtung des Seienden, die schon und unbeachtet in der Sprache geschehen ist.”
  225. Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, p. 33. “Das Gedicht eines Dichters bleibt ungesprochen. Keine der einzelnen Dichtungen, auch nicht ihr Gesamt, sagt alles. Dennoch spricht jede Dichtung aus dem Ganzen des einen Gedichtes und sagt jedesmal dieses.”
  226. Ibidem, p. 241, 242. “Was gar ungesprochen bleiben muβ, wird im Ungesagten zurückgehalten, verweilt als Unzeigbares im Verborgenen, ist Geheimnis.”
  227. Ibidem, p. 224. “Sich das Denkwürdige sagen lassen, heiβt -Denken. Indem wir das Gedicht horen, denken wir dem Dichten nach. Auf solche Weise ist: Dichten und Denken.”
  228. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 65. “Die Kunst ist als Stiftung wesenhaft geschichtlich. Das heiβt nicht nur: die Kunst hat eine Geschichte in dem äuβerlichen Sinne, daβ sie im Wandel der Zeiten neben vielem anderen auch vorkommt und sich dabei verändert und vergeht und der Historie wechselnde Anblicke darbietet. Die Kunst ist Geschichte in dem wesentlichen Sinne, daβ sie Geschichte gründet.”
  229. See: note 178.
  230. See: paragraph 1.3.2.
  231. See: paragraph  3.1.4.
  232. Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe, Band 40, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, p. 121, eigen cursivering. “Überlegenes Wissen, und jedes Wissen ist Überlegenheit, wird nur dem geschenkt, der den beflügelnden Sturm auf dem Weg des Seins erfahren hat, dem der Schrecken des zweiten Weges zum Abgrund des Nichts nicht fremd geblieben ist, der jedoch den dritten Weg, den des Scheins, als standige Not übernommen hat.”
  233. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 82. “It [Grund] takes prefixes, especially as Abgrund, strictly 'earth going down (wards)', i.e. 'unfathomable depths, abyss, underground, etc.'; […].”
  234. See: paragraph 3.1.3 en noot 168.
  235. See: paragraph 1.2.
  236. Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, p. 87. “Der Satz vom Grund, in der anderen Tonart gehört, sagt als Satz vom Sein dieses: Sein und Grund: das Selbe; Sein: der Ab-Grund.”
  237. Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy, p. 41. “Since every ground can only be an entity, we can only think of Being itself as the abyss from which all entities spring into presence.”
  238. See: note 175.
  239. John David Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, p. 213. “For the Nothing, as that which withdraws behind beings and is not any being, is no less than Being itself. The being as such emerges in the ground of this Nothing which, as Being, is the sustaining ground of the being.”
  240. Ibidem, p. 162. “Man can in no way effect this event of himself; he can only make a “clearing” in which it might take place.”
  241. See: sub-paragraph 2.3.2 en noot 143.
  242. See: sub-paragraph 1.2.2.
  243. See: note 55.
  244. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 189. “Wenn sich demnach als das Wovor der Angst das Nichts, das heißt die Welt als solche herausstellt, […].”
  245. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 113. “Das Seiende wird doch durch die Angst nicht vernichtet, um so das Nichts übrigzulassen.”
  246. See: sub-paragraph 3.1.4.
  247. Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 113. “Das Nichts enthüllt sich in der Angst – […].”
  248. Ibidem, p. 114. “In der hellen Nacht des Nichts der Angst ersteht erst die ursprüngliche Offenheit des Seienden als eines solchen: daß es Seiendes ist – und nicht Nichts. […]. Das Wesen des ursprünglich nichtenden Nichts liegt in dem: es bringt das Da-sein allererst vor das Seiende als ein solches.”
  249. Ibidem, p. 111. “In der Angst - sagen wir - »ist es einem unheimlich«.”
  250. See: notes 137 en 139.
  251. Van Dale Groot Woordenboek Hedendaags Nederlands geeft als betekenis voor ‘natuur’: “niet (door de mens) gewijzigde omgeving of omstandigheden”. Haakjes zelf toegevoegd.
  252. Michael Inwood, A Heidegger Dictionary, p. 6. “What began as the Greek phusis has ended up as 'nature'.”
  253. Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, p. 109. “Sein west als φύσις. Das aufgehende Walten ist Erscheinen. Solches bringt zum Vorschein. Darin liegt schon: Das Sein, Erscheinen läβt aus der Verborgenheit heraustreten.”
  254. See: sub-paragraph 1.3.2.
  255. Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, p. 109. “Denn das griechische Wesen der Wahrheit ist nur in eins mit dem griechischen Wesen des Seins als φύσις möglich.”
  256. See: sub-paragraph 1.1.1, en: noten 22 en 23.
  257. Edward Witherspoon, ‘Logic and the Inexpressible in Frege and Heidegger’, in: Hubert Dreyfus, Mark Wrathall, Heidegger Reexamined. Volume 4. Language and the Critique of Subjectivity, Routledge, New York, London, 2002, p. 196. “Heidegger uses the term "world" for the totality within which Dasein locates itself and encounters other entities. So we can say that Dasein 's understanding of the world makes it possible for Dasein to encounter any particular entity. Because Dasein understands the totality of entities [das Seiende im Ganzen], Dasein can perceive, think about, and talk about particular entities.”
  258. See: sub-paragraph 1.2.1, en: noten 41 en 42.
  259. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 233. “Im Dasein steht, solange es ist, je noch etwas aus, was es sein kann und wird. Zu diesem Ausstand aber gehört das »Ende« selbst. Das »Ende« des In-der-Welt-seins ist der Tod.”
  260. Ibidem, p. 245. “Das mit dem Tod gemeinte Enden bedeutet kein Zu-Ende-sein des Daseins, sondern ein Sein zum Ende dieses Seienden. Der Tod ist eine Weise zu sein, die das Dasein übernimmt, sobald es ist.”
  261. Ibidem, p. 240. “Wenn aber das »Enden« als Sterben die Ganzheit des Daseins konstituiert, dann muß das Sein der Gänze selbst als existenziales Phänomen des je eigenen Daseins begriffen werden.”
  262. See: sub-paragraph 2.3.2, en: noot 141.
  263. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 262. “Das Sein zum Tode ist Vorlaufen in ein Seinkönnen des Seienden, dessen Seinsart das Vorlaufen selbst ist.”
  264. Ibidem, p. 325. “Das Vorlaufen macht das Dasein eigentlich zukünftig, so zwar, daß das Vorlaufen selbst nur möglich ist, sofern das Dasein als seiendes überhaupt schon immer auf sich zukommt, das heißt in seinem Sein überhaupt zukünftig ist.”
  265. Ibidem, p. 228. “Dasein aber – das liegt in der Seinsverfassung als Sorge – ist sich je schon vorweg.”
  266. Ibidem, p. 325. “Das die ausgezeichnete Möglichkeit aushaltende, in ihr sich auf sich Zukommen-lassen ist das ursprüngliche Phänomen der Zukunft.
  267. Ibidem, p. 325. “Formal existenzial gefaßt, ohne jetzt ständig den vollen Strukturgehalt zu nennen, ist die vorlaufende Entschlossenheit das Sein zum eigensten ausgezeichneten Seinkönnen.”
  268. See: sub-paragraph 3.2.2.
  269. Stephen Mulhall, Heidegger and Being and Time, Routledge, London / New York, 1996, p. 138. “In short, the only authentic mode of resoluteness is anticipatory resoluteness: the only authentic mode of anticipation is resolute anticipation.”
  270. Martin Heidegger, Die Geschichte des Seyns, Gesamtausgabe, Band 69, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, p. 94. “Das Ereignis ist das wesende Wesen der Geschichte und aus dem Bezug zum Austrag im Sinne der Inständigkeit ist das Da-sein wesentlich geschichtlich.”
  271. Alfred Denker, Historical Dictionary of Heidegger’s Philosophy, p. 181. “Poetry is thus the ‘founding and giving’ or institution (Stiftung) of the unconcealment of Being and so the origin of the history of a people.”
  272. Martin Heidegger, Die Geschichte des Seyns, p. 96. “Geschichte ist nur dort, wo jedesmal anfänglich über das Wesen der Wahrheit entschieden wird.”
  273. See: note 219.
  274. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 26. “Gerade in der groβen Kunst, und von ihr allein ist hier die Rede, bleibt der Künstler gegenüber dem Werk etwas Gleichgültiges, fast wie ein im Schaffen sich selbst vernichtender Durchgang für den Hervorgang des Werkes.”
  275. Jan van Ruusbroec, Vanden blinkenden steen, in: Jan van Ruusbroec, Opera omnia 10, (editors: G. de Baere, Th. Mertens, H. Noë, English translation: A. Lefevere, Latin translation: L. Surius), Lannoo / Brepols, Tielt / Turnhout, 1991, p. 180, 181. “Ende hi es een levende willich <in>strument gods, daer god mede werct wat hi wilt ende hoe hi wilt; ende des en dreecht hi hem niet ane, maer hi gheeft gode die eere.” Volgens Engelse vertaling: “And he is a living, willing instrument of God with which God does what he wants, the way he wants; and he does not claim this for himself, but gives the honor to God.”
  276. See: notes 42 en 43.
  277. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 61. “Entwerfen ist das Auslösen eines Wurfes, als welcher die Unverborgenheit sich in das Seiende als solches schickt.”
  278. See: sub-paragraph 3.2.4.
  279.  Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 59. “Alle Kunst ist als Geschehenlassen der Ankunft der Wahrheit des Seienden als eines solchem im Wesen Dichtung.”
  280. Maurits Smeyers, ‘Chistelijke mystiek in de middeleeuwse beeldende kunst’, in: Joris Baers, Auke Jelsma, Otger Steggink (redactie), Gerrit Brinkman (redactiesecretaris), Encyclopedie van de mystiek. Fundamenten, tradities, perspectieven, Uitgeverij Kok / Lannoo, Kampen / Tielt, 2003, p. 82. “Er bestaat wel terdege wisselwerking tussen mystiek en kunst: kunst wordt enerzijds geïnspireerd door mystieke ervaringen, anderzijds leiden kunstwerken tot beschouwingen van mystieke aard en tot visioenen.”
  281. See: sub-paragraph 2.2.3, en: noten 119, 120 en 121.
  282. Martin Heidegger, Holzwege, p. 61, 62. “Das entwerfende Sagen ist jenes, das in der Bereitung des Sagbaren zugleich das Unsagbare als ein solches zur Welt bringt. In solchem Sagen werden einem geschichtlichen Volk die Begriffe seines Wesens, d.h. seiner Zugehörigkeit zur Welt-Geschichte vorgeprägt.”
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