- 1. ANTHROPOLOGY: THE SOUL
- 2. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SPIRIT: THE CONSCIOUSNESS
- 3. PSYCHOLOGY: THE SPIRIT
The subjective spirit is a concept from the philosophy of Hegel, and this consideration is in a certain sense the completion of a Hegelian dialectic process.1 Where at the start of the study of the subjective spirit still only a general conception thereof was present, there were during the study his distinct specifications consciously examined, to conclusively come from there again to a general summarization wherein however now also the consciousness of the specifications is contained. Also is for more than a very general summarization here no place and the consideration shall thus consist of a thorough sketch of the large lines in which the details will not be present in an explicit way.
So the subject of consideration regards the subjective spirit as it is presented in Hegel's Enzyklop ӓ die der philosophischen Wissenschaften.2 The subjective spirit as an sich moment of the spirit is in first instance nature spirit that has lost itself as it were in the him surrounding. In the process which in the subjective spirit is gone through becomes the spirit aware of himself, when he will have arrived at the für sich of the objective spirit.3 With this then achieves the spirit at the same time its freedom which he at the start in the subjective spirit still lacked.4 This subjective spirit is further (just like the objective spirit) ending (or finite) spirit (where the absolute spirit is depicted as unending (or infinite) spirit. That finiteness of the spirit we must understand as a finiteness within the infinity of the spirit, there placed by himself for the benefit of his self-conscious becoming. For the process of the spirit is to become conscious of his boundaries as finite spirit. Right in that becoming conscious of that boundaries these come to fall away (for knowing the boundary means to transcend it) by which the spirit conclusively shall know and realize itself self-consciously as the infinite absolute spirit.5 The most important triplicity of moments in the subjective spirit regards: as an sich moment the anthropology or the soul, as für sich moment the phenomenology of the spirit or the consciousness, and as an und für sich moment the psychology or the spirit. These three moments are themselves further dialectically differentiated. In a certain measure shall this show during the consideration itself, however as general summarization is it as mentioned not possible to explicate the dialectical differentiation into the smallest details. Let us thus make the start with the consideration.
The soul is the subject of investigation of anthropology, is the an sich of the subjective spirit, and can as immediate subjective spirit be understood as nature spirit.6 For there the spirit is still captured by nature, still concerned with its corporality, not yet with itself and not yet free.7 Hegel considers this soul thereby as the foundation of all particularization of the spirit and with that also as the foundation of man.8 And regarding in its being the immateriality of nature it is as general soul to be considered as general substance, which however only in the particularity and with that in the subjectivity of the soul finds its real truth.9 The dialectic triplicity of the soul regards: the natural soul, the feeling soul and the real soul.
The moments through which the natural soul develops itself to the feeling soul regard natural qualities, natural changes and experience.10 The natural qualities know as first moment the climate, the seasons and the like11 which influence the nature and the behaviour of the plants and animals but also of humans for as far as it regards their nature,12 for man can eventually transcend his nature in the realisation of the freedom of the spirit.13 In the second moment man particularizes himself in the diverse races and peoples,14 and in the third moment is man particularized to an individual subject with its specific talents, temperament and character.15 Hereby we must take in consideration that the subjectivity of man here still regards the particularized sphere of the nature spirit or soul. In this sphere of particularization or separateness still rules accidence, where necessity belongs to the sphere of the general.16
The befitting sequel to this particularization of man does Hegel give under the natural changes by naming firstly the life course of man, which on itself by the way also regards a dialectic process.17 Other natural changes regard the relation of the sexes18 and the sleep-waking distinction. During sleep the soul has sunk in its general substance and during waking the soul has entered its individual subjectivity.19 On the level of the nature spirit regards waking the simply für sich encountering of the world as opposed to its own subjectivity.20
The above encountering of the world at the für sich moment of waking is in first instance still an undetermined encountering. Only at the experience does the distinction between world and subject receive a determination.21 This determination Hegel works out through the five senses.22 The quantitative determination regards simply the intensity of experience which is experienced as pleasant or unpleasant, by which thus also the innerness in this relation has a determination, a mood.23
With this then is the an und für sich of the natural soul reached, for in that act of experience whereby the outer world gets a place in the subject, is the für sich as distinction between world and subject removed.24 But this für sich is not just removed by an internalization of the outerness, but also by an externalisation of the innerness.25 For the inner mood finds on its turn its way to the outside by expressing itself through the body.26 Now because this mood as accidental nature aspect can contain both the particularity as the generality of the spirit (as first manner in which the spiritual shows up) we cannot appeal on this content.27 Thus leads the experience us from the point of the undetermined encountering of the world during waking through the perception eventually to the feelings.
In the feeling soul is the natural soul left behind with the reaching of an inner individuality which in the process within the feeling soul becomes independent and with that frees itself.28 This individuality, this subjective soul, distincts itself from the general soul by the contents of the feelings. These contents are at the same time both the subjective soul itself as the by the subjective soul set predicates of the general soul.29 The three moments within the process of becoming independent that takes place in the feeling soul regard the feeling soul in its immediateness, self-feeling and the habit.
The feeling soul in its immediateness is difficult to distinct from the last discussed part of the experience and regards the soul in its generality in which the soul in its subjectivity is carried (like a mother carries the foetus within herself). There is no question yet of a subjective self here, the general soul is still the self of both.30 Now when a human, distinct from his sensible consciousness, is sunk in such a hypnotic condition then one can speak of a disease.31
Where in the feeling soul in its immediateness is no question yet of a subjective self, due to the passive nature of that subjective self, there it comes to activity in the self-feeling and distincts itself from the self of the general soul.32 The distinction between subjective and objective which here comes to being is itself however in a certain sense still a subjective distinction. This means that the subjective and the objective are still located within the individuality of the subjective soul, and the objectivity not yet regards real objectivity. For real objectivity comes to being only when the consciousness throws out the whole of subjective feelings.33 That's why Hegel here speaks of a condition of insanity; for the insane lives in an own subjective world which may seem objective to him but which regards no real objectivity.34
An important moment in the feelings, which follows after the self-feeling, is the habit. Where in the self-feeling the contents of the feelings regarded still accidences there are these contents in the habit elevated to a certain generality by repetition and excersize.35 With this then takes with the habit as second nature (but still nature) also a liberation place of the accidental experiences in the first nature.36 Important is the habit especially (although every tread in the totality of the self-realisation of the spirit is important) because in the habit the anthropological side of man is being made suitable to function as an instrument of the spirit.37
In the real soul comes the process of the soul to a completion to subsequently cross into the consciousness. The real soul is itself reached through the habit. For the real soul is the identity of inner and outer whereby it in its corporality has its (by habit formed) free form of expression whereby it also has its self-feeling.38 Thus we see all three moments of the feeling soul (as well as, though more implicit, the moments of the natural soul) together again in the real soul. For the subjective spirit it [the real soul] is as self-feeling and from accidental experience free soul however still an sich, and with that is with the real soul the spirit not yet freed from the anthropological side. Only when this real soul eventually is set für sich through the consciousness shall the spirit be able to free itself from this soul to become thus a real I.39
The consciousness is the für sich moment of the subjective spirit. In this phenomenology of the spirit is the process run through of the consciousness as such through the self-consciousness to the reason.40 In this process a becoming conscious takes place of the experienced objects, a becoming conscious of the real I, and a becoming conscious of the unity of those two.41 The consciousness regards the appearance of the spirit and is like the light that in manifestation of itself also manifests the objects.42
The consciousness as such knows within its own dialectic the three moments of the sensuous consciousness, the perception and the intellect. In the sensuous consciousness is that which was an sich experienced set für sich.43 This means that the contents of experience here do not take place anymore in the nature of the subject but are placed out of it. This then is what the becoming conscious of objects brings to being; here still in the form of consciousness of the immediate being of simple things. The essence of the objects is here not yet the case.44
A simple object however does have many qualities and predicates which regard a certain generality. These generalities, when by the mind taken, make the perceptive consciousness come to being.45 For the perceptive consciousness does not only take the object simply as notice, but also wants to really (intellectually) know the object.46 With this is the simple object thus related to the general (and with that the real) and does a mixing of these two take place.47 In this für sich of the consciousness as such there is however still another distinction between the outer general and the inner general which as such in the an und für sich of the consciousness is elevated or brought to a synthesis.
When this general of the simple objects thus is related to the general as inner given can be spoken of the intellectual consciousness. For the intellect does not see reality in the sensuous perception but wants to take the inner general for real.48 For in the intellectual as generality in the objects does the intellect re-find itself. Hegel considers these in the objects present generalities as laws (in which the intellect thus re-finds itself).49 This re-finding itself in the generalities of the objects means however that the consciousness is not anymore an sich but that it went over to a für sich, that it went over to a self-consciousness.50
Within the self-consciousness Hegel sees a dialectical triplicity in the desire, the acknowledging self-consciousness and the general self-consciousness. In this dialectical process takes the development place of the immediate self-consciousness as consciousness of 'I' to a consciousness of 'I = I'. In this last moment (where then the reason is entered) becomes the spirit free, be it in first instance still in an abstract way.51 The first moment in the self-consciousness regards however the desire, which is also a tendency. This tendency sets in because the intellectual consciousness, in which the object and the subjects in their generality are identical, still contains that dual opposition of subject and object. For the tendency is always out to solve this opposition, thereby determined by the contents of the feelings which regarded the I of the subjective spirit an sich.52 The tread on which we find ourselves here regards however already the self-consciousness, and on this tread the subject relates in the desire the object to itself by seeing in the object of desire its own lack.53 In the satisfaction this particular desire, this particular distinction of subject and object, is ended,54 however it will always again make place for a new particular (and selfish) desire.55
Only in the setting für sich of the desire and its satisfaction (and thus only at the setting für sich of the self-consciousness an sich) is this endless circle broken, or better; ended. This happens in the acknowledging self-consciousness. For although the process of desire goes on without end it is nevertheless so that in the satisfaction the immediateness of the self-consciousness is ignored, or being placed für sich, whereby then so to speak a second self-consciousness is placed against it.56 This awakens a battle between these two because the für sich self-consciousness cannot recognize itself in the immediateness of the first self-consciousness, the desire, and this one immediately wants to end it.57 This is as a battle of life and death whereby one through bondage of the other shall become ruler.58 In easier to understand words it can be attested that the desire though the free self-consciousness must be bonded to be really free. This is the battle which in the acknowledging self-consciousness is waged and which eventually in the outcome thereof, in the being bonded of the desire, brings us to the next tread, knowing the general self-consciousness.
In this general self-consciousness as the an und für sich is the self-consciousness really free. The immediate self-consciousness as desire is bonded, this means elevated to the general, such that the für sich self-consciousness now can recognize itself in the immediate self-consciousness. The becoming free of the immediate self-consciousness by elevation has therewith also made the acknowledging self-consciousness really free and thus they have in their distinction and in their being elevated to the general both their place in the an und für sich of the general self-consciousness.59
When now in the above described way the immediate and the acknowledging self-consciousness merge in the generality of the general self-consciousness then can actually not be spoken anymore of a self-consciousness because in precisely self-consciousness the holding fast to the particularity of the self is presupposed. In the elevation of this particularity of that self then is entered into the reason.60 Elevation of the particularity of the self in the reason takes place because herein is seen that the determinations of the essence of the outer objects and the determinations of the own thoughts are the same.61 The outer objects have no real, loose from the reason, existing independence but are, to speak with Adam and Eve, 'flesh of his flesh'.62 Here, in this knowing itself as unending generality of the reason, it is that the spirit makes itself as spirit free.63
The spirit as subject of consideration of the psychology is the an und für sich of the subjective spirit. Already in the an und für sich of the consciousness was a knowing of unity of the general in object and subject reached. This knowing is in first instance however still only a formal knowing an sich. Here the spirit still only is an intelligent knowing (of the unity of generality in subject and object) but knows itself as such not yet.64 The process of this knowing an sich to the knowing an und für sich is the process which is run through in the psychology. The three moments which the spirit here knows regard the theoretical spirit, the practical spirit, and the free spirit.
In the theoretical spirit is the abstract and formal an sich knowing elevated to a concrete and objective knowing. This means that the knowing is elevated to a recognition by taking the intelligent in the object and subjectively and objectively placing it.65 This is a process which takes place through the beholding, the conception and thought.
The beholding lets Hegel consist of the experience, the attention and the eventual beholding. The experience, as also the thereto closely related feelings, were already discussed in chapter 1. This experience, which thus regards an an sich moment within the beholding, was characterized by an immediateness and a (on that tread thus also still immediate) unity of the innerness and outerness of the spirit. Now in the attention is the distinction between this inner and outer set by which the content of the experience can be understood.66 On itself is this setting of the distinction in the attention yet still an undetermined and abstract distinction (for the unity of subject and object still rules), and becomes thus only reality and set determined when the intelligence steps further in this experience and attention.67 The first moment in this determined setting of the distinction regards thus the beholding,68 in which the experiences in space and time are being set.69
The conception as second moment in this process knows itself as three moments the recollection, the imagination and the memory. The recollection regards the internalization of the beholded contents through images,70 which in the subconscious of the intelligence (recognize at the place of these images the an sich moment of the conception) are saved and on unchosen time and place through beholdings are brought up again.71 In the imagination then a turnaround takes place because this [imagination] must be understood as an externalization. Hereby the imagination runs through three treads. On the first tread simply a chosen reproduction of images takes place independent from possible beholdings.72 On the second tread the intelligence elevates the images to general conceptions (universals or predicates).73 Hegel speaks here of the associating imagination because on this tread the images in their generalities can be related to each other.74 The third tread of this externalization regards conclusively the conversion of these generalities first into symbols and subsequently into signs.75 With symbols we must think of those things that on the one side may symbolize a generality, but that on the other side on themselves (thus loose from their symbolical value for what they symbolize) also have already a certain meaning [themselves] which is related to the symbolized general, like for instance in allegories and metaphors. For the sign however goes that it on itself does not have such a meaning. The sign then can be chosen randomly.76 Now the first sign of expression of the innerness regards the sound, which further articulated regards speech.77 This speech in sounds can be further externalized in the letter script,78 which thanks to its close relation with the sound speech has as pure sign Hegel's preference over a hieroglyph script such as the Chinese.79 Now when the spoken word (as externalization) in relation to its inner meaning (the general that has its place in the innerness) is saved as recollection we have to do with the memory.80 It is however not so that when we hear a name for the first time we already immediately make its general meaning our own. Only after repetition do we learn to know the case in the name and the name in the case without help of beholding and image, whereby we then also have gained the power to reproduce it.81 (Here the relation with thought already shows because we have here the words as thoughts before us.)82 However the more we become familiar with the meanings of words the more are these meanings united with our innerness, and the more do the word meanings disappear as für sich paced cases, what thus makes the reproducing of words more meaningless (and spiritless).83
This internalization of the meanings of words, which means: the thus set unity of meanings of words in their outerness and innerness, regards itself still a subjective an sich given. Here we may be thinking, but do we not know ourselves yet as such. Now the process in thought is exactly to come from this being the thinker to the knowing oneself as thinker.84 And this pure knowing oneself as thinking then encompasses the becoming fully free from the outer objects. Hegel describes this process through the intellect, the reason and the pure thought. In the intellectual thought are the generalities from the simple objects abstracted and internalized85 (this regards the understanding), in the reasonable thought are the inner generalities related to the objects or synthesized (the judgement), and eventually in the pure thought is this reasonable thought in its activity itself known and recognized.86 In the objects one finds thus only oneself (as the judge of those objects) and herewith then is a complete freedom in relation to the objects reached.87 With the reaching of this freedom is also at the same time the will set, which is the subject of consideration in the practical spirit.88
Where at the end of the theoretical spirit the will an sich was brought to development there is in the practical spirit this will developed to free will, what corresponds to the elevation of the will to a thinking will.89 This process is worked out through the practical feelings, the tendency and the arbitrariness and the bliss.90 In the practical feelings is the will still an sich and thus not really free. Here the will has still relations to the direct needs which give the subject a pleasant or unpleasant feeling.91 Therein lies also the subjective notion of the must, and of the difference of this must with being consists Hegel's notion of evil.92 That the content of feelings however can also stem from the generality and substantiality of thought is also true (as in morality, virtuousness and religiosity), but this is definitely not always the case.93
Where in the practical feelings the correspondence of the inner felt subjective must and the outer found objective being is still dependent on the outer accidences and where the subject itself therein takes a passive stand, there takes in the tendency and the arbitrariness the subject itself the initiative to bring both to a correspondence on base of the realisation that the objective also lies in the own innerness and by the subject itself must be set.94 That tendency itself must not be confused with the desire. Though the tendency on this tread also has a place in the particular subjective (whereby the spirit here is not yet fully free) is it nevertheless not directed (as the desire) towards immediate simple satisfaction but does it encompass a series of satisfactions which makes it thus something general.95 Here Hegel sees by the way nothing morally evil, because without passion do great things not come to being.96 In the arbitrariness following that are these tendencies then set für sich. Because the will here however still has before itself the immediate tendencies as its direct possibilities of choice (and thus also still has a boundedness to the subjective particularity) is the will here still not fully free. It is the everlasting search for salvation in the satisfaction of the tendencies.97 When the general however in all those particular satisfactions is taken and set as goal, only then does this will become really free. This happens in the bliss.98 Here does the willing in the willing of the particular satisfaction itself become the goal of all the willing. Not the willing of one or the other satisfaction is here the goal, but the willing of the self-determination thereof is here the goal. Here then is the will really free will.99
In the meantime we have reached the tread of the free spirit. The free spirit is as the an und für sich of the spirit (as being subject of consideration of the psychology) the unity of the theoretical and the practical spirit. Here the real free will is reached which has elevated within itself all boundaries of accidences.100 This is the itself thinking, the itself knowing and the itself willing free intelligence, free will, free spirit.101 This freedom is the completion and the complete an und für sich of the subjective spirit, but on itself still only the an sich of the spirit itself. It thus lies in the determination of the spirit to develop this an sich freedom to a freedom an und für sich, and a first step towards that is the für sich setting of this freedom. This für sich setting shall take place in the objective spirit. This objective spirit however is not part anymore of our consideration; for we chose to limit this consideration to a general summarization of the subjective spirit. This choice, so may the appropriate final conclusion sound, is thus the freedom which we have as realized subjective spirit within us and which we are ourselves.